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Abstract
This doctoral thesis investigates contemporary disputes about international 
distributive justice by first outlining a distinctive human rights approach to the 
issues and then assessing alternative views of various kinds. The thesis is 
organized in terms of the dispute between cosmopolitans and communitarians on 
the question of ethics in international political theory.
Part One of the thesis, 'Cosmopolitanism,' outlines and evaluates the most 
significant cosmopolitan theories of international justice. Following an introductory 
chapter in which the debate is introduced in a general way, Chapter Two focuses on 
basic human rights. Chapter Three is on utilitarianism, and Chapter Four 
investigates Onora O'Neill's Kantian approach to international justice. I conclude 
that the human rights approach, conceptualized in a distinctive form, is the most 
promising of these alternatives.
Part Two of the thesis, 'Communitarianism,' investigates various 
"communitarian" challenges to the universalist ambitions of the arguments defended 
in Part One. These challenges are designed to prove that the pretensions of 
cosmopolitans are illusory, incoherent, overridden by some morally more important 
considerations, or otherwise wrong-headed. Constitutive theorists maintain that, 
while there are perhaps good grounds for recognizing the claims of human beings 
qua human beings, cosmopolitans fail to take proper account of the value of what 
we might call certain intra-species collectivities, most importantly, sovereign states 
(Chapter Eight). Relativists hold that justice is subject to community-relative 
standards that make cross-cultural comparisons impossible. Hence, universal 
claims to justice make no sense (Chapter Seven). Defenders of nationality base their 
conclusions on the ethical value of the 'nation,' and sometimes claim that 
distributive justice can be discussed properly only within the context of a given 
national community (Chapter Six). Patriots emphasize devotion to one's country as 
a primary moral virtue, and conclude that such devotion, in practice, amounts to 
legitimate favouritism for compatriots and, therefore, at least potentially, the denial 
of some of the claims of non-compatriots. If such a view requires the denial of the 
full force of human rights claims, then patriotism conflicts with cosmopolitanism 
(Chapter Five).
The argument of Part Two is that, on the whole, the communitarian challenges do 
not succeed. Nevertheless, there are significant lessons to be learned from the 
criticisms in each case. The defence of cosmopolitanism is strengthened by 
exposure to these objections, even though they do not provide any grounds for 
rejecting the basic human rights claims of individuals.
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Chapter One 
Distributive Justice and the International Context
1.1. Distributive Justice: The Concept and Its Scope
This dissertation is concerned with questions of international morality in general 
and the problem of international distributive justice in particular. Before outlining 
and assessing the arguments for and against cross-boundary obligations of justice it 
will be useful to have before us some general account of social or distributive 
justice.
In order to clarify the subject matter of distributive justice, we need to distinguish 
a number of questions. First, What is justice? Here we are looking for some broad 
characterization of the concept of justice — in our case, distributive justice1 — some 
common focus of discussion on the basis of which we may engage in disputes 
about the importance and demands of justice. Good answers to this question will 
take account of the history of debates on the topic and seek some common ground 
which links the whole range of them. My answer to the question, then, is that 
distributive justice has to do with the proper distribution of benefits and burdens 
among persons. A just distribution is one where each person receives what is his or 
her due. Notice that we have yet to say what actually is due each person; that is the 
job of specific, substantive positions on the question of distributive justice. 
Another, somewhat more controversial claim about the concept of distributive 
justice is that whatever is a person's due is equivalent to what that person can claim 
by right. In short, a person has a right to that which is his or her due2. Distributive 
justice concerns the correct assignment of rights to persons. Will Kymlicka offers a 
related analysis of the meaning of "justice" as "the system of entitlements on the 
basis of which people can demand social recognition of their legitimate claims (e.g. 
for resources, freedoms, etc.)."3 Hence a system of justice is a system of 
entitlements that provide the grounds for making claims on others for valued goods. 
If we think of rights as entitlements, then justice is concerned with what rights we 
have. The link between rights and justice is evident in commonsense thinking as 
well. Peter Jones points out that "when we are denied our rights, we typically
1 As distinct from retributive justice, whose concern is the proper assignment of specific sorts of 
burdens, namely punishments.
2 See, for example, Alan Gewirth, 'Economic Justice: Concepts and Criteria', in Kenneth Kipnis 
and Diana T. Meyers (eds.), Economic Justice: Private Rights and Public Responsibilities 
(Rowman and Allenheld: Totowa, N.J., 1985), 10. Readers who deny the existence of rights can 
ignore this last claim, but only for now. I argue for a particular conceptualization of rights as the 
proper requirements of justice in Chapter Two.
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respond with indignation or outrage, rather than with mere disappointment; we 
conceive ourselves as the victims of an injustice rather than as mere unfortunates 
who have been denied the milk of human kindness."4
This distribution of benefits (the basic goods valued by persons) and burdens (the 
costs they seek to minimize) becomes an object of concern only under certain 
conditions. These conditions, usefully labelled the 'circumstances of justice', are 
those features which must be present for there to be a problem of justice in the first 
place. The circumstances of justice include a certain type of scarcity and the 
consequent conflict between persons arising from that scarcity. Moderate self- 
interest of persons is also a requirement; however, the emphasis should be on the 
word "moderate," for the persons who require principles of distributive justice to 
adjudicate their dispute not only want what is best for themselves; they also aim for 
a principled arrangement which they can defend to one another.5 When valued 
resources are scarce, there is a need for some adjudication between conflicting 
claims to those resources. Accordingly, principles of distributive justice serve to 
generate just distributions of valued resources and disvalued costs, given that 
desired goods are neither superabundant nor exceedingly rare.
Now that we have some idea of what principles of distributive justice are meant to 
do, we can ask the second important question: What does justice require? This 
question has been the central preoccupation of some prominent political 
philosophers in recent years (Rawls, Barry, Dworkin, Cohen, Ameson, Sen, and 
others). It remains the subject of significant controversies about the proper 
understanding of equality in a theory of distributive justice (e.g. equality of welfare, 
of resources, of opportunity for welfare, etc.) and about the proper role in theories 
of justice of luck and chance on the one hand, and choice and responsibility on the 
other. Proper examination of these issues would take up an entire volume or more, 
so despite its importance I will not argue in any detail for one or other answer 
directly. My concern is not with inequality as such but with the specific problem of 
poverty, which is the most pressing problem for theorists of the international 
sphere. The distinctiveness of this dissertation lies not here but in its investigation 
of the third main problem of justice, to which we now turn.
3 Will Kymlicka, Liberalism. Community, and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 234.
4 Peter Jones, Rights (London: Macmillan, 1995), 50. G.A. Cohen makes a stronger claim: "The 
language of moral rights is the language of justice, and whoever takes justice seriously must 
accept that there exist moral rights." G.A. Cohen, 'Freedom, Justice, and Capitalism1, in History. 
Labour, and Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 297.
5 Cf. Brian Barry, Theories of Justice (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1989), 361.
Thirdly, and closely related to the second question above, we need to ask, To 
whom is justice owed? 6 To answer this question we need to distinguish different 
possible types of person as potential subjects of justice and then ask whether each is 
a plausible candidate for inclusion in the scope of distributive justice. A taxonomy 
of answers to this question should begin by distinguishing what Allen Buchanan 
calls justice as self-interested reciprocity (JSIR, for short) from what he labels 
subject-centered justice (SCJ).7 Is justice owed only to those who are (actual or 
potential) participators in a mutually beneficial cooperative scheme, as JSIR 
maintains? Or, as SCJ says, is consideration also due to cooperators and 
noncooperators alike in virtue of some (set of) characteristics such as capacity for 
rational agency or capacity to suffer and to experience happiness? Able-bodied 
contributors to cooperative schemes constitute one kind of subject, handicapped 
non-contributors another. Who is captured in the scope of justice? The answer to 
these questions will not, we should note, require the acceptance of a duty to 
recognize only the rights of compatriots (members of one's state), since JSIR may 
include some non-compatriots and exclude some compatriots, for mutually 
beneficial cooperation is possible with foreigners while some compatriots lack the 
capacity to contribute to cooperative schemes. Subject-centred justice, on the other 
hand, will certainly consider it necessary take note of the needs and interests of 
persons regardless of their state affiliation: at least prima facie, SCJ promises to 
include all those who qualify as persons according to the criteria in question (e.g., 
capacity to experience pleasure and pain or capacity for rational agency). The 
prominent approaches here are therefore destined to require a rethinking of the 
problems of international distributive justice. This should be evident in any case, 
since we should at some stage explicitly consider the moral status of persons of 
varying geographical and institutional distance from us: Is justice owed only to 
compatriots, or are foreigners entitled to the same rights as fellow countrymen?
A fourth question represents the flip-side of the third question. If we need to 
know to whom justice is owed, we equally require an idea of who owes justice to 
whomever it is justice is owed. That is, we not only want an account of right-
6 For a clear statement of the importance of this question, see Allen Buchanan, 'The Morality of 
Inclusion', in Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul (eds.), Liberalism and the 
Economic Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 233-57, especially 235ff. See 
also, Stanley Hoffman, Duties Beyond Borders: On the Limits and Possibilities of Ethical 
International Politics (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981), 150ff.
7 Allen Buchanan, 'The Morality of Inclusion', and Allen Buchanan, 'Justice as Reciprocity versus 
Subject-Centered Justice', Philosophy and Public Affairs, volume 19, no. 3, 1990, 227-53. 
Buchanan's distinction is related to Brian Barry's earlier distinction between types of contractarian 
justice, "justice as mutual advantage" and "justice as impartiality." See Brian Barry, Theories of 
Justice (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1989) and Justice as Impartiality (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1995).
bearers, we also want to know how to assign the duties to which those rights give 
rise.8 The two-pronged fourth question, then, is: To whom should the duties o f  
justice be assigned, and how much o f the burdens o f justice should each individual 
or collectivity bear?9 The problem of distributive justice is double-sided in the sense 
that we require the determination of both to whom duties are owed and exactly who 
should bear those duties (and how much of a burden each duty-bearer should bear).
Answers to these four (or five) questions — about the nature, requirements and 
scope of distributive justice — are the minimal requirements of an acceptable theory 
of distributive justice. Moreover, any such theory, as we have seen, requires us to 
take a position of some sort on the question of international distributive justice, for, 
in answering the third question, the proper response to the needs and desires of 
members of other states is addressed, while the fourth question implicitly asks after 
the obligations of persons toward distant others.
But why should an answer to the scope question, the question about who 
possesses rights, be so urgent or controversial? Isn't it obvious that every person is 
a claimant to the valued resources of his or her society, and that states should 
recognize the (prima facie) equal claims of all their citizens when making 
distributive decisions? The short answer to this last question is simply, No. This is 
not because all citizens do not have equal rights (they do); it is because this answer 
fails to consider the claims of non-citizens, claims that might turn out to be just as 
strong as those of citizens. The reason the "equal claims of citizens" view is not 
obvious, despite its popularity, is that it makes a questionable assumption about the 
institutional context in which claims to justice should be considered. To explain 
what I mean here, I now consider a fifth question: What are the institutions whose 
moral character theories o f distributive justice should assess? Answering this 
question will make it clear that any theory whose focus is limited to the confines of 
the nation-state is thereby fundamentally misguided. The fact that most theories to 
date have been only implicitly limited in this way does not excuse them, but it may 
help to explain why there has not been any widespread questioning of the domestic 
assumptions at some earlier time.
Like John Rawls, I take justice to apply to the "basic structure," the main social, 
legal, political and economic institutions which have such a dominant impact on the 
life prospects of individuals.10 Principles of distributive or social justice provide the 
theoretical underpinning and normative justification for a given set of institutions.
8 See Chapter Two for more on this theme.
9 Cf. Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence. Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), 112.
10 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 7. The 
conclusions of Rawls's account of distributive justice are contained in what he calls "the two
This institutional focus is justified, I think, again in agreement with Rawls, by the 
fact that the way rights are distributed by way of governmental and economic 
arrangements largely determines persons' chances to secure for themselves the 
means to pursue a meaningful life. Unlike Rawls, however, I see no reason to 
restrict our moral focus to the basic structure of any particular nation-state; on the 
contrary, if one's concern is with the justifiability of the institutions which 
determine persons' life chances, there are compelling grounds for taking a wider 
view. The reason should be clear: the institutions and quasi-formal arrangements 
affecting persons' life prospects throughout the world are increasingly international 
ones — international financial institutions, transnational corporations, the G7, the 
GATT — and the restricted Rawlsian view fails to assess the moral character of 
those institutions.11 So the object of our inquiry ought to be what we may call the 
international basic structure, the major institutions in the world as a whole which 
affect persons and their access to desired goods and resources. The international 
basic structure includes intra-state, inter-state and non-state institutions.
According to David Miller, conceptual historians "focus on the way in which the 
agents in question [i.e., political actors in a given historical period] sought to alter 
the map [of political concepts] in the light of their argumentative needs. ... 
Conceptual history then becomes the study of the (deliberate or accidental) 
redrawing of conceptual boundaries by actors seeking to articulate novel political 
standpoints."12 We can see the present suggestion in these terms, that is, as part of 
a recent movement — at least since the publication of Charles Beitz's Political 
Theory and International Relations13 — to redraw the boundaries of the concept of 
distributive justice. The aspect of the problem that needs questioning is the 
assumption, in traditional discussions of that concept (including Rawls's) that 
distributive justice properly applies only to compatriots.14 Redrawing conceptual 
boundaries here means extending the scope of the concept's application, though it 
seems that much of the rest of what is now meant by 'distributive justice' is left 
unaltered. It might turn out that the same reasons supporting redistribution in the 
domestic case also support an extension of the scope of distributive justice to 
foreigners. For example, if the requirement to satisfy basic needs goes some way
principles of justice for institutions." Ibid.. 302.
11 By referring to the "Rawlsian view" here I do not mean to exclude from blame most of the other 
theorists who have written about distributive justice in recent years. On the other side, Beitz, 
Barry, Richards, O'Neill, Shue, Singer and Elfstrom are some of the philosophers who have had 
the good sense to go against this particular Rawlsian grain, although none of their views is 
without its own problems. The arguments of some of these writers are scrutinized in Part I.
12 David Miller, 'The Resurgence of Political Theory1, Political Studies, 1990, 426.
13 Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.
14 Cf. Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), 
Chapter 6, 'The Hidden Agenda: National Values and Liberal Beliefs'.
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toward justifying redistribution of domestic wealth, then recognizing that distant 
peoples share those needs will help to ground a case for global redistribution.
1.2. How to Argue for Principles of International
Distributive Justice
I will now outline and defend the main presuppositions of any argument for a set 
of principles of distributive justice, with specific reference to the international 
sphere. In short, I maintain that the following must be shown:
(1) the distribution of valued resources is subject to human control,
(2) those resources are indeed relatively scarce, and
(3) (at least in the present political context) nation-state boundaries either are or 
are not relevant for the purpose of determining justice-based obligations.
The first claim to defend, then, is that actions aimed at affecting the distribution of 
basic goods (or rights to valued resources) are indeed possible. Any reasonable 
discussion of the grounds for redistribution obviously presupposes that 
distributional arrangements can be changed if they are found to be unjust. Defence 
of this claim requires a refutation of what we might call the incapacity objection. 
This objection is especially prominent in the history of attempts to deny the 
relevance of international justice. It runs as follows: questions about the justice of 
global resource distribution are beside the point because action designed to affect 
such distribution is not possible. We lack the formal and informal global links 
necessary to control distribution across international borders. Talk of international 
distributive justice, then, is simply utopian, for 'ought' implies 'can' and in current 
circumstances we cannot, so it is pointless to say that we ought.15 The condition of 
the world's poor may be regrettable, but it is a mistake to say that it is an injustice, 
for that presupposes the efficacy of a global institutional framework for providing a 
remedy.
There was a time when this objection did have some weight. Throughout most of 
human history there were neither extensive transport links nor local surpluses of 
valued resources, and, therefore, it would be pointless to assert that justice 
demanded the redistribution of resources from one side of the globe to the other. 
But on the verge of the twenty-first century the incapacity claim only needs to be 
stated in order for its falsity to be exposed. We now have the technological capacity 
to affect the earth's wealth distribution, so it is perfectly in order to ask about the
15 See Onora O'Neill, 'International Justice: Distribution', in Lawrence C. Becker and Charlotte 
Becker (eds.), Encyclopedia of Ethics (London: Garland, 1992), 624, and Onora O'Neill, Faces of 
Hunger: An Essay on Poverty. Justice and Development (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), Chapter 
2, for comments on this objection.
moral character of that distribution. Arguing for international justice therefore starts 
from a recognition of the ability of human actions, individual and institutional, to 
alter the distribution of rights to valued resources.
A related objection to the project of questioning the justice of resource distribution 
asserts that the inequalities in life prospects, wealth and resources between persons, 
and between rich and poor countries, are natural inequalities. The falsity of this 
assertion is presupposed in what follows, and for the following reason. The 
chronic hunger that hundreds of millions of human beings now experience is not a 
fact of nature; high death rates are not inevitable, even when terrain and climate are 
harsh. The key factor in explaining why Africans die in large numbers while 
Californians (i.e., desert dwellers) or Minnesotans (i.e., those who have to live 
through harsh winters) do not is the robustness of economic and social structures. 
Consequently, hunger and famine in distant countries should be remediable by 
strengthening the economic and social institutions capable of offsetting the dangers 
presented by natural processes.16 So the world's badly-off peoples do not face 
inevitable comparative deprivation; on the contrary, the appeal to so-called natural 
inequalities should be seen for what it is, namely, an attempt to avoid seeking 
solutions to a state of affairs whose existence is undeniable. Moreover, since I 
consider it to be clear that the present predicament is in part the product of the 
workings of social structures created by human beings, and since we and our 
forbears got us here, we and our descendants may be able to bring about change for 
the better if such change is both feasible and desirable.
I should note at this point, however, that the creation of a state of affairs by 
human (individual and institutional) actions is not a necessary condition for that 
state of affairs being properly considered the concern of justice. I disagree with 
those who claim that a distribution of valued resources is neither just nor unjust 
unless it was brought about by deliberate human actions. For if that were true, 
desperate poverty resulting from bad luck — for instance, having been bom into a 
poor family in a Third World country — could not be unjust. It isrii that the causal 
history of a state of affairs is irrelevant to its susceptibility to justice; rather, it is that 
causal background is only one of a number of criteria for determining when justice 
applies. Other criteria include the urgency of the condition of the individuals 
involved and the cost to others of rendering the required assistance to the 
deprived.17 Social causation is obviously relevant to determining duties, since those
16 Onora O'Neill, 'Hunger, Needs and Rights', in Steven Luper-Foy (ed.), Problems of 
International Justice (London: Westview, 1988), 67-68.
17 These points about the diverse criteria forjudging whether duties of justice exist, and the 
suggestion of these criteria, are made by Bruce Landesman, 'Justice: Cosmic or Communal?', in K. 
Kipnis and D. Meyers (eds.), Economic Justice: Private Rights and Public Responsibilities , 123.
who were instrumental in bringing about an unjust state of affairs have a special 
responsibility to ensure that the injustice is eradicated or compensated. But in the 
absence of action by the primary duty-bearers, others are not simply excused from 
providing the necessary assistance. Where we can do something about poverty and 
suffering without excessive cost to ourselves, then we should do so, whether or not 
we directly caused the suffering in the first place. To the extent that much of the 
world's poverty can be attributed to international arrangements for which we are 
responsible, however, our obligations to alleviate suffering can only be 
strengthened.
The second move in an argument about international distributive justice is to show 
that the valued resources in question are properly thought to be scarce, in the sense 
that for whatever reason there will be a conflict about the preferred distribution of 
those resources. It may turn out that the most satisfactory resolution of such 
conflicts will take account of the reason for the scarcity's existence. For instance, 
natural resources such as oil and land are scarce because there is only a finite 
amount of them on the earth, but a right to a share of income — a different sort of 
resource or, rather, a claim on resources — is scarce not because some fact about the 
natural world makes it so, but because every person makes a similar claim to a 
share of income: in the first case it is a natural fact (combined with the assertion of 
limited altruism) that leads to a problem of distributive justice while in the second 
case interpersonal conflicts, and hence problems of justice, stem from facts about 
the finitude of rights-distribution (along with the limited altruism claim). It is 
possible to assign more extensive rights to income, or rights to a larger share of 
income, to one person or to a minority group of people. But by doing so the rights 
of everyone else are restricted, since one person's claim to x  requires not only that 
others lack that claim but that they have correlative duties to do or forbear in various 
ways. Rights to a share of income will be contested by persons with an interest in 
having secure claims to the means to satisfy their needs and wants; in other words, 
every person will need to reach some agreement with all the others about the 
distribution of these rights. My tentative claim is that the reason for the existence of 
interpersonal disputes over valued resources — whether natural (as in the case of 
land) or otherwise (as in the case of rights to income) — will lead us to alternative 
grounds for resolving the problems of distributive justice arising in each case.
The next move in an argument for distributive justice is to assess the arguments 
for and against assigning special ethical status to nation-state borders. The special 
nature of this move calls for extended comment, to which we turn in the next 
section.
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1.3. The International Context
Inequalities within countries are vast and ever-increasing, despite our ability to 
prevent them. Wealthy individuals separate themselves from the growing mass of 
domestic poor just as the wealthy nations deny the existence of any obligations 
beyond the most minimal charity toward the poor countries. The problems of 
distributive justice within societies such as Great Britain, Canada, and the United 
States are difficult and controversial, to the extent that one commentator has 
suggested that "the task is daunting enough, without the further complexities of 
international relations."18 But an examination of this area of political morality must 
focus on the most pressing issues, and international inequality is first on this list. 
The 1992 report of the UN Human Development Program notes that the richest 
billion people on the earth control 83 percent of the world's wealth, while the 
poorest billion are left with 1.4 percent. Since 1960 this gulf has doubled.19 
Principles of distributive justice ought to tell us the extent to which such inequalities 
may be justified from an ethical point of view.
But are cross-border inequalities ever properly considered unjust? It is the task of 
this entire thesis to answer this question, but here I will address briefly the claim 
that inequalities can be unjust only when the societies in question form a true social, 
political or economic community. Ism/it the case that justice is only possible where 
there is some communally accepted system by reference to which claims of justice 
can be adjudicated? I a  certain degree of interdependence between persons a 
prerequisite of justice? In short, I think we should answer 'No' to both questions. 
If individuals or groups in a distant country, with whom other countries have little 
or no contact, suffer violations of what we would call their rights to free speech and 
assembly and their rights to protection from violent attack, is the lack of cultural and 
economic cohesion with that country good grounds for others to deny obligations to 
assist? If we take the criteria of urgency and cost to be relevant to determining 
duties of justice, a case can be made for recognizing the need to respond to 
violations of rights in distant countries.20
18 James S. Fishkin, The Dialogue of Justice: Toward a Self-Reflective Society (London: Yale 
University Press, 1992), 6.
19 These figures are cited by Noam Chomsky in Year 501: The Conquest Continues (London: 
Verso, 1993), 62. He notes that this doubling is attributed in that report in part to policies of the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and to the protectionist policies of OECD 
governments during the 1980s.
20 In Part Two of this thesis, I respond to the objection that this ignores the rights of sovereign 
states.
Consider the case of the people of East Timor, a people which has suffered from 
brutal violations of their basic rights to life at least since the Indonesian invasion of 
their country in 1975. What should be the response of the citizens of a foreign 
nation with few or no economic ties to the region and with a significantly different 
culture? Again, I think the urgency of the claims of the East Timorese makes it 
plausible to recognize that duties of justice toward foreign and culturally different 
countries is indeed possible. Much more argument would be needed in order to 
show precisely what action is required by that recognition, but the 
unreasonableness of denying the human rights of foreigners is evident. I address 
the issue of the supposed communal background to justice in Part Two, where the 
arguments of David Miller and Michael Walzer are assessed, but for now I want to 
maintain simply that the presence of distinct cultures and the absence of extensive 
contacts between countries does not make it impossible for obligations of justice to 
exist. On the contrary, to say that there is only a duty of charity to provide some aid 
to the Timorese seems, on the face of it, deeply implausible.
This last point introduces another important issue, namely, the requirements of 
humanitarianism in international affairs. The main claim I want to make here 
concerns the relation of humanitarian assistance to demands of distributive justice. 
What ought to be given in humanitarian aid to others can be determined only after 
an assessment has been made concerning what is owed as a requirement of justice. 
This is because, without that prior assessment, individuals or states could give 
"generously," thinking they were acting charitably, when their giving actually 
constitutes merely what justice already demands.21 In such cases what is required is 
taken for what is optional or supererogatory; hence disorganized thinking leads to 
the misidentification of fundamental moral categories and correspondingly skewed 
assessments of what ought to be done, both individually and institutionally.
There are a number of central themes in debates about global justice which get 
played out in the varying contexts of the different approaches to the issues. For 
instance, there is a general problem identified by the following question: Can 
abstract principles apply cross-culturally? In discussions of human rights, a specific 
instance of that general question is, Are human rights universal?22 Again, there is 
the general problem o f agency, of which individuals or collectivities should be 
assigned the responsibilities to provide which benefits to whom. In the human 
rights debate, the questions become, Who are rights-holders? and, Who are duty-
21 Cf. Henry Shue, 'Morality, Politics, and Humanitarian Assistance', in Bruce Nichols and Gil 
Loescher (eds.), The Moral Nation: Humanitarianism and U.S. Foreign Policy Today (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), 14-16 and 22-23.
22 See, for instance, James Nickel's Making Sense of Human Rights , chapter 4. Also, Noam 
Chomsky, 'The US and Human Rights', Lies of Our Times, 1993. And see my discussion of
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bearers? In the course of the following chapters, we will examine many of these 
general questions while assessing the specific solutions proposed by alternative 
moral theories.
The main aim of Part One of this thesis is to gain an understanding of the 
implications for global distributive justice of the dominant contending theories 
currently attracting attention in Anglo-American political philosophy. The main 
contenders are: rights-based theories, consequentialism (especially one variant, 
utilitarianism), and duty-based theories (especially the neo-Kantian approach 
developed by Onora O'Neill). Each of these theoretical perspectives can be 
characterized as cosmopolitan.
The international distributive justice debate is part of the wider discourse of 
"normative international relations theory," whose main concern is to address "the 
moral dimension of international relations .... "23 The larger picture within which 
this debate takes place is crucially important to the content of that debate itself, for 
no answer to the question of the requirements of international justice can be 
regarded as satisfactory if it fails to address the objections of defenders of state 
sovereignty, nationality, patriotism or relativism, to name only the most prominent 
attempts at restricting the scope of justice. Accordingly, the second half of this 
thesis (consisting of Chapters Five through Eight) is devoted to a consideration of 
these general communitarian challenges to the very idea of international justice — 
although none of the challengers denies the relevance of justice as it applies to more 
limited spheres. The question of the ethical status of nation-state borders is the most 
basic problem facing the theorist of international distributive justice.
The best way to approach this question is to look at examples of the main 
background ethical perspectives. Following recent tradition, I distinguish two 
general approaches to the subject-matter, cosmopolitanism and 
communitarianism.24 As I have said, my account, in chapters Two through Four, 
assesses the merits of three species of cosmopolitanism: human rights theories, 
utilitarianism and Onora O’Neill’s neo-Kantianism. I will then, in chapters Five 
through Eight, evaluate four communitarian accounts of international ethics: 
patriotism, nationalism, Michael Walzer’s relativism and neo-Hegelian constitutive
relativism and justice in Chapter Seven.
23 Chris Brown, International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches (Hemel Hempstead: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), 3.
24 The cosmopolitan/communitarian distinction provides the organizing framework for two recent 
books on international political theory: Chris Brown, International Relations Theory: New 
Normative Approaches , and Janna Thompson, Justice and World Order: A Philosophical Inquiry 
(London: Routledge, 1992). See also Part II, ‘Cosmopolitan and communitarian perspectives’, in 
Chris Brown (ed.), Political Restructuring in Europe: Ethical perspectives (London: Routledge, 
1994).
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theory. First, I should provide a brief outline of the two general theoretical 
perspectives.
Cosmopolitanism is a moral perspective with several basic components. The 
cosmopolitan standpoint is impartial, universal, individualist, and egalitarian.25 The 
fundamental idea is that each person affected by an institutional arrangement should 
be given equal consideration. Individuals are the basic units of moral concern, and 
the interests of individuals should be taken into account by the adoption of an 
impartial standpoint for evaluation. Cosmopolitanism as a moral perspective is 
closely akin to liberalism. John Gray characterizes liberalism as individualist, 
egalitarian, universalist, and meliorist, where meliorism signifies the “affirmation of 
the corrigibility and improvability of all social institutions and political 
arrangements.”26 Accordingly, we might understand cosmopolitanism as the ethical 
standpoint underlying modem liberal political theory, though to some extent even 
contemporary anti-liberals exemplify some or all of the central aspects of 
cosmopolitanism, at least when they are considering problems of domestic 
politics.27
The term ‘communitarianism’ is associated in contemporary political philosophy 
with certain kinds of criticism of liberalism. Communitarians object to the liberal’s 
supposed commitment to an “unencumbered self,”28 or to the alleged liberal 
misunderstanding of the relationship between the individual and the community, or 
to the liberal lack of attention to the communal origins of principles of justice.29 As I 
will use the word, ‘communitarianism’ refers to the view that the source of ethical 
value is the community (where ‘community’ itself can be given various 
interpretations). This distinguishes communitarians from cosmopolitans, since the 
latter see individuals as the origin of moral worth. Communitarians, in my sense, 
do not necessarily question the importance of intra-communal justice: they accept
25 See Charles Beitz, 'Cosmopolitan liberalism and the states system1, in Chris Brown (ed.), 
Political Restructuring in Europe: Ethical Perspectives (London: Routledge, 1994), 123-36, at 
123-27, for related suggestions.
26 John Gray, Liberalism (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1986), x. Roger J. Sullivan, 
An Introduction to Kant's Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 9, notes that 
these four features provide a useful way to organize the political theory of Immanuel Kant.
22 A recent attempt to work out the fundamental ideas of the cosmopolitan ethical perspective can 
be found in Brian Barry, Theories of Justice (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1989), and 
Justice as Impartiality (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995). Barry’s statement of ‘justice as impartiality’ 
“entails that people should not look at things from their own point of view alone but seek to find 
a basis of agreement that is acceptable from all points of view. The general approach ... calls on 
people to detach themselves from their own contingently given positions and take up a more 
impartial standpoint....” Theories of Justice , 7-8.
28 Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1982).
29 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1983).
that the good society is one whose institutions are consistent with a set of principles 
of distributive justice. But when considering the issue of international justice, 
communitarians deny that the arguments for ‘justice at home’ apply equally to those 
elsewhere. The communities where justice primarily applies are usually thought to 
be nation-states, though some thinkers prioritize the nation itself, as distinct from 
the state. In Part Two of this work, we shall look at different versions of these 
communitarian attempts to limit the scope of arguments about justice.
But why look at these opposing perspectives in the global justice debate? Why not 
simply focus on what I take to be the correct view and develop that view in more 
detail? I think there are three good reasons for considering the main competing 
theories. First, in the interests of achieving a broad scope (though I do not pretend 
to offer a complete survey), it is desirable to assess the merits and demerits of 
prominent viewpoints; this will enable us to pick out important claims we might 
otherwise have overlooked. Secondly, our choice of moral theory has a direct 
bearing on the features of particular problems that arise. Moral theory does not 
simply get applied to various pre-existing problems; rather, different theories throw 
into relief different features of an issue, highlighting those features often at the 
expense of obscuring others. Concentrating on only one theoretical approach, 
therefore, may blind us to other morally relevant features of a specific disputed 
problem. For example, utilitarians can highlight the fact that the present 
international economic system fails to maximize benefit, but they might have 
difficulty addressing the problem of agency. (These claims are discussed in Chapter 
Three.) The third reason for investigating other theories is obvious, but no less 
important: it is vital that we establish which is the best approach and for what 
reasons.
The general conclusions reached in these pages about the requirements of 
distributive justice world-wide can seem both too radical and too conservative, 
depending on one's favoured approach to these issues. On the one hand, it can 
appear quite revolutionary to maintain that every human being has a right to have 
her or his vital interests met, regardless of nationality or citizenship, and that the 
failure on the part of our institutional frameworks to protect those interests 
constitutes a moral catastrophe. On the other hand, some readers might think that 
we owe it to one another as human beings to ensure not only that rights to the 
protection of basic interests are acknowledged, but also that more substantial 
commitments be made -- perhaps, that we recognize human rights to a more 
extensive list of 'goods' than the one I offer here.
I answer the objection that accepting human rights to the protection of vital 
interests is too radical a proposal by arguing for the undeniable moral importance of 
those interests and by showing that it is neither impossible nor too demanding to
allocate the duties correlative to those rights. To those who make the second 
objection, and so see my project as lacking in ambition, I make only two points 
here. First, I should note that I am sympathetic to an expansion of the commitments 
of those in the wealthy nations toward those persons who at present suffer from 
endemic poverty, lack of adequate food and water, complete exclusion from 
decision-making about questions that directly affect their interests, and the like. But 
in the interests of practical relevance, I believe that we must start with the least 
controversial case, namely, the case for human rights to subsistence, liberty, and 
physical security. Nothing in my argument precludes others from making a case for 
more extensive obligations. Secondly, the difficulty of offering a convincing 
argument for cosmopolitanism with respect to distributive justice should not be 
underestimated. I defend human rights against those who deny their very existence, 
but that is not all that such a defence requires. It is also necessary to engage in the 
task undertaken in Part Two of this thesis: to defend the view that persons have 
similar obligations of justice to all other persons, regardless of national or other 
community-based duties they might also have, and that the requirements of patriotic 
loyalty do not rule out the recognition that compatriots and foreigners alike are 
human beings with equal rights to the protection of their vital interests. The chapters 
in Part Two address what I take to be the most important types of "limitation 
arguments," that is, arguments whose purpose is to place limits on the universalist 
pretensions of the case made in Part One, either by restricting the scope of justice to 
co-nationals or co-citizens, or by denying that that there can be an account of justice 
that encompasses anything larger than a more or less rigidly circumscribed 
community.
As we noted earlier, communitarian criticisms of cosmopolitan justice maintain 
that justice is best reserved for domestic debate, and that nation-states are 
communities in some sense relevant to distributive justice, while the world itself is 
not a community in this sense. I introduce the most interesting versions of 
communitarian justice in Part Two, but I should note here my sympathy for the idea 
that nation-states are not homogeneous entities, nor are they arenas for cozy 
cooperation between large groups of people committed to some ideal of "national 
advancement." The reality is different. When considering the question of 
international distributive justice, we do well to keep in mind the fact that nation­
states are themselves the focus of conflicts between rich and poor, and that fellow 
members of the wealthy classes in the world -- as well as fellow members of the 
world's hungry population — might have common interests of greater importance 
than the interests that bind compatriots or co-nationals to one another. Sentiments of 
loyalty can ran along lines that separate compatriots from one another and underpin 
bonds toward others with whom some set of important interests are shared.
No one would deny that the present international political and economic system is 
not perfect. Starting from this agreement, I will ask specifically how the 
international order stands up to justice-based criticism. In other words, my aim is to 
determine both what is wrong and what can be done to improve matters, at least 
with respect to the justice of current arrangements. We need to ask the following 
questions: What reasons are there for the extremes of wealth and poverty that exist 
in the world? Are such inequalities unavoidable? If not, why might they be 
considered desirable? The thesis itself is an examination of arguments for and 
against the radical inequalities of the international political and economic system by 
way of an assessment of arguments for and against the assignment of duties of 
justice toward compatriots and foreigners.
Chris Brown has said that "in the last resort the extent to which communitarian as 
opposed to cosmopolitan thought is convincing seems to depend more on the 'gut' 
feelings of individual authors than on the processes of reasoned argument."30 
While there might be no way to disprove this claim conclusively, this dissertation 
aims to limit the extent to which gut feelings will decide the large questions of 
international ethics. My hope is that this work will go some way towards 
demonstrating that close attention to specific arguments is a fruitful way of 
achieving progress in international political theory.
30 Chris Brown, International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches , 75.
Part One
Cosmopolitanism
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Chapter Two 
Basic Human Rights: The Moral Minimum
'[T]here is one right which ... I am confident [man] neither does nor can possess 
— a right to subsistence."-- Thomas Malthus1
"The central and most obdurate problem in any theory that would appeal to human 
rights, or indeed to any moral rights whatsoever, is to establish the existence of 
such rights by specifying their grounds."2
Cosmopolitan justice can take a number of forms, the most important and 
promising of which are rights-based, obligation-based and utilitarian. We will look 
at the latter two approaches in Chapters Three and Four, but first we should 
investigate what is perhaps the most popular form of cosmopolitanism in non- 
academic discourse, the rights approach. Rights-based theories require social, 
political, and economic arrangements to be consistent with the recognition of a set 
of rights held by persons. A central feature of rights is their functioning in 
arguments concerning such arrangements as reasons of sufficient strength to effect 
a general shift of the burden of proof on to those who would ignore or override 
them.3 Hence any violation of a right will need to be accompanied by a justification 
which appeals to relatively powerful moral reasons, if not other rights. The 
popularity of rights-talk and the moral force of appeals to rights are undeniable, but 
that popularity is not necessarily coincident with the meaningfulness or 
argumentative power of such talk, nor is that moral force beyond question. So at 
least four important tasks are suggested: we need to determine, first, whether and to 
what extent the rights approach to global distributive justice is intelligible; secondly, 
what the substantive content of a defensible account of rights should be; thirdly, 
how particular rights-claims are justified, and the cogency of such justifications; 
and finally, what the main problems are with the project of conceiving global 
distributive justice in terms of rights. I propose to make a start on these questions in 
this chapter by offering a defence of basic human rights which is plausible as well 
as useful in making sense of the most important rights claims likely to be made by,
1 Thomas Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population (New York: Dutton, 1914), 190-91. 
Cited by Philippe van Parijs, 'Competing Justifications of Basic Income', in Philippe van Parijs 
(ed.), Arguing for Basic Income (London: Verso, 1992), 31.
2-Carl Wellman, Review of Henry Shue, Basic Rights , in Human Rights Quarterly 3, 1981, 144.
3 This is true even if rights are not always capable of "trumping" competing moral considerations. 
On 'rights as trumps', see Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977), 
xi, 90-94 and 364-68; Ronald Dworkin, 'Rights as Trumps', in Jeremy Waldron ted.) Theories of 
Rights (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1984), and Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1985), 335-72.
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or on behalf of, actors in global politics. My focus is on the right to subsistence, 
but rights to physical security and liberty also may be justified by using the 
framework provided here (although I do not provide any such justifications). The 
cosmopolitan character of the human rights approach should be obvious, for "the 
whole thrust of human rights theories is that the boundaries of nations are not the 
boundaries of moral concern."4 Judging the reasonableness of such theories is 
therefore an important element in the assessment of cosmopolitanism.
2.1, Conceptual Preliminaries
Defending the intelligibility of rights discourse requires the presentation of a 
compelling analysis of the concept of a right.5 The brief analysis presented here is 
designed to pick out only the salient elements of the concept of a right in order to 
assess the prospects for a rights-based theory of global justice. My concern in this 
chapter is with minimum moral requirements, with the grounds for, and duties 
attaching to, the basic rights of human beings.6 Basic rights will be claim-rights, 
that is, if a person has a basic right to something — to perform a type of action or to 
gain access to an object of a certain kind — then there is a claim on some other or 
others to ensure that the content of the right is obtained by the right-holder.7 But 
this is getting ahead of ourselves. We must first ask the following question: What 
are the elements of the concept of a right?
There are four central elements of the concept of a (claim-)right: whenever a right 
exists there will be a specification of a right-holder, an addressee, a right-content, 
and a statement (implicit or explicit) of the right's normative strength. First, there is 
the right-holder, the possessor of the right; the right-holders of most interest to us 
here are individual human beings. Secondly, there is the addressee of the right, or 
the right-regarder. In cases where rights give rise to duties — i.e., the sorts of cases 
we will be discussing — the addressee is the duty-bearer, the agent or agency 
assigned the duties generated by the right. Thirdly, there is the content of the right, 
that which the right is a right to. We will be interested in one content in particular: 
subsistence, or the means to a minimally adequate standard of living. And fourthly,
4 Raymond Plant, Modem Political Thought (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 290.
5 See L.W. Sumner, The Moral Foundation of Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).
6 This is the project embarked upon by Henry Shue in Basic Rights: Subsistence. Affluence, and 
U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980).
7 See Joel Feinberg, Social Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), 58. And 
see the discussions in Lawrence C. Becker, Property Rights: Philosophic Foundations (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), 11, and James W. Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights: 
Philosophical Reflections on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (London: University of 
California Press, 1987), 23.
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there is a statement of the normative strength of the right-claim, that is, its capacity 
to override "competing considerations."8
There are several types of relationship that might exist between right-holders and 
addressees. I follow Wesley N. Hohfeld's treatment, but I will forego prolonged 
discussion of the details and focus on only one of those relations, that which holds 
when a claim-right gives rise to a duty.9 "To have a claim-right is to be owed a duty 
by another or others."10 If rights are taken to be morally prior to duties, the 
existence of a right generates or gives rise to a duty or set of duties, and the 
question 'Why do these duties exist?', is answered by referring to the existence of 
the right. Duty-bearers are required to ensure that the right-holders are protected in 
their possession of the content of the right. In different circumstances there will be 
considerable variation in the duties attaching to different agents and agencies and in 
the actions and omissions required of duty-bearers.
The normative strength of a right claim is always quite strong relative to other 
moral reasons, but it need not be absolute (i.e., it need not be necessarily dominant 
in cases of conflict with other moral norms). The relatively high normative force 
rights possess in moral debate stems from their function as protections for the basic 
interests of individuals.
The assertion of a right should be likened to the use of 'for', 'since', 'because' or 
other words and phrases used in rational discourse to signal the imminent presence 
of a reason or premiss in an argument. The use of a reason-indicator, like 'since' or 
'because', tells one's interlocutor that a reason for some disputed claim is about to 
be given. Similarly, the use of a right-assertion, such as 'A has a right to X ', 
should tell one's interlocutor that strong reasons exist, whether or not they are made 
explicit, for believing the right-holder in question should be guaranteed the content 
in question by imposing duties on others. An arguer who, when asked why anyone 
else should believe some controversial claim he is putting forward, simply says 
'Because!', is refusing to engage in rational argument. Similarly, someone who,
8 L.W. Sumner, The Moral Foundation of Rights. Chapter 2. James Nickel calls this element the 
"weight" of the claim, noting that the weight "specifies its rank or importance in relation to other 
norms." Making Sense of Human Rights , 14.
9 Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning (New 
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1919). Hohfeld sometimes reserves the term 'right' for what 
I am calling a claim-right. He distinguishes four types of normative relations, all of which utilize 
the language of rights: liberties (privileges), claims, powers, and immunities. Hohfeld did not 
himself use the term "claim-right"; rather, he referred to rights "in the strict sense." See Peter 
Jones, Rights (London: Macmillan, 1994), 13.
10 Peter Jones, Rights , 14. This way of defining claim-rights is superior to that proposed in 
James Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights , 23: "[a] claim right to A is matched by duties of 
the addressees to act in ways that will make A available to the rightholder." The problem with 
Nickel's definition is that he makes it sound as though a claim-right always requires positive 
action on the part of duty-bearers. This is a substantive question, not to be settled by a definition.
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when asked why subsistence should be guaranteed to everyone by enforcing duties 
on others, simply says, 'Because every person has a right to subsistence!', is, if he 
stops there, refusing to push forward the argument, since the questioner is asking 
for a reason to show that such a right exists.11 Rights-claims are, in part, reason- 
indicators and therefore are not free-standing reasons. The confusion of these two 
candidates for the proper function of rights is one of the abuses noted by Jeremy 
Bentham, for whom the appeal to rights as premisses in moral and political disputes 
constitutes the fallacy of 'begging the question', of using as a premiss "the very 
proposition which is admitted to stand in need of proof."12 When we come to 
discuss the right to subsistence, it will become clear that defenders of that right need 
not be unaware that justifications are required, beyond the mere assertion that such 
a right exists. So rights-discourse cannot stand on its own in moral and political 
discussion; any given right requires grounding in some morally relevant property or 
in an argument to the effect that something of special importance to individuals is at 
stake. But rights-talk may still prove useful in clarifying many of the relations 
between agents which have traditionally been the concern of political philosophy, 
for example, the relations between states and citizens. Other relations also become 
relevant to theorizing when we focus our attention on the rights persons have; for 
instance, the links between one individual and another, the relations between states 
and foreign individuals (non-citizens), and the connections between non­
governmental organizations (NGOs), states and individuals.
As we have said, central problems with discussions of rights concern the 
normative force a right carries when it comes up against competing moral claims, 
including other rights. This force varies with the content of the right. For instance, 
a right to subsistence carries more normative weight than a right to periodic 
holidays with pay, other things being equal. To see why this is so, we must clarify 
what is meant by 'A has a right to x'. My claim will be that human rights are best 
conceived as protections for the basic interests of persons, and that according to that 
conception no other right-content has moral priority over subsistence, although 
other contents may be no less important than subsistence. There are rights that do 
not protect basic interests, for example, rights persons have to the fulfillment of
11 "Thus, specific 'natural' or 'human' rights are not the moral basis for demands in politics. 
Rather, they are the demands themselves, and the justification for the demand has to be 
forthcoming in each case." Brian Barry, Political Argument: A Reissue with a new introduction 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), lv.
12 Jeremy Bentham, 'Anarchical Fallacies' (1843), in Jeremy Waldron (ed.), Nonsense Upon Stilts: 
Bentham. Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man (London: Methuen, 1987), 47. Bentham's critique 
was aimed at the French 'Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen' (1789), and was written 
in 1795-96.
2 9
promises made to them. I assert here only that human rights are best understood as 
being ultimately grounded in basic human interests.
There is no sound argument -  in the sense of an argument whose conclusion 
follows from true premisses by way of a deductively valid inference — for the claim 
that there are human rights to the protection of vital interests. Three implications 
might be drawn from this fact (only one of which may be accepted at any one time): 
the first is human rights skepticism, the second is human rights fideism, or (implicit 
or explicit) faith in human rights claims, and the third — which demands an 
evaluation of the plausible arguments for and against human rights — is a suitably 
modest acceptance or denial of basic human rights claims. Let us briefly outline 
each of these moves.
First, it can be maintained that, since there is nothing to compel adherence to basic 
human rights, it follows that there are no such rights. We can call this human rights 
skepticism, since it denies that there are human rights at all. This view takes too 
seriously the notion that deductively valid arguments with true premisses are, in 
general, very good arguments.13 It fails to recognize that many other forms of 
argument are quite respectable. Moreover, in moral argument, it is likely that a good 
case can be made for a particular claim even though no one is compelled, on pain of 
contradiction, to accept that claim. This is especially probable in the case of disputes 
on moral and political subjects, where almost any conclusion one could imagine 
will be denied by someone. Since sound arguments (in the technical sense of the 
word "sound" — i.e., true premisses and valid inference) are not required, we are 
not justified in denying all human rights claims simply on the grounds that they 
cannot be defended by sound arguments.
A second move is to express faith in basic human rights claims, while admitting 
that logic does not compel us to accept them. I have called this position human 
rights fideism. "There might not be good arguments for human rights," the fideist 
says, "but I believe in human rights just the same." This alternative suffers from the 
same drawback as human rights skepticism. The response to it, in short, is to point 
out that we should look for plausible reasons for accepting human rights, reasons 
that could be denied but that seem sufficiently credible to command assent from 
honest seekers after truth in moral matters. Expressions of faith and assertions of 
self-evidence are non-starters.
Thirdly, we can actually look at the most plausible arguments for and against 
accepting basic human rights and, having assessed these arguments, come to a
13 Not all such arguments are good, however. Some, such as those with the form 'P, therefore P' 
are useless in the context of a dispute about P, despite their technically valid character. This 
argument form is valid because the conclusion must be true if the premiss is true. But no one 
ought to believe a disputed proposition P simply on the basis of P's being put forward by an 
interlocutor as evidence in its favour!
considered position. I will follow this strategy. Specifically, I defend basic human 
rights by outlining arguments whose premisses appeal to vital human interests.
2.2. Questions of Substance: Rights and Interests
Clarifying the elements of the concept of a right goes no way toward defending 
the content of any particular right. There is no limit to the possible contents of right- 
claims, to the things persons can be said to have a right to. It is easy to announce 
that all human beings have a right to subsistence, but that is merely an 
announcement until reasons are offered to support it. Justifying a right-claim is the 
difficult part of this sort of moral argument, and distinguishing the potential 
grounds for a right opens up the entire range of reasons adduced in moral theory 
generally. Hence a right may be justified by appeals to rational self-interest, to 
utility, to what would be agreed by contractors variously conceived, to the basic 
needs or vital interests of human beings, and so on. But no claim of right is any 
stronger than the strength of the reasons offered in defence of that claim.
One initially plausible thought about rights is that, although they may be used to 
justify the imposition of duties on individuals and collectivities, "rights themselves 
need to be justified somehow, and how other than by appeal to the interests their 
recognition promotes and protects?"14 On this view, the direction of justification is 
from an individual interest to the existence of a right. Thus, an argument for a right 
"is an argument showing that an individual interest considered in itself is 
sufficiently important from a moral point of view to justify holding people to be 
under a duty to promote it."15 On this "interest conception of rights," then, the role 
played by rights in normative discourse is to "mark the way in which interests 
generate duties."16 So rights function as a middle ground between human interests 
on the one hand, and duties attaching to individual agents and collectivities on the 
other. Rights-talk is the language in which the connections between the two 
domains are made.
One way of defending the requirements of distributive justice is to argue that the 
protection and promotion of a set of rights is both necessary and sufficient for
14 T.M. Scanlon, 'Rights, Goals, and Fairness1, in Samuel Scheffler (ed.) Consequentialism and 
Its Critics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 74.
15 Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 3. Similarly, 
for Joseph Raz, to say that a person has a right to some content (e.g. free speech, subsistence, 
political participation) is to say that an aspect of that person's "well-being (his interest) is a 
sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a duty." Joseph Raz, The Morality 
of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), 166. Cf. Jeremy Waldron, Liberal Rights: Collected Papers 
1981-1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 11, 212, 359. Raz, Waldron and Neil 
MacCormick are the most prominent defenders of the interest conception. See also MacCormick, 
'Rights in Legislation', in P.M.S. Hacker and Joseph Raz (eds.), Law. Morality and Society: 
Essays in Honour of H.L.A. Hart (Oxford: Clarendon, 1982).
16 Waldron, Liberal Rights , 214.
justice to be done. This sort of move is familiar in recent political theory, but it is 
often confined to rights which can be recognized by nation-states. Global justice 
should not be restricted in this way. It may turn out that states are the primary duty- 
bearers when individuals claim their rights, but that conclusion awaits assessment 
of its grounds. When one takes a moral perspective, the set of right holders cannot 
be restricted to citizens of particular nation-states: we are led, therefore, to a 
consideration of human rights. A human right always requires justification in terms 
of the "interests which each individual is thought to have in common with every 
other."17
A few questions naturally arise at this point. What are the interests which all 
individuals share? How do we determine exactly what those interests are? The most 
plausible conception of such interests ties them closely to the well-being of 
individuals; on this view, so-called "welfare interests" are "abstracted from actual 
and possible preferences."
Welfare interests consist just in that set of generalized resources that will be 
necessary for people to have before pursuing any of the more particular 
preferences that they might happen to have. Health, money, shelter, 
sustenance, and such like are all demonstrably welfare interests of this sort, 
useful resources whatever people's particular projects and plans.... We can 
know what is in people's interests, in this most general sense, without 
knowing what in particular is inside their heads. Furthermore, at some 
suitably general level at least, one person's list of necessary basic resources 
reads much like anyone else's. ... welfare interests are highly 
standardized.18
It is in someone's interests, therefore, to have access to those resources necessary 
for leading a recognizably human life. Without food, shelter and a reasonable level 
of health maintenance, human lives are simply not possible. (The inclusion of 
money on Goodin's list of universally useful resources is perhaps incorrect, since it 
displays a kind of fetishism about the means of exchange which should be avoided 
by any theory of all and only vital human interests. Nevertheless, its inclusion in a 
list of currently applicable basic human interests clearly has some justification.) 
This analysis suggests the form of an argument for rights to these resources, and 
since 'subsistence' can be taken to mean 'the means to a minimally adequate 
existence', I will now assess the prospects for a right to subsistence.
2.3. The Human Right to Subsistence
It is often held that there is a certain minimum level of well-being below which no 
individual should be allowed to fall. One way of stating a commitment that no
17 Waldron, The Right to Private Property , 90.
18 Robert E. Goodin, 'Utility and the Good', in Peter Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 244, 246.
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person should be permitted to starve or to live without the shelter necessary to lead 
a minimally acceptable existence is to assert a right on the part of persons to the 
contents in question, i.e., to food and shelter, clothing, minimal health care, clean 
air and water. A human subsistence right is a right of persons to the means 
necessary to meet these minimum requirements. It seems that the interest 
individuals have in continued, minimally comfortable existence should be 
sufficient, if  anything is, to put someone or some collectivity under a duty.
Those who would base their theory of human rights on interests face the problem 
that interests are "at most a necessary condition for having rights, since there would 
be an enormous and indeed unmanageable proliferation of rights if the having of 
any interest X were sufficient to generate a right to X."19 The focus on vital human 
interests overcomes this difficulty, since such interests form a manageable subset of 
the larger group of interests human beings have. In the case of vital interests, it is 
argued, we have both necessary and sufficient conditions for putting others under a 
duty.
I will discuss two arguments for a human right to subsistence. The first is Henry 
Shue's argument and the second comes from Jeremy Waldron.20 I will call them 
the indirect argument and the direct argument, respectively.
The indirect argument for a human right to subsistence is premissed on the claim 
that no right exists in the absence of a right to subsistence. Henry Shue offers an 
argument of this form.21 This strategy is aimed at convincing the proponents of a 
right to liberty that commitment to that right entails acceptance of a right to 
subsistence. If we assume for the sake of argument that a person's interest in liberty 
is sufficient to ground a right to liberty, then, it is argued, we should be concerned 
to provide the necessary conditions of the exercise of liberty, most importantly, the 
meeting of one's subsistence needs. It is often noted that a right to liberty is of no 
use in the absence of the requirements for the liberty's enjoyment, those conditions 
necessary for making the liberty worth having.22 John Rawls says that both Shue 
and R.J. Vincent23 "interpret subsistence as including certain minimum economic
19 Alan Gewirth, 'Starvation and Human Rights', in Human Rights: Essays in Justification and 
Applications (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 198.
20 Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence. Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy ; Jeremy Waldron, 
Liberal Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), chapter 1, where both arguments 
are discussed.
21 Basic Rights , 24-5.
22 See, for instance, the sensible comments in Robert E. Goodin, Reasons For Welfare: The 
Political Theory of the Welfare State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 308: "I can 
see no reason for championing or cherishing worthless liberties. If you care about liberty, you 
must also care about those elements that make that liberty practically meaningful. If you do not, I 
simply have to question the sincerity of your arguments for liberty in the first place."
23 R.J. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge: RDA/Cambridge 
University Press, 1986).
security, and both hold that subsistence rights are basic. One must agree with this 
since the reasonable and rational exercise of all liberties, of whatever kind, as well 
as the intelligent use of property, always implies having certain general all-purpose 
economic means."24 Shue maintains that no proposed right content is enjoyed as a 
right unless it is protected from "standard threats." So, for example, no one can 
truly claim the existence, on their part, of a right to free expression unless there are 
guarantees that, emergencies aside, they will have access to resources required to 
meet their subsistence needs. A^since the guarantees amount to the recognition of a 
right to subsistence, it follows that no one has a right to free expression if they lack 
a right to subsistence. But this may fail to convince. It needs to be shown how the 
enjoyment of free speech as a right presupposes this basic subsistence right. The 
dependence of one right on the other needs to be demonstrated.
The first point of clarification is that malnutrition, lack of shelter and the absence 
of protection from disease leave persons incapable of engaging in the autonomous 
activity the protection of which is often thought to justify concern for civil and 
political rights in the first place. But then, if rational agency is valued, its necessary 
preconditions ought to be valued as well. The argument is in part an appeal to 
consistency. Consequently, a commitment to a right to liberty presupposes, on pain 
of inconsistency, acceptance of a right to subsistence. This may still leave some 
skeptics unmoved, but the introduction of a second point settles the issue in favour 
of the defender of subsistence rights.
The second point is that those in circumstances of severe need not only suffer 
from obvious harms (hunger, disease, and so on) but are also subject to a sort of 
dependence on the powerful which should concern the proponent of liberty rights. 
When people "lack essentials, such as food, because of forces beyond their control, 
[they] often can do nothing and are on their own utterly helpless."25 The plight of 
such people contrasts with the victims of repressive regimes whose rights to 
physical security are violated: such people can often fight back against the regime 
or, if all else fails, attempt to escape. These options are not available to persons 
lacking subsistence rights, who suffer from a dependence amounting to subjection 
to the powerful. This shows that failure to recognize subsistence rights restricts 
liberties in a very real sense, since a lack of subsistence rights leaves non-state 
collectivities, other individuals, and especially governments free to deny people the 
means to the minimum requirements of existence and thereby to coerce the helpless 
(or potentially helpless). Therefore the absence of guaranteed access to subsistence
24 John Rawls, 'The Law of Peoples', in Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley (eds.), On Human 
Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993 (New York: Basic Books, 1993), 225.
25 Shue, Basic Rights , 25.
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renders individuals vulnerable in a way that threatens the credibility of any claim 
that other rights, such as civil and political rights, are protected.
I think the indirect argument for subsistence rights shows that there is a link 
between these 'socioeconomic' rights and the more traditional civil and political 
rights. Again, the relation is not a logically tight one in any technical sense, but it 
nonetheless makes it more difficult for right-wing libertarians, or indeed anyone 
else, to fail to recognize subsistence as a right. Still, Shue's argument will not 
convince someone skeptical of all rights-claims, for it is premissed on the 
acceptance of some right or other. The direct argument, on the other hand, makes 
no such assumption, so it is better able to address the rights-skeptic. And if rights- 
claims are simply assertions, then everyone should be a rights-skeptic until some 
persuasive case is made for accepting a particular right-claim.
The direct argument from subsistence needs to subsistence rights runs as 
follows.26 Rights as we are conceiving them here are grounds for imposing duties, 
but rights themselves are justified by appealing to the interests individuals have in 
the contents of those rights. If we can find a highly important human interest, we 
have a strong premiss in support of a basic right claim. The interests individuals 
have in meeting their subsistence needs, it is argued, are at least as important as any 
other interests one could mention. From a moral perspective, concern about "the 
primal necessities and vulnerabilities of human life" is of the first importance.27 The 
effects on a person's life when she cannot find shelter or meet her nutritional 
requirements are, if anything, more serious than the results of denying her a right 
to, say, freedom of religion. This is not to deny the relevance of civil and political 
liberties for living a satisfactory life, but it should serve to bring out the role of 
subsistence rights in a theory of basic human rights. Onora O'Neill, despite her 
objections to a rights approach, notes the universal acceptability of the central 
premiss of the present argument: "It is not controversial that human beings need 
adequate food, shelter and clothing appropriate to their climate, clean water and 
sanitation, and some parental and health care."28 If there are basic rights, then 
rights to meet one's basic needs as a physical and vulnerable being must be among 
them.
I understand this line of argument to reveal the importance of the contents of 
subsistence rights: food, shelter, health care, clean air and water, and so on. As 
R.J. Vincent has said, "the right to life has as much to do with providing the 
wherewithal to keep people alive as with protecting them against violent death. ...
26 See Jeremy Waldron, 'Liberal rights: Two sides of the coin', in Liberal Rights , lOff.
27 Ibid., 11.
28 Onora O'Neill, 'Transnational Justice', in David Held (ed.), Political Theory Today (Oxford: 
Polity, 1991), 279.
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The right to life, if it exists at all, is a right to subsistence as well as to security."29 
But now it might be objected that the importance of those contents was never in 
question. The case against a human right to subsistence does not deny that in 
standard cases everyone has an interest in such things; rather, that case stems from 
a number of points that arise even if the importance and universality of those human 
interests are accepted. By looking at these further objections to subsistence rights, 
along with the replies to those objections, we will be able to fill in the rest of the 
argument for holding those rights to be proper members of anybody's list of basic 
human rights.
2.4. Building a Case: Objections and Replies
The Negative-Positive Rights Distinction
The first objection to any human right to subsistence focuses on the well-worn 
distinction between negative and positive rights and uses that distinction to deny 
universal rights to aid. Negative rights are rights requiring only omissions on the 
part of duty-bearers; for instance, if someone has a negative right not to be tortured, 
this requires merely that others refrain from torturing that person. Since recognition 
of negative rights requires of duty-bearers nothing more than avoidance, it is clearly 
possible that everyone can be asked to accept the duties those rights generate. 
Positive rights, however, are another matter. ('Positive' in this sense is not to be 
understood as 'institutional' or 'legal'.) When someone has a positive right to some 
content, omission is not sufficient to fulfill the duties generated by the right. Such 
rights are positive in the sense that positive action is required if individuals' access 
to the contents of the rights is to be protected. A right to subsistence is a positive 
right, for it may in some cases impose duties on others to provide aid to needy 
persons, thereby imposing a requirement for positive actions rather than mere 
omissions. But notice now that corresponding duties in such cases cannot attach to 
everyone, as with negative rights, since every person cannot be required to ensure 
that some particular person has her subsistence needs met. We are left with a 
purported right but no clear account of the duties with which it is associated, and 
this is a serious problem only for so-called positive rights. How should we respond 
to this problem?
The first thing to say is that there are two points being made by this objection and 
they must be distinguished from one another. First, there is a claim that negative 
rights can be clearly distinguished from positive rights, and secondly, there is an 
assessment of the moral priority of the two sorts of rights relative to one another, an 
assessment grounded in the need to assign duties to rights if those rights are to be
29 R.J. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations , 90. Cf. Ibid.. 145.
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protected. The upshot of the objection is that civil and political rights should be the 
only human rights because only they are correlated with duties it is reasonable to 
ask every person to bear. Responding to the objection, then, requires two replies, a 
short answer dealing with the positive/negative rights distinction and a longer 
answer telling a story about correlative duties. The story I will tell contradicts the 
supposed simplicity of right-duty relations embodied in the objection. Once both 
answers have been given, the first objection loses its appeal.
First, the short answer. The distinction between negative and positive rights is 
simply not an accurate rendering of the duties corresponding to any given right.30 
So-called negative rights, like the right not be tortured, require both forbearance 
(the duty not to torture anyone) and positive action (duties to stop attempted 
torturing by others and duties to help victims of torture). And if even supposed 
negative rights call for positive action, the objection — which depended on there 
being rights requiring only omissions on the part of duty-bearers — rings hollow.
Maybe a legitimate commitment to a right not be tortured does demand that 
positive steps be taken. But is this the case for other rights? What about, say, the 
right to free expression? Can we not uphold this right simply by failing to stop 
people from speaking, that is, by allowing them to voice their opinions on matters 
of concern to them? The answer, again, is no. While many people may recognize 
the required omission -- not to interfere with expression of opinion — there may still 
be some who do not, and the right is not enjoyed as a right if some are allowed to 
avoid their duties of omission. On the contrary, a right to free expression is 
recognized only when a set of conditions is satisfied: obligations to omit restricting 
expression must be accepted, and when some individuals are actively restricted 
from expressing their views (as no doubt will happen) there is a further obligation 
to stop such restricting activity. And if there is a duty to stop those actions that 
restrict expression of opinion, it is reasonable to accept a distinct duty, namely, the 
duty to make arrangements to ensure that restrictive actions do not occur in the first 
place. Individuals do not have rights if there are no socially imposed safeguards 
protecting the contents of those rights; against those who would violate the right 
holder's interests, the larger society must put in place protective measures. There is 
no one-to-one relation between rights and duties; rather, a given right "generates 
waves of duties," such as those we have suggested here for the protection of the 
right to free expression.31
30 The examples of rights to a fair trial, rights not be tortured, and rights to subsistence are 
discussed in Henry Shue, 'Rights in the Light of Duties', in Peter G. Brown and Douglas MacLean 
(eds.), Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1979), 65- 
81.
31 The phrase "waves of duties" comes from Jeremy Waldron, 'Conflicts of Rights' in Liberal 
Rights , 211-12. Of course, one cannot be protected against all threats: if protection against all
Once we have seen that the distinction between negative and positive rights cannot 
be maintained, there can be no simple dismissal of so-called socioeconomic or 
welfare rights. We can then look at the complete list of proposed human rights and 
ask what I take to be the most important question about them: Which o f the interests 
these rights are intended to protect are the most important interests? In other words, 
we should ask about the importance of human interests relative to one another, 
since there is no general argument for dismissing any right merely on the basis of 
its supposed correlativity to positive duties that some would take to be overly 
demanding or indeed impossible to meet. It therefore seems reasonable to prioritize 
rights by the basicness or importance of the interests they protect.
The longer answer to the objection that positive rights are especially problematic, 
in a way that negative rights are not, is to clarify the complexity of the duties 
corresponding to any right. We have seen that the distinction between negative and 
positive rights fails to capture the duties generated by such rights. But what is 
needed now is some idea of what those duties are. One promising way of 
characterizing the duties correlative to basic rights (for instance, the right to 
subsistence) is as always coming in three general forms and as attaching to different 
sorts of "agents" in various circumstances. This is Henry Shue's characterization.32 
Briefly, these are:
(i) duties to avoid depriving right-holding individuals of the content of the right,
(ii) duties to protect right-holders from being deprived of the right-content, and
(iii) duties to aid deprived right-holders when avoidance and protection have 
failed.
Notice that both omissions and positive actions will be required in order to fulfill 
the duties generated by rights. A human right to subsistence, for instance, generates 
duties on others to aid those unable to obtain the means to subsistence for 
themselves. But it also requires precautions to be taken to ensure that the means to 
feed, clothe and shelter themselves is not likely to be beyond the reach of persons. 
And finally, actual right-violations must be avoided: for example, if Central 
American farmers are satisfactorily providing for their own subsistence, others 
should not take actions which will effectively force those farmers to give up their 
present existence and become dependent on help from others simply to meet their 
own basic needs. This last point raises two issues. First, subsistence rights may 
require not only that others act in various ways but that they also forbear from
conceivable threats were required, then no one would have any right to anything. Accordingly, 
Shue rightly recognizes that rights require protection only against "standard threats." See Shue, 
Basic Rights , 13.
32 Basic Rights: Subsistence. Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1980), 51-64. This interesting analysis has not received the attention it deserves.
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acting in other ways. Avoiding depriving persons of food, shelter and health care is 
one of the correlative duties of the right to subsistence. The second issue is the 
importance of picking out the duty-bearers whenever we discuss these different 
duties of avoidance, protection and aid. This is the problem o f agency: if there are 
duties generated by right-claims, to whom do they attach? This problem must be 
solved; otherwise no right, no matter how important the interest it is designed to 
protect, will be able to provide the guarantees necessary to ensure its proper 
recognition.
Assigning Duties
The problem of agency generates the second objection to a human right to 
subsistence. A complete justification of any right incorporates three elements: the 
importance of an individual's interest in some content must be shown, then the 
assignment of obligations generated by that interest, by way of the right claim, must 
be justified. The second move requires both an outline of what the duties are and a 
statement of who will bear those duties. So the three moves are first, justifying the 
importance of an interest; second, justifying the existence of duties necessary to 
protect that interest; and third, justifying the imposition of those duties on particular 
agents (individuals, states, nonstate groups). Rights claims are adequately 
grounded only if  the three lines of argument are made out. That is, if the three cases 
are not made, the overall case for protecting the right is not complete. So duties 
must be stated, duty-bearers must be found to fulfill the requirements of rights, and 
reasons must be offered to show that the list of duties is correct and that those duty- 
bearers are the right ones for the job. The second objection to a human right to 
subsistence, then, is that there is no cogent line of reasoning capable of justifying 
the assignment of correlative duties to various agencies. If the objection succeeds, 
we will be left with mere 'manifesto subsistence rights', ambitiously asserted in 
documents such as the Universal Declaration o f Human Rights (Article 25) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Article 11) but 
doomed to remain, practically speaking, in limbo because no duties are or can be 
assigned on their basis.33
Both Joel Feinberg and James Nickel make a useful distinction between claims-fo 
particular right-contents and claims-against duty-bearing agents.34 A justified right 
includes both a justified claim to some content and a justified claim against some 
duty-bearer. The type-identities of duty-bearers must be known before justifications
33 Joel Feinberg discusses "manifesto rights" in 'The Nature and Value of Rights', reprinted in 
Philip Pettit, Contemporary Political Theory (New York: Macmillan, 1991), 31-2.
34 Joel Feinberg, Social Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), 59; and James 
W. Nickel, 'How Human Rights Generate Duties to Protect and Provide', Human Rights Quarterly 
15 (1993), 77-86. Justifying a claim-against requires identifying both duty-bearers and duties.
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can be attempted; otherwise we would have an argument with an incompletely 
described conclusion! Therefore to respond to the second objection we need to 
offer an outline of duty-bearers along with the sorts of reasons capable of justifying 
picking out just those agents as the right ones to fulfill the duties required to protect 
a given right. On the tripartite analysis of duties outlined above, we distinguished 
duties of avoidance, protection, and aid. Duties to avoid depriving right-holders of 
the contents of their rights can be attached to every person, state and 
nongovernmental organization because these duties require only omission and it is 
possible to require that every agent not do something. So one set of duties 
generated by the human right to subsistence is the duty of everyone and every 
collectivity not to stand in the way of persons in their attempts to meet their 
subsistence needs. The problem of agency does not arise for these duties of 
avoidance; it is when we come to discuss duties to protect from deprivation and 
duties to aid the deprived that suitable agents need to be identified. We want to 
know, in the cases of such duties, who is required to do what, and why.
It is helpful to think about the duties arising from any right as lying along a 
spectrum ranging from negative duties to increasingly positive duties.35 Negative 
duties require only that duty-bearers avoid acting in a particular way, or if one 
insists on phrasing duties actively we could say that what is required is avoidance- 
behaviour of a certain kind. Positive duties call for actions directed at protecting 
right-holders from deprivation or assisting those deprived of the contents of their 
rights. (The negative/positive distinction is helpful here, even though it failed to 
capture anything morally relevant about rights. The earlier trichotomy of duties 
relates to the negative/positive distinction in this way: Avoidance of deprivation is a 
negative duty; protection and assistance are different sorts of positive duty.) While 
negative duties can be bome by all agents simultaneously, positive duties must be 
assigned selectively, so the grounds for such assignments will play a vital role in 
justifying a right claim. Since people's resources are finite, duty assignment calls 
for careful work on our part.
I will not engage in any detailed analysis of the process of identifying duty- 
bearers here. Instead I hope to give some idea of the sorts of questions which must 
underlie any such analysis.36 First, since 'ought' implies 'can', the assertion that a 
duty should be imposed on some agent or agency requires that the agent or agency 
is capable of fulfilling those duties. Thus the first question is: Is the proposed duty- 
bearer capable of meeting the requirements to protect and assist the relevant right­
holders? Secondly, there must be a morally compelling reason to believe the duties
35 Cf. Henry Shue, 'Mediating Duties', Ethics 98 (1988), 689.
36 See also, James W. Nickel, 'How Human Rights Generate Duties to Protect and Provide'.
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in question are properly assigned to these agents or agencies, for capability alone 
does not justify an assignment. Thus the second question is: Is there some moral 
justification for holding some agents to have a particular set of duties? This second 
question can be subdivided into further questions. What is the relation of this duty- 
bearer to this right-holder in virtue of which there is thought to be a justified 
assignment of a duty? Are the duties too demanding for the agents to fulfill? All of 
these questions should lead us to assess the prospect not only of individuals but of 
states and international (state and nonstate) organizations bearing duties.
We now have some idea of the individualist emphasis of basic rights such as the 
right to subsistence, for these rights attach to individual persons insofar as they are 
embodied, needy beings. But we have seen as well the potential plurality of the 
duties and addressees arising from basic rights claims: individuals, nation-states 
and other collectivities may all be duty-bearers, depending on the arguments 
adduced in a given instance. Still, there seems to be a danger of creating so many 
duties that there will be no way for the human right to subsistence ever to be 
satisfied, for there are desperately needy people not only within one's country but 
in foreign countries as well. But that problem can be avoided by assigning a subset 
of duties to particular agencies; in this way, duty-overload is not necessary, since 
the greater efficiency of coordinated activity carried out by institutions may render it 
unnecessary to spend all of one's time and energy attending to the subsistence 
needs of others. Individuals would then have duties to create institutions capable of 
respecting rights to subsistence.
To see in more detail the motive for moving beyond individuals as duty-bearers, 
we can ask the following question: how should individuals respond to a situation in 
which they, acting alone, are unable to protect right-holders from being deprived of 
their rights and to provide aid to the deprived? Here, as we have said, there is good 
reason to require individuals to create collectivities with the relevant capabilities. I 
will now outline an argument for a duty of individuals to develop individual-duty- 
fulfilling institutions.37
This argument begins with the assumption that, where an individual interest is of 
sufficient importance, there is reason to believe a claim to the content of a right 
exists. But genuine acknowledgement of the claim to the content should motivate in 
others a search for ways to fulfill the duties generated by the right. And, given 
contemporary conditions, isolated individual action is not sufficient to fulfill the 
duties to avoid, protect and aid suggested by the right. Organizational or 
institutional actions, on the other hand, are likely to enable such duty-fulfillment in
37 For recent arguments along similar lines, see Henry Shue, 'Mediating Duties', 695ff.; Jeremy 
Waldron, 'Liberal Rights', 17; Robert E. Goodin, 'The State as Moral Agent', in Alan Hamlin and 
Philip Pettit (eds.), The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989).
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contemporary conditions. Therefore, individuals have a duty to set up organizations 
and institutions, or to use such collectivities as already exist, to fulfill the duties 
generated by the basic right in question. Of course, this line of reasoning only sets 
out the beginnings of a case for the duty to set up duty-fulfilling collectivities. The 
difficult work still remains, namely, to show that the demands upon persons who 
must shoulder this duty will not be too great. To repeat, there is one important 
consideration suggesting that the danger of overburdensome duties is not 
excessively worrying: If the importance of an interest suggests the need to assign 
some duties to protect that interest, collective coordination of action — such as that 
carried out by institutions or other organizations — is best able to provide effective 
interest protection because it is more efficient than the actions of disconnected 
individuals.
Assertions of human rights such as those found in the Universal Declaration o f  
Human Rights apparently assume that states are the main agents obliged to respond 
to those rights. This assumption makes such pronouncements more practical in one 
respect but wildly idealistic in another. The practical point is that there is no 
proposal calling for the creation of a world state as the proper protector and 
promoter of human rights, a proposal which seems unlikely to receive a hearing in 
contemporary global circumstances. Nation-states already exist and, moreover, they 
request and receive recognition from each other as sovereign over both a territory 
and a collection of individuals. Human rights claims which accept these sovereign 
entities and then attempt to bring about extensions of their responsibilities have a 
much better chance of success than claims requiring for their implementation new 
bodies (e.g., a world government) which are unlikely to appear on the horizon.38
Despite this realistic assumption of human rights claims, there is perhaps a fatal 
flaw in the confinement of these claims to states as the correct addressees. Some 
states simply cannot meet the obligations required of them by an acceptance of basic 
human rights, and the capacities of those states to meet those obligations has in 
recent years declined. So it is a utopian dream to expect all states to fulfill the duties 
generated by human rights; many cannot do so, nor is it plausible to believe they 
will be able to do so in the foreseeable future.39
38 In Chapter Eight, below, I question the normative force of sovereignty claims in the face of 
widespread global deprivation. And in the Conclusion, I argue against the assumption that a stark 
choice must be made between the present system of states on the one hand and a world government 
on the other.
39 Regarding food provision, the inability referred to here seems not to be an unalterable empirical 
fact. Since in many cases sufficient food may be available (even within a famine-struck country), it 
is more reasonable to focus on individuals' legal entitlements to food, entitlements which may be 
subject to change by altering ownership laws. On this point, see Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen, 
Hunger and Public Action (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), Chapter 2.
Thus we are in the grip of a dilemma. Either we reject the view that nation-states 
are the bearers of duties arising from human rights claims (thereby accepting some 
unrealistic belief that a world state is likely to come into existence to enforce those 
claims), or we restrict the category of duty-bearers to nation-states (thereby 
ensuring that many, perhaps most, of those claims will go unrecognized in practice, 
since countless states lack the resources to meet them). However, I should say 
immediately that I think this is a false dilemma; it sets up two unsavoury alternatives 
and suggests that we must choose between them. But the options are not as 
restricted as the dilemma makes them out to be. A more or less obvious solution is 
to require nation-states with more than they can use to redistribute wealth and 
resources to other nation-states who have less than they need. In addition, 
avoidable activities which make it less likely that poorer states can meet their own 
citizens' rights-claims could be disallowed, thus enabling those states to fulfill their 
obligations with less positive aid from other states. This solution retains the positive 
features of the earlier options while excising the weaknesses. We can throw out the 
bathwater yet keep our baby: Nation-states are the main duty-bearers on this view, 
hence no appeal need be made for the creation of a world state; and when some 
states lack the capacity to fulfill the duties generated by human rights, steps are 
taken to give them that capacity. This requires both positive steps (actions) and 
negative steps (omissions). If there are good reasons for recognizing human 
subsistence rights, then there is a motivation to look for capable duty-bearers. The 
assignment of increased duties to states, although not only to states, promises to 
meet the demands made by rights and in so doing makes it possible to act on the 
recognition that the interests which form the basis for rights are morally important.
Let us look briefly at an example relevant to the problem of assigning duties to 
protect the human right to subsistence. Transnational food corporations are not 
designed to protect human rights, but neither are they exempt from duties not to 
bring about rights violations. It is reasonable to hold that such TNCs have a duty 
not to advertise and sell products which, in contemporary Third World conditions, 
are likely to contribute to serious harm and even death. The notorious, and 
continuing, behaviour of the transnational corporations engaged in the production 
and sale of baby-milk powder is a classic instance of a violation of this duty.40 A 
duty of avoidance on the part of corporations is clearly in order, but so is a duty,
40 The role of the Nestle corporation, the largest such transnational, has made it the centre of 
attention in this controversy. In Third World countries, baby-milk powder is peddled to 
impoverished mothers by 'nurses' (corporate representatives), with the consequence that infants are 
undernourished and diseased because of polluted local water and inappropriate instructions to 
mothers who are, in any case, unable to afford the cost of sufficient amounts of baby-milk powder 
over an extended period. See Antonio Cassese, Human Rights in a Changing World (Oxford: 
Polity, 1990), 138-52.
assignable to everyone and through them to their governments, to protect 
individuals in the developing countries by monitoring the activities of TNCs, whose 
behaviour is motivated by amoral reasons (having to do with profits and market 
share and the like) but may result in basic rights violations. The corporate duty of 
avoidance cannot be met by corporate self-regulation, so duties might attach to 
governments to ensure that such rights-violating behaviour does not occur. Exactly 
how these government duties should be assigned is a difficult question. Should 
governments in the countries of the South, who might be thought to have the 
primary duties to protect their citizens' subsistence rights, be required to deal with 
TNCs based in other countries? There is a serious question concerning capability 
here: Are such governments able to protect their citizens from corporate actions? 
The same question arises when we turn to the duties of states in which TNCs are 
based. In the case of Nestle, that particular corporation has a larger annual budget 
than its home government (Switzerland), which suggests something about the 
relative power of the two parties. Perhaps, then, there is a need for an international 
body, such as the World Health Organization, to be assigned duties to protect in 
this case. Sadly, this move will not lead automatically to protection of subsistence 
rights, since the honourable WHO initiatives of recent years have not been binding 
on member countries. These initiatives could have effect only if they were backed 
by the coercive powers now held only by nation-states.
Is Subsistence Sufficiently Important?
The objection from agency requires more discussion, but for now we must move 
on to a third objection to a human right to subsistence. The present claim is that the 
human interest in subsistence is not sufficiently important to justify the recognition 
of a human right to it. This may seem a bizarre assertion, but it stems from an 
important and compelling belief, namely, that where persons choose not to meet 
their subsistence needs their choices should be respected and others should not 
impose upon them some alternative conception of what is in their interests. The 
proper reply to this claim is to point out, first, that in the overwhelming majority of 
cases the choices of individuals will be to meet their subsistence needs and, in the 
remaining cases, persons may be allowed to choose otherwise -- say, to build a 
monument to their God rather than feed themselves. Acceding to the objection in 
this way will not change the implications of the human right to subsistence in most 
cases, for the interest in subsistence really is that important to people. The second 
move in reply to this objection is to note that, while it is conceivable that individuals 
might, in certain circumstances, choose to forego guarantees that their subsistence 
needs will be met in order to further some other interest they have (say, in political 
emancipation from autocratic mle), it does not follow that subsistence is no longer 
in such a person's interest. The latter point is supported by reminding ourselves that
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even brave and inspiring opposition to dictatorial regimes will falter if rebels fail to 
feed, clothe and shelter themselves. Moreover, one powerful reason for opposing 
dictators in the first place is to overcome the arbitrary discretion such rulers 
maintain over crucial policies, including the institutional guarantee that subsistence 
needs will be met. The interest in subsistence does not disappear when some 
individual prefers, say, to further the cause of a political or religious group rather 
than meet his subsistence needs: this is a case in which two interests conflict, not 
where one content ceases to be in the interest of the person. Since, whenever 
interests are considered, such needs are never very far from the surface, and since 
subsistence is a permanently present concern of the world's poor, subsistence 
rights are plausible candidates for basic human rights.
Side-Constraints
A fourth objection to a human right to subsistence leads us back to the distinction 
between negative and positive rights and to considerations of agency. We can call it 
the argument from side-constraints, and it is motivated by the conception of rights 
favoured by Robert Nozick.41 Earlier we answered the objection that duties to 
protect and duties to aid are not readily assignable, and that, therefore, no right 
requiring such duties can be recognized. That objection failed to take on board the 
point that any right requires duties of protection and aid, so we are obliged to look 
for possible assignments: there is nothing in principle which rules out the 
possibility of finding duty-bearers. Nozick claims, on the contrary, that rights are 
side-constraints on action and nothing more; hence we need not bother with the 
attempt to find bearers of duties to protect and to aid, since the only duties are duties 
of avoidance. One simply cannot rule out a conception of rights by definition, but 
this is exactly what Nozick is doing here. He defines rights as side-constraints on 
action, thereby eliminating the possibility of conflicts of rights by accepting only 
those corresponding duties which can be accepted simultaneously by everyone. It 
follows from his definition of rights that there cannot be a right to assistance of any 
kind, but this offers a definition where there should be an argument. Nozick 
appeals to the importance to each individual of living a meaningful life, and argues 
that side-constraints are necessary if individuals are to shape their lives for 
themselves. But once we recognize that outright denial of positive duties of justice 
will have terrible consequences for many people, Nozick’s argument loses its 
appeal. We would do better to consider carefully the words of H.L.A. Hart: 
"Except for a few privileged and lucky persons, the ability to shape life for oneself 
and lead a meaningful life is something to be constructed by positive marshalling of 
social and economic resources. It is not something automatically guaranteed by a
41 Robert Nozick, Anarchy. State, and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974), 28-35.
structure of negative rights."42 In addition, Nozick's view falls foul of the point 
made earlier that rights call for institutional protection: even Nozick's minimal state 
would require a police force, courts, jails, and a tax system to protect his favoured 
list of rights. Moreover, it looks at any rate as if Nozick's theory is duty-based 
rather than rights-based: on his view, no one can ever violate their duty not to 
violate the (negative) rights of others. But it is by no means obvious that, in 
difficult cases it might not be best to violate some rights in order to ensure greater 
rights protection. In short, 'utilitarianisms of rights' and 'egalitarianisms of rights' 
are not unreasonable views, and opposition to them which focuses on the agent's 
absolute duty not to be a rights-violator looks to be more concerned with the agent 
and her duties rather than with the recipient and her rights 43
Overdemandingness
A fifth objection to subsistence rights says that recognition of such rights is too 
demanding for the relevant duty-bearers and, therefore, no one is required to 
recognize those rights. I think this is an important claim, and I will not pretend to 
offer an adequate reply in such a short space. A more elaborate response appears in 
Chapter Three, when we come to discuss consequentialist justice, since it is most 
obviously raised against certain utilitarian recommendations for change in the 
international system. This objection is related to the point about positive and 
negative rights, and is partly answered by pointing out that someone does not cease 
to have a right to something simply because it is impossible for everyone to ensure 
that he enjoys that thing. As we said above, only an oversimplified account of 
corresponding duties allows one to take that point seriously. Once potential duties 
are outlined, progress can be made on the problems of protecting people's rights. 
Unreasonable demandingness requires supporting argument; it cannot be shown by 
making a conceptual distinction. Nevertheless, this objection deserves to be taken 
seriously. While I believe it is accurate to characterize a human right to subsistence 
as one part of the moral minimum, this does not imply that accepting this right's 
existence will not entail substantial changes either at the individual or the 
institutional level, or at both levels. Recognizing the right is part of a minimally 
adequate theory of justice, and as such there are going to be restrictions on action 
and requirements to perform certain actions, both of which are likely to be 
demanding.
42 H.L.A. Hart, 'Between Utility and Rights', in Alan Ryan (ed.), The Idea of Freedom (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1979), 85.
43 Cf. Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property , 74-77. In fact, Nozick notoriously avoids 
the question of whether "side constraints are absolute, or whether they may be violated in order to 
avoid catastrophic moral horror". Nozick, Anarchy. State, and Utopia , 30. But this is not a topic 
one can avoid if one desires to give an adequate account of rights.
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2.5. Conclusion
Assuming I have presented the beginnings of a plausible case for the existence of 
subsistence rights for all human beings, along with a reasonable, rough estimate of 
the obligations necessary to recognize those rights, and a suggestion of who will be 
charged with fulfilling those obligations, we may still ask whether this goes far 
enough. Is the protection of subsistence rights, along with the changes required in 
the present international system in order to implement them, all that can be justified 
as required of a commitment to universal human rights? Isn't the focus on 
guaranteeing persons minimal protections too narrow?
This challenge assumes an optimistic view about the prospects for satisfying 
rights claims in the international political realm. Nevertheless I agree with an 
assumption the challenger makes, that subsistence is not the only content of a 
human right. But the problems constituting the contemporary global predicament 
really are so serious that honest argument is forced to address their seriousness 
head on. Faced with the injustices of the world, we should ask ourselves which are 
the most morally urgent and which we might be in a position to alter. Hunger and 
homelessness, both near and far, rank at the top of this list, and if individuals, 
governments and other agencies can act to eradicate such injustices then we should 
look for ways to require them, within reasonable bounds, to do so. Recognizing a 
human right to subsistence, and allocating correlative duties, is a necessary 
condition of the protection of any other rights; so, as an argument identifying the 
lowest rung on the ladder of individual and collective moral responsibility, the 
defence outlined in this chapter is the proper first step in any rights-based argument 
for global distributive justice.
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Chapter Three: Utilitarianism and Global Justice
3.1. What is Utilitarianism?
According to Russell Hardin, utilitarianism "is the moral theory that judges the 
goodness of outcomes -- and therefore the rightness of actions insofar as they affect 
outcomes -- by the degree to which they secure the greatest benefit to all 
concerned."1 From this definition of utilitarianism, we can distinguish its three 
central features. First, it is consequentialist. This means that it judges the rightness 
of actions (or policies) solely in terms of their consequences. Secondly, 
consequences are understood in terms of the benefit embodied in them. 
Specifically, utilitarians say we should aim to bring about benefit to all of the 
individuals affected by our actions. And finally, the amount of benefit to individuals 
should be maximized: a policy is to be preferred if it produces more benefit than 
would any other policy.
Utilitarianism is a clear case of a cosmopolitan theory (as we defined 
cosmopolitanism in Chapter One). It will be remembered that cosmopolitans favour 
an approach that is impartial, non-perspectival, individualist, and egalitarian. 
Referring again to Hardin's characterization, in answer to the question, 'What is the 
core of utilitarianism?', he says: "The fundamentally moral impulse of utilitarianism 
is the concern with consequences for people in general. Hence, the core of 
utilitarianism is its consequentialism, its universality, and some kind of value that is 
value to individuals. The element here that is not fixed is the value theory, which 
can take diverse contents."2 When assessing outcomes, concern should be shown 
for "people in general," where no one is to count for more than anyone else, since 
no one person has more inherent worth than any other. The latter claims embody 
the utilitarian commitment to egalitarianism, while the former claim recommends an 
impartial standpoint for evaluation. And it follows that no one perspective or group 
of perspectives should be privileged when making moral assessments: this is the 
requirement of non-perspectivality. No one's perspective or interests should be 
excluded or weighed more heavily than that of anyone else. The individualism of 
utilitarianism is explicit: whatever constitutes the value which the theory aims to 
maximize, that value is always and only a property of individual persons. As 
another interpreter says, "[according to the utilitarian tradition, the ultimate locus of 
value is the individual, and the reason for this is that it is individuals, not 
communities, that can be happy or unhappy, have desires satisfied or unsatisfied, 
and so on. We may speak of a community as wanting something, but this,
1 Russell Hardin, Morality within the Limits of Reason (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1988), xv.
2 Ibid., 19.
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utilitarians believe, can always be translated into some set of statements about the 
interests of individuals that compose the community."3 Utilitarian value theory is 
the subject of a substantial and ongoing debate, where the main contenders for the 
content of that theory are (1) happiness (2) want-satisfaction, or (3) some qualified 
want-satisfaction view (for instance, the satisfaction of rational preferences). But 
the preferred content for the value theory, in the present context of international 
relations, is the satisfaction of basic wants or vital interests. No doubt, a fully 
developed value theory would go beyond this minimum content, but for the 
purposes of international political philosophy in the contemporary context, there is 
good reason to restrict the focus of one's value theory in this way.
Utilitarian theory will here be considered not as an all-embracing theory of 
individual right action but as a justificatory apparatus for the performance of 
institutions. Let me make this point especially clear. Utilitarianism is often taken to 
offer a criterion of right action for individuals, but since my focus is on the 
institutions making up what I have called the international basic structure, it only as 
a justificatory theory of these sorts of institutions that utilitarianism will be 
addressed here. Moreover, while pleasure or want-satisfaction have traditionally 
been the main options for the conceptualization of utility, I believe the special and 
limited case of global obligations should be content with a limited value theory, 
namely, a conception of the most important values of persons. My concern is with a 
consequentialist perspective that prioritizes the protection of the basic interests of 
individuals or the satisfaction of their basic wants. This view may be seen as a form 
of utilitarianism if in the place of 'utility' we substitute 'the meeting of basic 
interests'.4
The vital or basic interests of persons are those interests which every reasonable 
person would take to be the necessary conditions of a recognizable human life. 
These include interests in obtaining food, safe drinking water, clothing, shelter, a 
certain (though, across societies, variable) level of education, and access to basic 
health care. This choice of values to be maximized might be rejected on the grounds 
that it leaves out much that is worthwhile for human beings. It is of course true that 
most of what matters morally in our lives is not mentioned by the basic interest 
utilitarian. However, a theory of international ethics does well to keep the more
3 Anthony Ellis, 'Utilitarianism and International Ethics', in Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel 
(eds.), Traditions of International Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 172-73. 
While this is true of the tradition of utilitarianism, utilitarian individualism is by no means as 
inevitable as this passage makes it seem. A prominent utilitarian, Derek Parfit, in Reasons and 
Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), argues that the ultimate unit of morality is the discrete 
experience; given that view, the individualism might be hard to retain. I am grateful to Anthony 
Ellis for bringing this point to my attention.
4 Gerard Elfstrom, Ethics for a Shrinking World (London: Macmillan, 1990), is a clear 
representative of what I call 'basic interests utilitarianism'.
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ground-level desiderata in clear view, for the present arrangement of global 
institutions does not protect them. Thus it is reasonable to limit the demands of 
morality in this way when to attain their satisfaction would be a major achievement 
requiring substantial change to the present system. If a utilitarian theory so 
circumscribed can justify substantial redistribution of wealth and resources from 
rich to poor countries, it will have achieved a great deal.
Restricting the scope of what counts as utility might still appear to be nothing 
more than an ad hoc move designed to produce particular conclusions to which the 
theorist is already committed. Since I want to avoid falling prey to this objection, I 
should point out in more detail exactly why utilitarianism as applied to global 
politics is best conceived as recommending the maximization of the protection of 
basic interests of persons.
The objection stems, in part, from a recognition that much of what is considered 
relevant to the happiness or want-satisfaction of individuals is left out by the basic 
interests utilitarian, yet there is no obvious reason, at the foundational level of moral 
theory, for excluding some aspect of utility from consideration. The BIU response 
to this charge is to deny it outright: if we focus, for convenience, on 'utility' as 
'want-satisfaction', then it is clear that, contrary to the objector's claim, there are 
some wants that ought not to be satisfied. If someone wants to torture innocent 
children, the utilitarian who proposes to include all wants in his calculus will be 
required to include that want along with all the others. This is clearly unacceptable 
from a moral point of view. This point is sufficient to show that restriction of the 
range of wants to be maximized is perfectly acceptable. (Of course, I am then 
denying that want-satisfaction is intrinsically good, but I see no way around this 
denial. This presents a problem for those who take utilitarians to exemplify the 
approach that says "the good is prior to the right." Since "the good" is to be 
maximized, on my view, only when it is subject to prior qualifications that rule out 
unfair treatment of persons, there is already a right-based constraint on the good to 
be maximized. Utilitarianism remains intact, then, only in its call for maximization 
of the (morally permissible) good.)
But the objection might be, not that it is wrong for utilitarians to restrict the range 
of wants in some way, but that it is ad hoc to exclude some morally permissible 
wants from consideration. The basic interests utilitarian answers that, in the 
international context, there are good reasons for these restrictions, and so focusing 
only on them is well-motivated. This is in part an acceptance of the objection, but 
only insofar as the objection pointed out the unreasonableness of excluding some 
classes of wants at the level of moral foundations.
I have said that, when considering international relations, there are good reasons 
for limiting theoretical and practical concern to the basic wants of persons. What are
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those reasons?5 First, these are the wants that are generally valued most highly by 
people. Secondly, satisfaction of basic wants are necessary conditions for the 
satisfaction of any non-basic wants. The facts that people generally value their 
interests in obtaining food and physical security above their other interests (say, in 
obtaining the goods of culture), and that protection of these interests is a 
precondition for the protection of the others, are both ways of saying that basic 
interests are, morally speaking, very important. These two reasons do not preclude 
the possibility that a sufficient number of non-basic wants could tip the scales in the 
other direction, but it does make that possibility seem highly unlikely, especially 
when the following reason is considered. The third reason is that it is difficult to 
satisfy the non-basic wants of individuals in far-away countries, whereas it is 
relatively easy to satisfy basic wants in those countries. Consider the undeniable 
interest persons have in obtaining cultural goods. That interest is protected and 
promoted by ensuring that the distinctive cultures of different societies function 
effectively; but the functioning of a culture is in general best left to those who 
participate in sustaining it. This suggests that promoting this particular interest is 
best achieved by leaving cultural matters to insiders. Outsiders are more likely to 
misinterpret features of unfamiliar cultures, with the likely consequence of cultural 
impoverishment when they act on those misinterpretations. Promotion of basic 
interests, whose variation is much less wide-ranging across societies, is 
accordingly easier to achieve.6 Moreover, the goal of creating and sustaining 
cultural goods will not be pursued properly unless vital interests are protected. The 
focus on basic wants or vital interests can be nothing more than a general 
recommendation, however, and nothing said here can rule out expansion of the 
class of globally-relevant wants or interests in a particular case.
Basic interests utilitarianism is not susceptible to the objection that utilitarian 
theories fail to take proper account of needs. This criticism maintains that 
utilitarianism in all its variants focuses on desires and the maximization of their 
satisfaction even when needs go unmet as a consequence of the maximizing
5 Cf. Elfstrom, Ethics for a Shrinking World ,15.
6 This is not to say that a simple redistribution of resources will succeed in bringing about 
significant changes to the meeting of vital interests. The World Health Organization's division of 
Intensified Cooperation (ICO), set up in 1994, has already had a marked effect in this regard, but 
its experience does not hold universally. For instance, this program "has achieved a higher rate of 
child immunisation in poor regions of Guinea-Bissau than in the US." The reason for this sort of 
success is that "much of its work focuses on helping governments to formulate their own health 
priorities and to channel resources to where they are most needed. At present, millions of dollars in 
aid go to waste because poor countries cannot use the money effectively and donors dictate the 
terms." George Graham and Frances Williams, 'WHO and Baltimore share prescriptions', Financial 
Times (London), August 16, 1995, 3. Even if basic interests are the only focal point of aid, the 
assistance is most effective when it is not tied to programs designed to make profits for Northern 
transnationals.
process.7 The objection does not touch those consequentialist approaches which 
focus on needs rather than desires (i.e., those that stipulate for 'utility' or 'welfare' 
a more objective definition than the desire approach allows). Consequentialist 
theories which do not focus exclusively on desire fulfillment are not fatally 
damaged. Another way to think of basic interests utilitarianism is that it limits the 
desires which will count for the purposes of aggregation; it therefore imports some 
objective conception of what it is that people ought to want even when they would 
disagree in some instances with what is included in that conception. Of course, the 
arguments generating the list of basic interests are closely tied to the facts about 
what people actually do want. The connection is often complicated, however, in at 
least two ways. First, there are cases where some people do not want what they 
actually need to survive and live a normal human life. Such people -- hunger 
strikers, for instance -- might be motivated by ideals which lead them to forego the 
requirements of existence in order to further some larger, perhaps collective cause. 
These people constitute a special exception for the basic interests utilitarian; the fact 
that they are clearly special cases, however, lends weight to the theory's 
applicability in standard cases. An alternative instance in which people do not want 
what they need is the existence of people who are psychologically handicapped in 
some way, and as a consequence are incapable of knowing what it is they need to 
survive. Here the objectivist character of the theory averts the difficulties such 
persons raise for wholly desire-based conceptions. Secondly, there are cases where 
lack of knowledge, on the part of those not mentally impaired in some other way, 
severs the link between needs and wants. For instance, most people want to be 
healthy and so also want to obtain adequate nutrition for themselves, but they may 
not realize that they need a certain vitamin intake to satisfy that want, hence they do 
not want what they in fact need. An objective concept of utility dissolves this 
problem of ignorance by shifting the focus to what individuals would want if they 
had adequate information about what was needed to protect their vital interests.8
3.2. The Implications of Utilitarianism for Global Justice
Consequentialists writing about international issues defend a variety of practical 
recommendations. Onora O'Neill accuses utilitarianism of giving rise to directly
7 Onora O'Neill, in several of her works, has pressed this objection. See, for instance, 'Hunger, 
Needs, and Rights', in Steven Luper-Foy (ed.), Problems of International Justice (Boulder and 
London: Westview, 1988), 69.
8 Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 140, distinguishes 'welfare' from 
'utility' and says that, in ordinary usage, "welfare is an objective concept rather than a subjective 
concept. Welfare corresponds roughly to the absence of harm (i.e., the presence of adequate food, 
clothing and shelter, freedom from pain and suffering, and so on)." If we accept this suggestion, 
the position outlined in the text could be renamed 'Basic Interests Welfarism', or even simply 
'Welfarism'.
opposed views about international obligations.9 For instance, Peter Singer 
recommends, on utilitarian grounds, large-scale redistribution from rich to poor 
irrespective of nation-state boundaries,10 while Garrett Hardin (not to be confused 
with Russell Hardin), combining a broadly consequentialist view with a 
commitment to neo-Malthusian ideas about population growth, argues that, if the 
aim is to minimize suffering, there should be no redistribution whatsoever.11 But if 
utilitarianism does not generate a single policy recommendation, it lacks the 
determinacy which was supposed to have been one of its central virtues. Will 
Kymlicka argues that, as utilitarian theories have become more sophisticated in the 
face of the complexities of both empirical disagreement and moral reasoning, they 
have abandoned their heritage of radical critique, reformism, and anti-traditionalism; 
"...utilitarianism does not immediately identify any set of policies as distinctly 
superior. Modem utilitarianism, despite its radical heritage, no longer defines a 
distinctive political position."12
While O'Neill and Kymlicka offer accurate assessments of utilitarianism as a 
family of approaches to political morality, their claims do not constitute a very 
telling criticism of any particular utilitarian view. For utilitarians can still (i) 
carefully outline a distinctive characterization of 'utility' that best suits 
contemporary global conditions, and (ii) assess the best available empirical evidence 
in order to develop policies for utility-maximization. Disagreements within the 
utilitarian camp can then be adjudicated by evaluating both the theory of 'utility' and 
the empirical evidence. We should note that any ethical theory needs some account 
of the good, at least if it holds it to be desirable to do good, so lack of utilitarian 
unanimity on this point hardly constitutes a shortcoming unique to that particular 
school of moral and political thinking. Moreover, it is surely not a drawback for a 
theory of international ethics that it requires careful examination of the causes of 
suffering and the available means for overcoming it.
9 See, for instance, Onora O'Neill, 'Transnational Justice', in David Held (ed.), Political Theory 
Today (Oxford: Polity, 1991), 283; or Onora O'Neill, Faces of Hunger: An Essay on Poverty. 
Justice and Development (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986), 56ff.
10 Peter Singer, 'Famine, Affluence and Morality', in Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1972), 
229-44. References will be to the version reprinted in Charles Beitz, et al. (eds.), International 
Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 247-61.
11 Garrett Hardin, 'Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor', in Psychology Today 8 
(1974), 38-43. Garrett Hardin addresses these same issues in Living Within Limits (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993). I do not deal with this issue at any length in this work, but I should note 
that Garrett Hardin's neo-Malthusianism is a non-starter, since Third World populations are 
expanding rapidly even with the extreme poverty and neglect they are now experiencing. So the 'do 
nothing' approach is no solution at all, because it ensures that there will be a catastrophe.
12 Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1990), 47. The utilitarian Gerard Elfstrom, on the other hand, prefers utilitarianism to 
alternative approaches to international morality because it is more flexible, more sensitive to 
context. See his Ethics for a Shrinking World , 12.
Proceeding then to consider the implications of what I take to be the best version 
of utilitarianism as applied to the entire globe, we should first look at the facts of 
deprivation. Just as a sampling of a depressing story, consider the following. 
Approximately 750 million people go hungry every day because they are in extreme 
poverty.13 One third of the population of the world lacks clean water, one half of 
the world's population lacks sanitation adequate to prevent the imminent likelihood 
of the spread of disease, and millions of children die each year from diseases 
against which they could be immunized.14 All of this coexists "with over a quarter 
of the world's population living at material standards vastly in excess of anything 
required to meet their basic needs."15 Any satisfactory utilitarian theory (indeed any 
satisfactory theory, utilitarian or otherwise) must be sensitive to these statistics; in a 
world with such advanced productive, technological and transporting capacities, the 
very existence of such miserable conditions is cause for concern. The massive scale 
of the crisis only serves to strengthen the case for addressing and attempting to 
overcome this predicament, so an adequate theoretical approach to these problems 
should accommodate and explain beliefs about the wrongness of this situation, 
beliefs which arguably form the core of most people's considered moral 
judgements.16
'Basic Interests Utilitarians' are of course especially sensitive to the failure to 
protect the vital needs of individuals, so they can easily register the harms the 
current international system either creates or allows to happen. Furthermore, such 
utilitarians recommend that — given the falsity of Malthusian views about 
population -- large-scale redistribution of wealth and resources from rich countries 
to poor countries is morally required, since this is the only way to maximize the 
satisfaction of the basic wants of persons, their desires for the means to life itself 
and to the conditions for satisfactory functioning within one's society.
13 Hans Binswanger and Pierre Landell-Mills, The World Bank's Strategy for Reducing Poverty 
and Hunger (New York: World Bank, 1995). The future is likely to be much worse than the 
present. Harry Walters, the World Bank advisor on food security in Africa, forecasts that the 
proportion of the world's seriously malnourished people in Africa alone is expected to rise from 20 
percent in 1995 to 45 percent by 2010.
14 Stephen Nathanson, Patriotism. Morality, and Peace (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 
1993), 181, citing Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures 1989 (Washington, 
D.C.: World Priorities, 1989), 24-35.
15 Brian Barry, 'Justice, Freedom, and Basic Income', in Horst Siebert (ed.), The Ethical 
Foundations of the Market Economy: International Workshop (Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul 
Siebeck), 1994), 75.
16 Of course, utilitarians could not judge a state of affairs to be wrong simply because it is 
characterized by widespread suffering, for that suffering first has to be weighed against the positive 
side of the ledger (the numbers of people with their basic interests protected), and then compared to 
possible alternatives, before an overall assessment can be made.
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If the general cosmopolitan perspective is thought to be a reasonable one,17 then 
this form of utilitarianism is a plausible view, not only for its consistency with a 
reasonable belief that suffering is bad, but also because it suggests a reformation of 
the international institutions which through their normal functioning have allowed 
this suffering to come about. Much of the empirical argument needed to justify this 
practical suggestion will be assumed for the present, for I want to assess 'basic 
interests utilitarianism' as a theory of international morality. Accordingly, I will 
allow that the facts and the best way to deal with them are as outlined above, and 
move on to evaluate the normative core of this form of utilitarian political morality.
3.3. Two Objections to Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism has been criticized for so many alleged shortcomings that it is 
difficult to know where to begin. I propose two criteria for selecting objections. 
First, an objection should to go to the moral core of the theory, to what it is that 
makes the theory utilitarian. Secondly, we should be especially concerned with 
objections that arise most clearly in a global context. The two objections I consider 
satisfy both criteria. The first criticism says that utilitarianism asks of individuals 
and institutions what cannot be required of them. Maximizing utility, it is often 
said, would mean giving up the lifestyles and relationships we know and value, and 
these are demands that we should not have to meet. The second criticism says not 
that utilitarianism demands too much but that it permits too much: utilitarians fail to 
rule out actions and policies which should be forbidden, such as the sacrifice of 
some individuals for the sake of the greater overall good. Utilitarianism is thus 
taken to be too permissive.18
In the context of debates on international distributive justice, these criticisms take 
particular forms. For example, redistributing wealth and resources from the rich to 
the poor countries so as to promote the maximal satisfaction of basic interests is 
asking too much of the people in well-off countries (the overdemandingness 
objection); and promoting the consequentialist goal may result in the using of some 
individuals for the sake of the greater good, whereas (mere) maximization should 
not be the one and only criterion of decision-making (the 'too permissive' 
objection). I will argue that the overdemandingness objection can be deflected to a 
large extent, at least in its application to international justice. I will then consider the 
'too permissive' objection, arguing that, while utilitarians need not support
17 Theories fundamentally opposed to cosmopolitanism are considered in Part Two, Chapters Five 
through Eight.
18 These objections are stated in many works on ethics. See for instance, Gilbert Harman, The 
Nature of Morality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), Chapter 13.
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violations of rights, their reasons for not doing so fail to capture precisely what it is 
about rights violations that makes them wrong.
Is Utilitarianism Too Demanding?
Considerations of diminishing marginal utility suggest that a distribution leading 
to the maximization of such wealth and resources as are needed for the protection of 
basic interests would be one much closer to equal shares for everyone in the world. 
Peter Singer's utilitarian argument for the claim that we should prevent the suffering 
of the world's deprived people when doing so does not require us to sacrifice 
"anything of comparable moral importance," leads to an egalitarian conclusion, but 
one which seems seriously burdensome for individuals in the rich countries, despite 
Singer's suggestion that the "comparable moral importance" principle is relatively 
"uncontroversial."19 Do we really believe we should be required to redistribute up 
to the point where further giving would reduce us to a condition below that of those 
to whom we are giving? Have we acted wrongly when we give anything less?
One response to the overdemandingness objection is to accuse it of begging the 
question.20 Knowledge of what is too demanding depends upon a prior solution to 
the problem of what is morally required, and if we already know what is morally 
required the proper response to utilitarianism is not to accuse it of 
overdemandingness but simply to point out its incompatibility with the preferred 
criterion. But the accusations usually levelled against utilitarianism on this point do 
not say why it is that their anti-utilitarian view should be accepted. Hence James 
Fishkin's claim that some significant moral argument is advanced by citing "the 
kinds of limits on moral demands we commonly presuppose in secular Western 
moral culture" is empty.21 Fishkin claims, plausibly, that we assume the existence 
of a "zone of indifference" which permits many of our actions to be directed toward 
ends which clearly are not utility-maximizing. In addition, the other side of this coin 
is that there is a "cut-off for heroism," that is, individuals are not obligated to 
sacrifice themselves or their perceived interests beyond some (hazily specified) 
point.22 These limits on what morality can require of us are merely stated, they are 
not defended; hence they ought not to deter the utilitarian, whose purpose is in this 
case to question received opinion. We want to know why the zone should not be
19 Singer, 'Famine, Affluence and Morality1, 249.
20 Brian Barry, Theories of Justice (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1989), 82-3.
21 James Fishkin, 'Theories of justice and international relations: the limits of liberal theory', in 
Anthony Ellis (ed.), Ethics and International Relations (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1986), 4.
22 Fishkin claims that other liberal, non-utilitarian theories are guilty of the same crime, since — 
like Beitz's contractarian theory -- they are "systematically impartial" in their assessment of states 
of affairs. But utilitarianism is the most demanding of this group of approaches. I address this 
misconception of impartiality at some length in Chapter Five.
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restricted23 and, similarly, why the cut-off point should not be shifted to render 
obligatory many of those actions and policies commonly thought to be heroic.
The petitio principii reply to the overdemandingness objection is not fatal, 
however. It would only be so either if no grounds could be offered for the 
commonly accepted limits or if such grounds as could be provided failed to show 
that what is wrong with utilitarianism is precisely that the amount individuals would 
be required to give up beyond those limits is more than those grounds permit. The 
question of demands becomes most important when we consider what persons, 
with the characteristic and perhaps unchangeable weaknesses we know them to 
possess, would be able to achieve while retaining their identities as individuals. We 
therefore need to ask whether people could live with utilitarian demands while 
continuing to live recognizably human lives.
When discussing the demands made on individuals and institutions, we need to 
clarify the point at issue by asking: 'Too demanding for whom?' Any system of 
moral demands will be demanding for some group of people, for example, either 
the propertied or the impoverished. We are then, I think, led to ask which of the 
interests opposed to each other has greater moral force. In this case, the interests 
protected by the claims of private property are opposed to the interests protected by 
claims to subsistence. We must choose one set of interests over the other, since it is 
not possible to accommodate both sets simultaneously. Viewed in this way, 
protecting the interest in subsistence begins to look more plausible because the 
urgency of the interest in subsistence is greater than the urgency of the interests 
protected by private property rights. Jeremy Waldron puts this point nicely:
In general, where resources are scarce relative to human wants, any system 
of rights or entitlements will seem demanding to those who are constrained 
by it. If an economic system includes provision for welfare assistance, it 
may seem overly demanding to taxpayers. But if it does not include such 
provision, then the system of property rights in such an economy will seem 
overly demanding to the poor, requiring as it does that they refrain from 
making use of resources (belonging to others) that they need in order to 
survive. As usual, the question is not whether we are to have a system of 
demanding rights, but how the costs of these demands are to be 
distributed.24
23 On traditional accounts of utilitarianism, where utility is interpreted more expansively, the 
utilitarian claim would be that the zone of indifference should be eliminated altogether; but if 
'utility' means 'protection of basic interests', there will likely be room for the pursuit of personal 
projects and the like, consistent with meeting the demands of the theory.
24 Jeremy Waldron, 'Rights', in Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit (eds.), A Companion to 
Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 580.
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While these points are worth making, it nonetheless is true that the 
overdemandingness objection is generally put forward on behalf of the well-off, 
therefore it is the force of the objection so understood that I will assess.
Overdemandingness is a problem for a theory of international moral obligation in 
a way that it is not for simpler cases of actions requiring sacrifice on the part of 
persons. Peter Singer attempts to persuade his readers by starting with an 
uncontroversial example, namely, that it is right for any person to save the life of an 
innocent child who is drowning in a nearby shallow pool. There are many elements 
involved in this example,25 but for our purposes the most important one is that it 
concerns an individual's duty to promote the good where individual actions can 
succeed by themselves in bringing about the desired result (in this case, saving the 
innocent child). In most cases saving the child's life would be considered a duty, 
even though it might require some sacrifice or risk on the part of the duty-bearer. 
But Singer argues by analogy that people in rich countries ought to do what they 
can to save the lives of those in poor countries who would die without their help. 
The problem with this argumentative strategy is that it is addressed to individuals in 
rich countries, and it is this feature which lends credibility to the 
overdemandingness objection. The problem is that solitary individuals in large-scale 
cases like this are unable "to determine an outcome independently of the actions of 
others."26 This suggests that, even if Singer is right about the drowning child case, 
the complexities of international suffering will make that case importantly different, 
most importantly in that it introduces considerations of strategic interaction. 
Arguments by analogy only work when the two cases being compared are 
relevantly similar, but the 'drowning child' case and the 'starving millions' case are 
dissimilar in a way that makes the latter morally more complex.
In addressing only individuals, utilitarians run into the following problem. In so 
far as the aim of action is to maximize utility, it seems to follow that utilitarian 
individuals should give even more whenever others fail to give as much as they 
can. This is not only unfair but impossible, for, on the one hand, people should not 
be required to give more than an equitable share towards the bringing about of good 
outcomes, and on the other hand, it is true by definition that utility cannot be 
maximized when some are not doing what they can to contribute to this goal.27 But
25 For a detailed account of the relevant features of Singer's argument, including replies to some 
central criticisms and an overall assessment, see Brian Barry, 'Humanity and Justice in Global 
Perspective', in Liberty and Justice: Essays in Political Theory. Volume 2 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1991), 183-87 (Originally published in 1982).
26 Hardin, Morality within the Limits of Reason , xvii.
27 It might be objected here that utilitarianism does not require that utility be maximized; it 
requires that the agent do the action which, of those available to him, will maximize utility.
Since, it might be thought, an individual can do that in this case — he can do that act which would 
produce more utility than would any other action he could perform — there is a sense in which it is
if we shift the focus to institutions, the problem faced by solitary individuals 
disappears, for compliance can be enforced by those institutions, thereby bringing 
lazy or otherwise uncooperative persons into line in a duty-sharing cooperative 
venture.
If one's aim is the utilitarian one of utility-maximization, institutions will loom 
large in one's moral and political theory, since institutions "can help us achieve 
better results than we could hope to achieve through individual actions, even well- 
intentioned individual actions."28 This point coheres nicely with the requirement to 
understand and assess the international basic structure that I mentioned earlier.29 
Rather than attempt to bring about good results by oneself, utilitarians (should) say 
that we should endeavour to create and support good-promoting institutions. 
Moreover, if such institutions are brought into existence, the demands utilitarianism 
places on individuals will be significantly reduced. Or, more precisely, in the 
absence of these institutions, it is, as we have said, literally impossible for 
individuals to succeed at bringing about what utilitarianism requires, for the 
limitations of isolated individual action render each person capable of only minor 
contributions to overall utility. Utility maximization is possible, then, only when an 
institutional framework is in place for doing so. It follows that utilitarianism 
imposes a duty on individuals to work for the creation of that institutional 
framework, since this is a necessary condition of the ultimate ethical end.
It might be thought that this move does not obviate the overdemandingness 
objection, for if it is true that such institutions will enable utility-maximization, then 
each individual should be doing all he or she can to bring these institutions into 
existence. But this seems just as demanding as the requirement that each person 
give some significant proportion of his money to the badly off: everyone should 
either quit their job (if they have one) and work to bring about the necessary global 
institutional framework or donate a large proportion of their salary to the relevant 
lobbying organization. The point here is that focusing on institutions does not 
lessen the demands on the individual, it merely refocuses them. And, in addition, 
the problems of cooperation identified earlier would remain.30 These points are 
persuasive to some extent, but they fail to recognize that the foundations of an 
international institutional framework are not entirely non-existent, so it is not as if 
each of us must start from scratch here. What is needed is likely only the alteration
not impossible that utility can be maximized in this case. In response to this point, I maintain 
that there is no action that the agent, acting in isolation, can perform here that would maximize 
utility; and if more utility could be produced by enforced cooperation, the agent's duty is not to act 
on his own where that does some good but less than could be produced by cooperative activity.
28 Hardin, Morality within the Limits of Reason ,11.
29 See Chapter One.
30 I am grateful to Anthony Ellis for raising these points.
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of activities by organizations which already exist, and if such alteration can only be 
brought about by constant lobbying, or by each of us paying a significant amount to 
fund such lobbying, then surely this is not too much to ask. I am assuming here, of 
course, that we think it important to eradicate the momentous suffering now 
endured by a very large number of human beings. Demanding such actions may 
well be, but not too demanding, given the expected benefits.
If it is now objected that the utilitarian criterion makes excessive demands on 
certain affluent states, since some may be required to give up more wealth and 
resources than otherwise whenever some states fail to live up to their commitments, 
the solution is to "locate Government House in UN Plaza."31 That is to say, the 
theory recommends the setting up of an enforcement mechanism to ensure that 
individual states each contribute their fair share to the goal of maximizing the global 
satisfaction of basic interests.32 International compliance with the requirements of 
utilitarianism would make it easier to meet the demands of the principle because the 
combined wealth of the rich nations is considerable, and so the amount required 
from any individual nation would be lessened. I should add, however, that if, say, 
10% of GNP is the amount necessary to do the job, no appeal to considered 
judgements about zones of indifference and cut-offs for heroism should deter the 
theorist -- or the citizen — from accepting that amount as what is morally required.
We should note as well that we are discussing 'basic interests utilitarianism', 
which is much less demanding than versions of the theory with more expansive 
conceptions of utility. This fact further weakens the overdemandingness objection. 
The charge of excessive strain on potential contributors to projects aimed at helping 
the badly-off in distant countries can be deflected if  there is reason to think that 
making contributions would not result in excessive impoverishment of contributors. 
And the combination of (i) international cooperation to protect the vital interests of 
individuals, and (ii) focusing only on vital interests, limits the demands of justice 
considerably.
In sum, the answer to the overdemandingness objection is as follows: the 
sacrifices required by utilitarianism are not excessive, at least not when three points 
are made clear. First, the theory focuses on basic want satisfaction. This diminishes 
the number of interests that require protection: it must be less demanding to satisfy a 
set of basic desires than it is to satisfy all the desires (or rational desires) of
31 Robert E. Goodin, 'Government House Utilitarianism1, in Lincoln Allison (ed.), The Utilitarian 
Response (London: Sage, 1990), 146. Here it looks as though moral cosmopolitanism requires, 
for its implementation, institutional cosmopolitanism, i.e., some global institutional framework 
with enforcement capabilities. The precise form of world institutional set-up needed to enforce the 
demands of cosmopolitan justice is not obvious, however.
32 The point here might seem to be less a matter of overdemandingness, and more one of ensuring 
a just distribution of the costs of meeting vital interests around the world.
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individuals, since the former is a subset of the latter. Secondly, the theory requires 
cooperative action as a necessary condition of the fulfillment of the duties of 
individuals. This rules out the possibility of large-scale avoidance of actions 
required by the criterion: public enforcement of duties to cooperate in schemes 
aimed at meeting the demand to protect basic interests makes it less likely that 
solitary individuals will have to shoulder the burden of self-sacrifice because others 
fail to contribute their fair share. Thirdly, the theory is concerned with public 
institutions. This limits the agents to whom the requirements of the utilitarian 
criterion directly apply: when asking about excessive sacrifice, we then look at the 
capacity of a set of institutions to achieve a given set of results.
Is Utilitarianism Too Permissive?: History and Justice
In what way is utilitarianism meant to be too permissive as a theory of 
international moral obligation? I distinguish two ways. First, utilitarians wrongly 
permit historical or backward-looking considerations to be entirely discounted. 
Secondly, utilitarians are accused of permitting distributive injustices in the name of 
utility maximization.
The first objection stems from the recognition that utilitarians are 
consequentialists. The question to be answered by the consequentialist is: Are 
consequences the only thing that matter morally? The consequentialist claim is not 
simply that consequences matter, it is that consequences matter and nothing else 
matters, when deciding what course of action would be right in the circumstances. 
An important objection to the forward-looking emphasis of consequentialists is the 
one stated by Stuart Hampshire, what I call the objection from historical 
consciousness, which emphasizes the ineliminability of backward-looking reasons 
in the justification of political and social arrangements.33 The value of consequential 
calculation need not, indeed should not, be denied. However, moral guidance can 
be provided equally well by reference to memories of times past, and 
consequentialism fails to take proper account of the importance of such reference.
But consequentialists have an answer to this objection. It is that, if familial, 
national, and other communal considerations which include an ineliminable 
reference to the past have a direct effect on the current desires of individuals, then 
consequentialism requires such considerations to be taken into account. Hence 
consequentialists cannot be accused of ignoring them, except in cases where they 
are not thought important by the individuals concerned. But in such cases it would 
be bizarre to take account of communal sentiments, for they are not valued by 
anyone (or at least not by a significant number of persons).
33 Stuart Hampshire, 'Justice is Strife', Presidential Address to the American Philosophical 
Association, Western Division, 1991. Further discussion of appeals to history to justify moral 
claims are considered in Part Two of this thesis, most directly in Chapter Six on Nationality.
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I think this reply is successful as far as it goes, but that is not very far. For both 
Hampshire's objection and this consequentialist reply (as I have stated it) seem to 
accept the desires of persons as they are. So both would have to find a place in 
ethical reasoning for the desires of racists, for instance. Hampshire (or those whose 
position he is characterizing) would be committed to this acceptance on the grounds 
that ethical argument must find a place for "the equal claims of memory and 
imagination to supply moral direction, alongside the claims of the calculation of 
consequences."34 Imaginative association on the part of racists with racist history 
and the needs of racists to retain a memory of great racist leaders would require 
taking full notice of racist views, a controversial position to say the least. On the 
other hand, consequentialists who seek the maximization of want-satisfaction 
would find a place for 'racists' wants' in their theory because they are committed to 
the equal consideration of the wants of all persons, even those (e.g., racists) who 
want some persons' wants to be denied satisfaction!
Consequentialist approaches which focus solely on the equal protection of vital 
interests are not susceptible to the above criticism, for the only wants they consider 
are those for the satisfaction of vital interests. Such desires are on the whole less 
controversial than the diverse desires conceivable on more inclusive accounts. But 
notice what the 'vital interests consequentialist' says in reply to Hampshire's 
objection from historical consciousness: If the protection of vital interests conflicts 
with a policy of recognizing the historical memories of communities, then so much 
the worse for historical memories. If a trade-off is to be made, it should favour 
whatever is more important to the living of a satisfactory human life, and since the 
protection of vital interests is plausibly taken to be a necessary condition for such a 
life, such protection takes priority.
Turning to the second objection under the 'too permissive' heading, the claim 
here is that utility maximization would entail sacrificing the interests of some 
persons in the name of the greater good, thereby allowing some persons to be 
treated as means to the larger impersonal, aggregate end. I take this criticism to be 
exemplified by the objection from justice, which says that maximizing good 
consequences allows some to have their rights violated, but that the general good, 
or the good of the greater number, or the net increase in good produced, is not 
sufficient reason for imposing such costs on some individuals. Some interests of 
persons — for instance, the interests each person has in the basic requirements of a 
recognizably human existence, i.e., food, shelter, physical security, education to a 
level necessary to participate in the common activities of the society — are not to be
34 Ibid., 26.
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traded off for the less important interests of others, even many others, even when 
such trade-offs maximize satisfactions or happiness.
There is nothing in traditional utilitarian theory to rule out neglecting the basic 
interests of one person in order to satisfy the relatively trivial interests of a lot of 
other people. One solution to this problem is to allow balancing of interests against 
one another, but only in cases in which the interests are of equal moral importance. 
So, where persons A and B each have an interest in obtaining shelter, there can be a 
conflict when, for reasons of scarcity, both interests cannot be satisfied 
simultaneously. In such cases some method of conflict resolution is needed. But, to 
turn to a different case, A's interest in obtaining shelter should not be ignored or 
overruled simply because doing so would satisfy the interests of persons D, E, and 
F (whose access to adequate shelter is secure) in obtaining an extra amount of 
disposable income. The principle at work here is, 'The interests a person has which 
are of fundamental importance to a recognizably human existence should not be 
subject to a calculative procedure whereby those interests could be overruled by an 
aggregation of the less important interests of other persons.' Acting on this 
principle would rule out a utilitarian balancing which focuses merely on the 
satisfaction of wants regardless of content. We are thus led to consider other, more 
restricted versions of the theory, such as the basic interests utilitarian position.
We might ask: What would be the point of a 'just' distribution of goods if that 
distribution did not protect as many vital interests as could be protected by some 
alternative distribution? Some would say that there would be no point, at least if we 
carefully distinguish standard forms of utilitarianism (which seek to maximize 
want-satisfaction) from a consequentialist approach that seeks to maximize the 
satisfaction of persons' basic needs or to provide the most wide-ranging protection 
of their vital interests. Traditional 'want-satisfaction utilitarianism' fails precisely 
because it could leave some persons without their vital interests protected in cases 
where doing so is required by a distribution of resources that satisfies more wants 
than any alternative.
It is of course in the nature of the utilitarian criterion of right action that no 
particular type of act is ever ruled out of consideration as always wrong to do. 
Protections for individuals, say, in the form of rights, always admit of exceptions. 
This is a serious worry, since (as has often been pointed out) the protections 
provided to individuals by utilitarian reasoning are potentially very weak and 
uncertain. No doubt, utilitarian calculations will result in some — perhaps most — 
persons having the security provided by ascriptions of rights, but the problem is 
that the impartial perspective of justice requires that a distribution of goods is to be 
acceptable to all persons and from each point of view. But if a person has her basic 
rights violated, it will hardly be satisfying for her to be told that the distribution
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under which she suffers is utility-maximizing. To describe the rights assigned 
under utilitarianism as 'defeasible' or 'prima facie' is not sufficiently informative of 
the reasons utilitarians offer for overriding individual rights-claims. Defeasibility 
can pertain for different reasons: overriding of individual rights can be 
recommended either when (1) utility would be maximized by doing so, or (2) it is 
simply not possible to meet all equivalent individual claims, as in cases of extreme 
scarcity. Reason (2) still allows that rights may be overridden, but rights will be 
more secure in this case than in the utility-based rights theory.
Perhaps the permissiveness objection succeeds only given an implausible 
conception of utility such as the one we previously dismissed. If on the other hand 
'utility' means 'basic interests', the objection might fail, for violating the basic 
interests of a person would then be recommended only when doing so is necessary 
for the protection of the very same interests of others. In some cases, it is simply 
not possible to protect the equivalent interests of everyone, so comparable vital 
interests will be susceptible to a trade-off procedure. But in the standard cases to 
which government policies are meant to apply, the general rule that basic interests 
should be accorded priority will provide all the protections it is reasonable to want.
But there is still a problem with utilitarianism even in its most plausible, 'basic 
interests' formulation. For we can imagine cases which suggest that the justificatory 
power of the theory is questionable. Consider the following example. Resources 
are relatively scarce, and some people are not able, given their current shares, to 
satisfy their basic wants. (Note that this case is an accurate description of the 
contemporary world and not an "imaginary" example in the bad, irrelevant sense.) 
Suppose that depriving a well-off North American or Western European of the 
means to life by withdrawing from him his resources can enable twenty Central 
Americans or Africans to escape their condition of near-starvation. What do 
utilitarians recommend in this case?
A simplistic utilitarian response would be that, since twenty lives are worth more 
than one life, the wealthy North American should be stripped of his wealth. But that 
answer fails to consider the ill effects of implementing a general policy stating that 
individuals in wealthy societies may be sacrificed for the provision of resources for 
basic needs to a sufficiently large number of others. It is reasonable to believe that 
no such policy would in fact maximize utility. The rules that structure and define 
public institutions must speak the language of generality and eschew reference to 
particular cases.35 Since rules requiring the systematic violation of people's basic 
interests will not maximize utility (in any sense of that term), utilitarian rules will
35 Robert E. Goodin, 'Government House Utilitarianism', 148. For the idea that the utilitarian 
principle applies to institutions, see John Rawls, 'Two Concepts of Rules', Philosophical Review 
64 (1955), 3-32.
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exclude such treatment. Hence a better answer to the problem is that the well-off 
should not be victimized in this way as a matter of policy or institutional 
arrangement.36
This utilitarian reply coheres with our considered judgements about distributive 
justice, but it cannot explain crucial features of the problem of distributive justice 
itself. It is no good for a theory of political morality simply to be consistent with the 
requirements of justice; we want the theory to explain or account for the fact that we 
determine those demands as we do. Utilitarianism says that sacrifices should be 
limited because widespread sacrifice would not maximize utility. But an alternative, 
and better, explanation for restricting the sacrifices individuals should be required to 
make is that where possible no individual vital interest ought to be outweighed by a 
group of vital interests somewhere else.37 The importance of vital interests might be 
lost in the aggregative procedure. This is not, however, to deny the point that 
sacrificing some interests for the sake of others is permissible in some cases.
Even if the reason for limiting sacrifices that utilitarianism provides is only 
somewhat unsatisfactory, a stronger objection to the justificatory power of the 
theory is that it does not correctly explain why in our example it is wrong to deprive 
the well-off North American or Western European. Most would agree that the 
advantaged person should not have his resources taken from him. But the 
wrongness of resource-stripping in this case lies in its unfair imposition of the costs 
of meeting the needs of the poor: in the example, one person is to bear the burden, 
whereas ceteris paribus this burden should be shared out amongst all those capable 
of providing the needed assistance. Resources can still be taken from our well-off 
person, but the amount taken must be adjusted. More equitable burden-sharing 
might, as a matter of fact, maximize utility, but its desirability is not accounted for 
by this fact.
The need for some qualification of the standard utilitarian view is suggested by 
the commonsense notion of the unfairness of leaving some individuals very badly 
off as a consequence of implementing a policy designed to maximize benefit. This
36 It is not true in general that one life may not be sacrificed for the sake of twenty others. As a 
counterexample to the general claim, consider a wartime surgeon who must choose between 
spending his finite time and resources on saving one person or, alternatively, passing over that 
person and saving twenty less seriously injured but still potentially terminal others. This example 
does not show, however, that it is always right to save twenty lives at the price of losing one. For 
a discussion of this type of case, and its relevance to criticisms of utilitarianism, see James S. 
Fishkin, The Dialogue of Justice: Toward a Self-Reflective Society (London: Yale University 
Press, 1992), 20ff.
37 Where the numbers are large enough, say, where there are twenty opposing vital interests, and 
where any distribution will violate the vital interests of at least one person, the opposite 
conclusion is the correct one. In this sort of case, sacrifice is permitted, but only subject to 
considerations mentioned in the next paragraph.
point, along with much else relevant to our concerns, is clear from Jon Elster's 
interesting discussion of
the common-sense conception of welfare, [which] may be stated in four 
propositions, each of which modifies its predecessor. (1) Maximize total 
welfare. (2) Deviate from that goal if necessary to ensure that all achieve a 
minimum level of welfare. (3) Deviate from the requirement of a minimum 
level of welfare in the case of persons who fall below it because of their 
own choices. (4) Deviate from the principle of not supporting the persons 
identified in (3) if their failure to plan ahead and react to incentives is due to 
severe poverty and deprivation.38
Rather than the common-sense conception of welfare, we might see this as the 
outline of a conception of the requirements of justice. Its first proposition is 
utilitarian, and its first two propositions together roughly correspond to one 
understanding of the "basic interests" version of utilitarianism. The third claim 
introduces the undeniable role of personal responsibility and choice within any 
satisfactory account of justice: persons should be held accountable for the 
predictable consequences of their freely made choices. But the fourth point renders 
the third largely irrelevant to the current international situation, since the deep 
poverty and deprivation of the world's worst off people suggests that it would be 
both insulting and unjust to treat them as if their condition were the result of their 
own laziness, as if the blame for their suffering was all their own. (This is self- 
evident in the case of the world's starving children.) When extreme poverty has 
been eradicated, we can begin to consider the international implications of the 
choice principle (Elster's third proposition). Until then, there is much to be said for 
basic interests utilitarianism, if that view is understood as requiring the protection of 
basic interests as a qualification on the requirement to maximize interest- 
satisfaction.
Another point to make in this connection is that utilitarianism, considered as a 
public philosophy, involves adopting "institutions and practices and policies [as 
opposed to particular actions], on a utilitarian basis; and those must, by their nature, 
be publicly accessible and relatively long lasting.... We m u st... adapt our choices 
to standard situations recurring across protracted periods, and do so in full 
knowledge that the nature of our choices will sooner or later become common 
knowledge."39 The idea here is that using some persons as means to the 
achievement of the greater good cannot succeed as a matter o f policy, and it is only 
as a matter of policy that such an approach is available to would-be utilitarian public
38 Jon Elster, 'The Empirical Study of Justice', in David Miller and Michael Walzer (eds.), 
Pluralism. Justice, and Equality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 97.
39 Robert E. Goodin, Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), 22.
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officials. Yet another consideration, mentioned earlier, is that utilitarianism itself 
tends toward distributional equality (given diminishing marginal utility), thereby 
ruling out the prospect of singling out some group for especially bad (or especially 
good) treatment. Hence distributive injustices cannot issue from utilitarian public 
policies.
I think these points are plausible, but they only provide reasons for thinking that 
utilitarianism is not the monstrous philosophy it is sometimes thought to be; they do 
not sufficiently explain why it is that we think it is unjust at some fundamental level 
to leave some without access to the means necessary to meet their basic needs. I 
would maintain that utilitarianism is unable to explain this sort of injustice at any 
deep level because it cannot, at least at that level, rule out its implementation. What 
would normally be called violations of rights are generally rejected by utilitarians as 
well, but the utilitarian reasons for doing so — that they rarely, if ever, would 
maximize utility; that public policy must deal in generalities; and so on -- seem to 
miss what it is about rights violations that makes them morally offensive. The 
problem is not that utilitarianism cannot be rendered consistent with our considered 
convictions about justice, it is that its method of doing so is lacking as a moral 
explanation. It is as a response to this sort of problem that I have introduced basic 
interests utilitarianism, but it remains something of an open question whether or not 
this new variant of the theory is really rather a significantly different theory 
altogether, for it seems to prioritize basic interests protection even if doing so does 
not guarantee utility maximization. The question is open because one could argue 
on the one hand, as I have, that there are good utilitarian reasons for restricting the 
scope of "utility" to basic interests alone, while on the other hand, one wonders 
why it wouldn't be preferable to adopt a moral perspective which provides 
guarantees for the protection of basic interests at the ground-level, as does the basic 
rights theory outlined in Chapter Two.
Shelly Kagan points out that even theories which constrain actions, say, by 
forbidding rights-violations "might still lack more general permission to act 
nonoptimally -- requiring agents to promote the good within permissible means."40 
That is, even if it is admitted that there are restrictions on what may be done, it is 
still possible to maintain that, while recognizing those restrictions, there remains an 
obligation to maximize good or to produce the best consequences. Hence, even if 
the justice objection can be met -- say, by recognizing (virtually) inviolable 
protections for the basic interests of all persons -- one could consistently maintain 
that there is a general duty to produce the best consequences (while recognizing
40 Shelly Kagan, 'Does Consequentialism Demand Too Much?1, Philosophy and Public Affairs 
(1984), 240.
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certain impermissible means of doing so, i.e., violating basic interests). My view is 
that, as a political and hence public morality, basic interests utilitarianism can deal 
with the overdemandingness critique, but it cannot make clear why it is we think it 
right to enforce restrictions on the demand to promote good.
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Chapter Four: O'Neill and the Obligations of Justice 
4.1, Introduction
Onora O'Neill has made several interesting contributions to the debates on 
international distributive justice, both in her 1986 book, Faces of Hunger: An Essay 
on Poverty. Justice and Development1, and in at least a dozen articles published 
over the last two decades. My aim in this chapter is to give an outline of O'Neill's 
Kantian strategy for tackling the moral problems of international poverty and to 
defend a human rights approach against her objections.
I begin, in section 4.2, with an overview of O'Neill's Kantian theory of 
international morality, showing how the categorical imperative functions to test the 
maxims of individual and collective agents, and pointing out the respects in which 
O'Neill's version is different from, and superior to, traditional Kantian accounts. In 
section 4.3, I state O'Neill's main objections to a welfare rights theory of the sort 
defended in my Chapter One, and then respond to these objections, in the process 
presenting an original line of argument to show that O'Neill's own premisses 
commit her to such rights. And in section 4.4, I canvass some other objections to 
O'Neill's Kantian approach, dismissing specific claims of Thomas Nagel and 
Partha Dasgupta, and arguing that the Kantian strategy might be thought of as an 
alternative route to the conclusions reached earlier in this thesis. There are, 
however, seemingly fatal problems with the Kantian approach that render it — to put 
it mildly — less useful for justifying judgements about international justice than a 
rights-centred strategy.
4.2. Taking Obligations Seriously; O'NeiH's Maverick 
Kantianism
I begin my outline of O'Neill's theory with a recognition of its Kantian character. 
The basis of O'Neill's approach to international ethics is the Kantian categorical 
imperative (or Cl, for short), "Act only according to that maxim by which you can 
at the same time will that it should become a universal law."2 The test embodied in 
the appeal to the categorical imperative is a test of maxims, and a maxim is a 
subjective policy or rule on which an agent acts. For instance, a famous example of 
a maxim, obviously relevant to our project, is given by Kant himself: "Let each man 
be as happy as heaven wills, or as he can make himself; I will not take anything
1 Onora O'Neill, Faces of Hunger: An Essay on Poverty. Justice and Development (London: Allen 
and Unwin, 1986).
2 Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals , Second Edition, Translated by 
Lewis White Beck, (London: Collier Macmillan, 1990), 38 (Prussian Academy pagination, 421). 
This version of the categorical imperative is widely known as the Formula of Universal Law 
(FUL).
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from him or even envy him; but to his welfare or assistance in time of need I have 
no desire to contribute."3 To assess the moral permissibility of an agent's maxim, 
one determines whether it is possible for all others to act on that maxim as well. As 
O'Neill puts it, "The central conception of Kantian ethics is that a maxim should not 
be acted on if it could not (not should not or would not) be acted on by others. Here 
obligations are a matter of refraining from action whose fundamental principles 
others cannot share."4
The Kantian moral theory developed by O'Neill is clearly cosmopolitan, since it 
holds that all human beings are part of a single moral universe, in virtue of their 
shared capacity for rationality.5 Inasfar as we are all rational agents, we all require 
equal consideration. Impartiality is demanded by the Kantian test for maxims of 
action: people are not allowed to make exceptions for their own case; what one 
proposes to do must also be what any other agent could also do in those 
circumstances.
While O'Neill develops a Kantian cosmopolitan theory, there are some important 
ways in which her approach branches out in new directions. These innovations are, 
in my view, improvements on the original Kantian approach. I will mention two 
respects in which O'Neill's perspective differs from traditional Kantianism, and 
explain why I think her amendments are helpful.
An important element in O'Neill's theory of international justice is her emphasis 
upon the claim that human beings are embodied creatures with material and 
psychological needs.6 Kant of course recognized this fact as well, so O'Neill's 
perspective is not entirely original, but what is new -- as against the traditional 
Kantian approach — is the emphasis on the centrality of the needs of physically 
limited, partially rational persons for considering the acceptability of acting on 
maxims that affect the interests of others. If human beings are to act at all, they 
require food, water, protection from attack, and some basic skills. Accordingly, 
maxims which deny access to such necessities could not possibly pass the 
universalizability test and therefore are morally impermissible. As we will see, 
maxims which deny obligations to provide aid to those in need are 
nonuniversalizable maxims, and are therefore not permissible from a moral point of 
view, however much they may seem appealing from a purely self-interested 
standpoint.
3 Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals , 40 (Prussian Academy pagination, 
423).
4 Onora O'Neill, Faces of Hunger , 134.
5 Cf. Thomas Donaldson, 'Kant's Global Rationalism', in Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel (eds.), 
Traditions of International Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 144.
6 Onora O'Neill, Faces of Hunger , 135.
It is important to note that O’Neill's emphasis on human weakness and 
vulnerability brings out what can be found in Kant's own work. As Roger J. 
Sullivan says, Kant believes that to engage in moral deliberation,
... we need to be aware, for example, that we are dependent 
physical beings with needs to be met with the help of our reason. 
We need to know we are emotional as well as rational beings, so 
that we have to take an interest in something before we will act so as 
to attain it. ... We need to recognize that we are only contingently 
rational and do not always act intelligently even in prudential 
matters.7
Thus empirical facts about human beings are straightforwardly relevant to the 
project of understanding our moral lives as both agents and recipients of the actions 
of others. But the fact that
the application of the Categorical Imperative to human life requires 
us to take into account features about human beings that we can 
learn only from experience does not mean that Kant's theory is 
therefore based on experience or anthropology. His theory retains its 
objectivity because it remains an analysis of what it means to act as a 
rational agent, albeit now an agent who is contingently rational, 
dependent, physical, emotional, and so on.8
So the traditional Kantian emphasis on the requirements of rational action 
remains, but arguments about what constitutes rational or consistent willing must 
take full account of embodied, vulnerable, partially rational human nature.
O'Neill's second development of the traditional Kantian ethical approach is her 
explicit introduction of the idea that the Cl can serve as a test for the maxims of both 
individual agents and social agencies. When proposed maxims remain at the level of 
individual interaction, there is little hope that anything relevant will be said about 
global issues such as world hunger and poverty. Thus the reasonable way to 
proceed is to assess the maxims on which influential collective agencies act (i.e., 
nation-states, transnational corporations, powerful nongovernmental organizations 
like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund), thereby undertaking a 
moral assessment of the activities of those bodies most liable to have a lasting effect 
on the plight of the world's hungry people.
The categorical imperative test for maxims is akin to one type of contractarian test 
for proposed rules of action. Both tests judge rules or policies permissible 
whenever each person affected is taken into consideration and when none could 
reasonably veto what is being proposed. Maxims of action which pass the
7 Roger J. Sullivan, Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), 160.
8 Ibid.. emphases in original.
universalizability test are maxims that can serve as laws for everyone. Let us look at 
the way the Kantian categorical imperative test for maxims of action works in the 
context of a particular case.
Consider a transnational corporation, intent on increasing its shareholders' return 
on their investments and on increasing its market share. These corporate goals will 
affect the maxims on which the corporation may be taken to act in specific 
circumstances. Now imagine that this corporation offers to set up a factory in a 
poor country which is desperate for investment and, aware of this fact, the 
corporation successfully pressures the government of the poor country to offer 
extremely attractive terms (viewed from the corporation's perspective) in return for 
setting up shop there. If the poor nation accepts corporate investment on terms no 
relatively wealthy nation would accept, there is reason to believe that the gulf in 
bargaining power between the two parties has led to coercive imposition upon the 
poor country of an agreement on the terms of investment.9 Let us assume that the 
maxim on which the corporation acts is as follows: 'When we can best pursue 
corporate goals by investing in a relatively poor country, paying low wages and 
avoiding taxes, then we will do so, even if such investment coerces others into 
accepting our preferred terms.' Now to determine whether this maxim is morally 
permissible we ask whether it is possible for all agents to act on such a maxim. For 
the purposes of evaluation, the important point about this maxim is its general form, 
which is its claim that the agent will pursue a course of action even when doing so 
involves coercion. We next perform a thought experiment in which all agents act on 
a maxim involving coercion, and we are led to see that no such maxim is 
universalizable because one cannot simultaneously will (i) that I achieve my ends by 
coercing another, and (ii) that everyone achieves their ends in this way. As O'Neill 
says, "[p]rinciples can be universally acted on only when others' agency is 
respected, and the core of respect for agency is not to destroy or override it."10 The 
contradiction is clear: there is no possible world in which I can coerce others and in 
which everyone else does so as well, for I would then be in a world in which I both 
freely act and am unable to act freely .
I should say that i f  coercion is going on in this sort of case, then it is 
impermissible for that reason, but it is not clear that coercion is occurring at all. 
What happens, rather, is that the differences in bargaining power of the two parties 
have a significant effect on the content of the agreement reached. But if one means 
by coercion "threatening somebody (or some group) with being worse o ff  if they
9 In the following paragraph I give reasons to think that what is happening in this example is not 
best understood as coercion.
10 Onora O'Neill, 'Hunger, Needs and Rights', in Steven Luper-Foy (ed.), Problems of 
International Justice (London: Westview, 1988), 80.
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do not do what you want them to do," then the poor country is not coerced when it 
agrees in this case. In the example under discussion, the poor country is made 
better off by accepting the deal; the problem is that the corporation takes unfair 
advantage of its bargaining power. Again, one can consistently will that everyone 
makes offers that people freely accept, so the Kantian test does not capture the core 
problem here: that problem is simply one of taking unfair advantage. The severely 
deprived are easier to manipulate than any better-off group, since their overriding 
concern is simply to remain alive, to keep their heads above water. They are in no 
position to organize themselves in any way that would enable them to give voice to 
their claims in such a way as would have some noticeable effect on their 
interlocutors. People can be treated unjustly even when they are not coerced. One 
takes justice seriously by rejecting certain agreements because they are unfair to one 
or other of the parties, even when those agreements were freely accepted by those 
unfairly treated.
On the basis of the above sort of argument, O'Neill concludes that every agent 
has an obligation not to coerce or deceive in their dealings with other agents. I have 
rejected O'Neill's specific claims here, but I agree that coercion and deception are 
morally impermissible. These are perfect obligations, i.e., there are no 
circumstances in which agents can fail to recognize and act upon them. But there are 
also important imperfect obligations, or duties to perform actions at least some of 
the time for at least some others. One of these imperfect obligations was hinted at 
earlier, when we mentioned the maxim, "Let each man be as happy as heaven wills, 
or as he can make himself; I will not take anything from him or even envy him; but 
to his welfare or assistance in time of need I have no desire to contribute."11 That 
there is an obligation to help those in need, and that it is a different kind of 
obligation from the obligation not to coerce or deceive, is shown by performing the 
universalizability thought experiment for this maxim. In this case one's maxim tells 
one to take no account of people who need help whenever coming to their aid 
conflicts with other goals or interests one has. Now imagine everyone acting on 
such a maxim. While we can conceive of a world of universal indifference to the 
suffering of others,12 we run into a contradiction when we attempt to will that such 
a world should exist. To will something is to take the necessary means to bring it 
about. Human beings are not self-sufficient, therefore, as a human being, I cannot
11 Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, 40 (Prussian Academy 
pagination, 423).
12 As Kant says, not only can we think of such a world, but in such circumstances the plight of 
the human race would be an improvement upon "a state where everyone talks of sympathy and 
good will or even exerts himself occasionally to practice them while, on the other hand, he cheats 
when he can and betrays or otherwise violates the right of man." Foundations of the Metaphysics 
of Morals , 40 (Prussian Academy pagination, 423).
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rationally will that I refuse the help of others when I am in distress, since such 
refusal would be a straightforward denial of a means to some of my ends. But at the 
same time, in the imaginary world created by our thought experiment, I would also 
be willing that no one helps anyone in distress. Hence I would be attempting to 
bring about both that I get the assistance of others when I am in need and that no 
one helps others when they are in need. This is a contradiction in willing, and so 
the maxim is morally impermissible. This type of contradiction is not as immediate 
as the contradiction in conception which generated the perfect obligations not to 
coerce or deceive; contradictions in willing generate imperfect duties, in this case 
the duty to help some others some of the time. One cannot act on a maxim that one 
should never assist the needy. This duty to assist those in needs applies, of course, 
to individual agents and collective agencies as well.
I will not discuss Immanuel Kant's own international theory in any detail, but I 
should at least note an important difference between Kant and O'Neill. In Perpetual 
Peace , Kant argued for a federation of free states and, with respect to the treatment 
of individuals, he believed that "cosmopolitan right shall be limited to conditions of 
universal hospitality."13 O'Neill's Kantian theory of international relations — 
correctly in my view -- defends more far-reaching obligations toward individuals on 
the part of the citizens of foreign nation-states and of those states themselves.
We have before us, then, the outlines of O'Neill's revised Kantian approach to 
international justice. It proposes to use the categorical imperative to test the maxims 
of important collective agencies, and such a test must determine whether the 
proposed maxim could be acted on by all agents, individual and collective. 
Moreover, it is to be kept in mind that individual agents (i.e., human beings) are not 
the disembodied rational entities to be found in the works of some moral theorists; 
rather, individuals are physically and emotionally needy, only partially rational, and 
vulnerable to the coercive and deceptive practices of more powerful agencies.
4.3. O'Neiirs Critique of Rights-based Cosmopolitanism
O'Neill presents her neo-Kantian theory as an alternative to the two other main 
contenders in the global justice debate, utilitarianism and rights-based theories. As 
we have seen, my approach is based on a conception of basic human rights 
(Chapter Two), and it is a conception which is in many ways similar to an 
(admittedly unorthodox) utilitarian theory (Chapter Three). My strategy, therefore, 
is to outline O'Neill's objections to rights-based cosmopolitanism and to defend that 
view against those objections.14 In the following section of this chapter, I offer
13 Hans Reiss (ed.), Kant: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991),
105.
14 Some of O'Neill's main objections to utilitarianism were dealt with in Chapter Three.
some other criticisms of O'Neill's Kantian approach, in part defending that 
approach against popular but misguided criticism but ultimately rejecting her 
account in favour of a strategy that argues for human rights by directing our moral 
gaze to the vital interests of persons.
It should first be noted, however, that O'Neill does not believe rights-based 
theories to be completely misguided, so long as we carefully distinguish between 
libertarian rights theories (which, in her view, are wholly mistaken) and welfare 
rights theories (which are in part correct). The arguments of Alan Gewirth and 
Henry Shue are based on basic human rights, and O'Neill admits that these 
arguments are persuasive and important. The main strength of such arguments, 
according to O'Neill, is their recognition that there is an obligation to help those in 
need, that contrary to common opinion it is not simply an optional act of charity to 
come to the assistance of someone in need of help. The rights theorist puts this 
point by saying that each individual has a right to have his or her vital interests 
protected, hence there is an obligation of some agents or agencies to ensure that the 
means to such protection exists. O'Neill wants to assert that there is an obligation to 
help, but to deny that this obligation corresponds to a human right to be helped.
This is the first respect in which rights-based theories are mistaken, according to 
O'Neill. The obligation to help those in need does not correspond to any right on 
the part of the needy to the help they need. Consider the position of Immanuel Kant 
on this matter. For Kant, rights are attributed to persons when the maxim of a 
proposed action cannot be conceived as a universal law.15 Contradictions in 
conception generate perfect obligations and counterpart rights. Hence a right again 
seems to be one side of a coin whose other side is a perfect obligation; rights exist 
simply by virtue of our coming to see that a proposed maxim cannot be thought as a 
maxim for everyone. But it follows from this account that there could not be rights 
to be helped when in need, for a maxim of not helping is thinkable; the problem 
with such a maxim is that it is not universalizably willable, hence there is an 
imperfect obligation to help, an obligation which does not correspond to any right. 
Helping those in need is an obligation, but it falls into the realm of virtue, not of 
Recht (right or law).
O'Neill argues against the human right to food (one of the basic human rights, on 
my account) by taking seriously the distinction between positive and negative 
rights. Those who use this distinction generally deny that there are any positive 
rights, and this is how I interpret O'Neill's argument. She says that someone has a 
right only if "others have an obligation to respect or fulfill that right. If nobody has
15 Immanuel Kant, Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 
originally published in 1797, Prussian Academy pagination, 218-221.
such obligations, there just is no right at all."16 So, on this account, a necessary 
condition of a right ascription is that obligation-bearers can be identified. A person 
can have a right not to be assaulted only if others have an obligation not to assault. 
O'Neill believes the right to food is problematic in a way that the right not to be 
assaulted is not. My response to this claim, as we have seen, is that the two cases 
are much more similar than she suggests. For in both cases the corresponding 
obligations include both actions and omissions, whereas O'Neill implies that the 
right not be assaulted correlates with nothing more than a duty not to assault. On the 
contrary, I believe that a person can have a right not to be assaulted only if all others 
have an obligation not to assault and all others have a collective obligation to 
provide the protections necessary for ensuring that those individuals who are 
inclined to overlook their obligation not to assault are deterred from failing to act 
upon that obligation. This second, collective obligation requires some positive 
action on the part of others; moreover, the right not to be assaulted is not properly 
recognized unless and until both obligations are met. It is important to notice as well 
that acting on one's obligations in this way may be very costly -- police forces, 
judicial and prison systems are not cheap, and a relatively poor society will find it 
difficult to pay these costs. But this is presumably no reason for denying that there 
is a right not to be assaulted.
This argument applies to the right to food as well. This right gives rise to 
obligations on all others not to deprive anyone of the food they need to survive. But 
it also generates collective duties upon all others to ensure that, within the limits of 
scarcity, each person can obtain for themselves the requirements of subsistence. It 
is misleading to interpret the right to food as requiring simply the provision of food 
to those who need it. The reality is more complex. If the right to food generates a 
range of obligations, from the duty not to deprive others of necessary food, to the 
duty to protect individuals from having their food sources taken from their control, 
to the duty to provide for those still needy even when the first two types of duty 
have been acted upon, then it is not obvious that the right to food will be any more 
difficult to recognize and enforce than the right not to be assaulted.
O'Neill says that there is no human right to food because we cannot show "that 
there is a counterpart obligation to provide that food to which everybody has a 
right."17 She asks, 'Who has the obligation to supply food to all those who need 
it?' and I answer, 'All of us'. The obvious fact that no one person can ensure that 
everyone can meet their subsistence needs does not imply that those needs lack 
strong claims to be met. O'Neill's strategy is to argue for imperfect obligations to
16 Onora O'Neill, 'Hunger, Needs and Rights', 70.
17 Ibid.
meet the needs of others, obligations to which there are no counterpart individual 
rights. But it is equally plausible to hold on to the idea that persons have rights to 
the protection of their vital interests, in which case an alternative strategy presents 
itself, namely, to ensure that the obligation we all share to protect vital interests is 
fairly met by everyone, and this in turn means that, ceteris paribus, the obligation 
should be met by everyone equally. The importance of O'Neill's argument is that it 
forces rights theorists to take seriously the need to give an account of the agents and 
agencies with the counterpart obligations, in order to preclude merely announcing a 
set of 'manifesto rights' with no corresponding duties. However, she does not 
show that no such account can be given, and the classification of duties into duties 
of avoidance, protection and aid provides a plausible framework for that account.
A related strategy O'Neill uses to show that there are no universal human rights to 
welfare is to point out that allocation of duties cannot be universal and that this 
restriction of duties transfers over to the correlative rights as well. As she puts it:
"Advocates of welfare rights [such as Henry Shue] face the problem 
that allocation cannot here be universal and thus remains 
undetermined. Some have argued that this raises no problem once 
we address the institutionalization of rights. All rights, even liberty 
rights, can be enforced only by allocating specific powers and 
obligations to particular agents and institutions. In this respect, there 
is nothing special about welfare rights. However, we cannot move 
on to questions of enforcement until we know what human rights 
there are. For we would not know what should be enforced."18
The last two sentences of this quotation constitute O'Neill's objection to Shue's 
institutionalization point. O'Neill's claim is that enforcement of rights is a 
secondary matter, to be dealt with only after it has been determined which human 
rights exist. But is her objection sound? I think not, for two reasons. First, if we 
start from the claim that each person has basic interests, and that these interests give 
rise to legitimate claims to have those interests protected or satisfied, then "we 
know what human rights there are" in the sense that we know what is important 
from the perspective of recipience. The next task is to look for ways to meet the 
interest-based claims in the world as we know it, and this will be a matter both of 
determining the extent of material scarcity and of the fair sharing out of the 
obligations to meet those claims (assuming that scarcity is not so extreme as to 
render impossible the attempt to meet all such claims). So we can conceive of better 
and worse reasons for attributing rights to human beings, and for assigning so- 
called positive rights to them. And on that basis we then try to discover which of 
those supposed rights can be protected in the world of scarcity and conflicts of
18 Md., 76-77.
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interest. However, this is to say that an answer to the question of what can be 
enforced is directly relevant to the question of what rights there are. Secondly, if no 
one can be said to have a right unless others have correlative duties, enforcement 
becomes a primary consideration, and the statement of a right is incomplete unless it 
includes an outline of the correlative duties that need enforcing if that right is to be 
protected adequately.
O'Neill rightly points out that human beings are not disembodied rational agents; 
on the contrary, we are only partially rational and we have material, social, and 
psychological needs. Specifically, she mentions the needs for security and 
subsistence as the most basic needs we have, for they "are needed for any sustained 
life involving autonomous action."19 But if these needs are so important, it is odd 
to conclude, as O'Neill does, only that individuals and collective agents have 
obligations to meet only some of the needs of some others only some of the time.
The relationship between needs on the one hand and autonomous action on the 
other is brought out by an important passage in Faces of Hunger in which, I
maintain, O'Neill seems committed, despite herself, to human rights to the
satisfaction of basic needs. O'Neill claims that
... the specific policies and institutions which might be just in actual 
human situations must do more than rule out a limited range of
coercive and deceptive forms of action that undermine any sort of
rational agency. The details of human justice must take account of 
the most basic needs that must be met if other human beings are not 
to be fundamentally deceived or coerced. Any just global order must 
at least meet standards of material justice and provide for the basic 
material needs in whose absence all human beings are 
overwhelmingly vulnerable to coercion and deception.20
O'Neill points out an important implication of a recognition of the perfect duties 
of nondeception and noncoercion, namely, that people should have their basic 
"material needs" met because failure to meet those needs renders people susceptible 
to the coercive and deceitful practices of the powerful. I will not discuss here the 
oddity of the claim that the reason why people should have, say, enough to eat is to 
avoid coercion and deception, since my aim is merely to show that, even if we 
accept O'Neill's central claims, there is a right to subsistence.
As O'Neill suggests, there is in fact a correlation between (i) seriousness of 
material deprivation, and (ii) vulnerability to deception and coercion. An individual 
who lacks food necessary for her survival, or the means to produce that food, will 
'consent' to 'offers' of assistance which are contingent upon her 'agreeing' to some 
conditions set out by the provider. But 'consent' and 'agreement' lose their normal
19 Onora O'Neill, Faces of Hunger (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986), 143.
20 Ibid.. 141, emphasis in original.
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senses in this context, for the cost to the individual of failing to accept the offer is 
so high that consent will likely be given come what may. But then refusal of the 
offer is not a live option, so we lack the possible alternative that is present in 
standard contexts, where consent can be given freely. In short, the worse off a 
person is, the more vulnerable she will be to coercion by the better off; and when 
the deprivation is sufficiently severe, such consent as may be given takes on the 
character of a surface phenomenon, shrouding the unfreedom created by severe 
material need.
Up to this point, then, I am in complete agreement with O'Neill. But I maintain 
that the coercion/deprivation connection strengthens the case for subsistence rights, 
while O'Neill denies that there are such rights. From her perspective, the claims to 
food correspond to imperfect duties to feed some others at least some of the time; 
hence these claims cannot be rights. However, there is a more or less obvious 
argument available to the rights theorist in reply to this move.
The argument runs as follows. If each individual has a right not to be coerced, 
and if any person is overwhelmingly vulnerable to coercion whenever their basic 
needs remain unmet, then every individual should have a right to the satisfaction of 
her basic needs, in order to ensure that the right to noncoercion is protected 
adequately. Hence access to food is a matter of justice and not merely a demand of 
beneficence. O'Neill seems to acknowledge this point when she asserts that the 
meeting of basic needs must be part of an account of "the details of human 
justice."21 But she seems not to see the significance of this line of argument for the 
advocates of basic subsistence rights.
O'Neill maintains that positive obligations to assist others fall into the realm of 
beneficence rather than justice. "The central demand of Kantian justice is negative: 
that action, policies and institutions not be based on or conform to fundamental 
principles of coercion or deception."22 However, if my argument above is sound, 
justice cannot be purely negative, for justice can never be done where agents merely 
keep their slates clean in the way O'Neill recommends. Of course, noncoercion and 
nondeception are necessary conditions of justice; my point is that, contrary to 
O'Neill's claims, they are not sufficient. Accordingly, a commitment to human 
rights to noncoercion and nondeception entails a parallel acceptance of basic human 
subsistence rights.
O'Neill's objections to rights-based strategies can hold up only if there is a clear 
distinction between obligation-based and rights-based approaches, but it can be
21 Ibid. Cf. "A just global economic and political order [has] to be one designed to meet material 
needs." Ibid.. 149.
22 Ibid., 146.
argued that the difference between the two is merely superficial. Kant's first 
formula of the categorical imperative centres on the standpoint of the agent; the 
second formulation, on the other hand, the Formula of the End in Itself (FEI), 
shifts the focus to those on whom the agent impinges when she acts. The FEI says: 
"Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, 
always as an end and never as a means only."23 Hence we have a formulation of 
the Kantian categorical imperative which focuses on those at the receiving end of 
action and which might even be glossed as claiming that every one has a right not to 
be treated merely as a means. Kant notoriously claims that the different 
formulations of the categorical imperative are equivalent to each other, so on these 
grounds we could conclude that a recipient-based conception of just action is not 
only to be found in Kant but that such a conception is merely another way of stating 
the criterion of right action which, in its first formulation (the Formula of Universal 
Law) centres on agents. We are thus given Kantian grounds for a rights-based 
theory of justice.
Of course, it is highly controversial to take at face value Kant's claim that the 
different versions of the categorical imperative are equivalent to one another. 
However, two points can be made to answer suspicions on this score. First, we can 
at least make intuitive sense of the supposed equivalence claim. To say that a maxim 
could not be willed by everyone is clearly similar to saying that at least some people 
could not consent to the maxim, and the latter claim is akin to the view that acting 
on a maxim to which not everyone could possibly consent is to treat some persons 
merely as a means. Secondly, O'Neill herself uses the FEI version of the 
categorical imperative in some of her work, most elaborately in 'Ending World 
Hunger',24 so if this version of the Cl makes the same moral point from the 
perspective of the recipient rather than that of the agent, O'Neill can hardly deny the 
relevance of my claim here that there is no deep moral difference between 
obligation-based and rights-based Kantian theories.
Moreover, violations of the FEI version of the categorical imperative can also be 
understood as instances of inconsistency, as forms of irrationality. Using other 
people for one's own ends involves denying that they are also ends themselves, but 
this contradicts one's (perhaps implicit) recognition that others are in fact ends. 
Someone who (merely) uses other people treats them like things, yet cannot deny 
that others have perspectives, aims, and plans just like he has. So he treats them as
23 Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals , 46 (Prussian Academy 
pagination, 429).
24 Onora O'Neill, 'Ending World Hunger', in Tom Regan (ed.), Matters of Life and Death , third 
edition (London: McGraw Hill, 1993), 235-79.
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something other than what he takes them to be, and accords himself a status and 
importance he cannot honestly affirm.25
Rights are the correlatives of obligations, so it is just not possible to offer a 
coherent argument for a human right without presenting a case for the counterpart 
obligations. Thus, contrary to O'Neill's claims, rights-based arguments do not fail 
to address the powerful, since it is precisely powerful agents and agencies which 
will be the bearers of the obligations in question. O'Neill presents no reasons why 
ethical argument cannot address both recipients and agents. She argues that rights- 
talk is rhetorically powerful but cannot be ethically basic, since it does not address 
those who have the power to do something about international injustice.26 But the 
correlativity of rights and duties, and the necessity of finding duty-bearers to protect 
rights, means that those with the power to ensure that rights are recognized will be 
required to do so. Moreover, by beginning with the moral relevance of vital human 
interests in food, water, health, and education, a rights-based theory enables us to 
see why certain kinds of activity and inactivity are morally condemnable; therefore 
we are provided with strong reasons for viewing a particular state of affairs as 
unjust. If one begins the justificatory process with obligations, on the other hand, 
the moral force of one's arguments may gain credence only by way of an implicit 
appeal to the very interests which provide the backing for human rights claims. In 
that case, the rights approach and the Kantian obligations strategy are two sides of 
one coin, and there is therefore no reason for denying that the former method is 
equally reasonable, if not more so.
4.4. Critique of O'Neillian International Distributive 
Justice
A proper appreciation of O'Neill's account of international distributive justice will 
bring out both its strengths and its weaknesses. I begin with the strengths. 
O'Neill's account stresses the ideas of obligation and need; both ideas are necessary 
to any satisfactory theory of global moral relations. The claims of the needy must be 
a central concern of those who would address world poverty, and a good theory 
will outline the duties, and duty-bearers, necessary to meet those needs. My
25 For a discussion of this Kantian strain of thought, which points out the inconsistency of 
failing to treat others as ends, see A. John Simmons, The Lockean Theory of Rights , (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1992), 41-42. Simmons believes that the inconsistency in question 
here is weaker than the sort Kant concerned himself with, but my view is that this description of 
violating the formula of the end in itself is, at the very least, compatible with the Kantian 
understanding of what is wrong with using other people. I reserve judgement on Simmons's point 
that these ideas are to be found in John Locke's moral theory.
26 Onora O'Neill, Faces of Hunger , 119-20.
disagreement with O'Neill, as we have seen, is mainly with her claim that there is 
something to be gained by eschewing the notion of basic rights.
We have already canvassed some objections to O'Neill's theory, but there are 
others, some of which are ultimately unconvincing, but which nevertheless might 
have undue influence. It is therefore important to deal with them here.
One objection to the Kantian universalization test for maxims is that it fails to 
generate any positive duties, and so cannot justify obligations to help those whose 
vital interests need protection in the form of positive action. In answer to this 
objection, it simply has to be pointed out that positive duties to help the needy stem 
from a double negation, a denial of a denial. If someone attempts to deny that he 
has a duty to help others, the Cl test shows that the denial is wrong because it 
cannot be universalized. But then it follows that it is wrong not to help others, or 
alternatively, that it is right (in the sense of required rather than simply permitted) to 
help others. If it is not permissible to avoid a course of action, then it is required 
that the course of action be performed. Hence positive duties can be derived from 
the Kantian test of maxims.
Another objection with which I disagree is Thomas Nagel's claim that rich people 
can reject the beneficence maxim. Let us reconsider the maxim of denying needy 
others the help they need. Nagel reasons as follows:
But here is the main problem. Because the situation involves a 
conflict of interests, any maxim on which a person proposes to act 
would, if universalized, conflict with what he would want for 
himself in at least one of the hypothetical positions he might occupy 
under it. The principle of no mutual aid, to be sure, contradicts what 
he would want if he were destitute. But a positive principle of 
charity contradicts his antecedent preference for keeping his money 
for himself. Even a destitute person, testing the universalizability of 
a principle of charity, would have to acknowledge that it requires 
some sacrifices by the better off -- sacrifices which he would prefer 
not to have to make were he among the better off. So why doesn't 
every maxim one might propose in such a situation fail to satisfy the 
categorical imperative, by generating a contradiction in the will when 
one tries to will its universalization?27
Nagel purports to show that any maxim involving a conflict of interests (in this 
case, the conflict is between the destitute person's interest in receiving help and the 
wealthy person's interest in keeping his money) will fail the Cl test. But Nagel's 
argument fails. While a human being could not rationally will that no one helps him 
when he is destitute, he can quite easily will that some of his excess income be 
taken from him in order to provide for those who are unable to meet their basic
27 Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 42-43, 
emphases in original.
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needs; therefore, on grounds of universalizability, there is an important difference 
between the perspectives of the rich person and the poor person. I think Nagel's 
reasoning fails to convince because it does not consider the relevance of a deeper 
discussion about the relative importance of the interests in conflict and the reasons 
why contradiction arises in the universalizability of some maxims. Once we 
compare the importance of these interests, we can see that, while the rich person 
would not be irrational to deny aid to the poor person, such denial would 
nonetheless be unreasonable, for any argument for keeping excess wealth would 
come up against the trumping counterclaim that desperate straits merit moral 
priority. The fact that giving up some of his wealth is a sacrifice that "he would 
prefer not to have to make" hardly constitutes a reason for denying that one has any 
obligation to make the sacrifice. Nagel seems to have missed the point of the 
universalization test. The uncharitable maxim is morally impermissible not because 
there is at least one perspective from which one would want to veto it; if that were 
the case, then, as Nagel points out, no maxim concerning charitable giving would 
be permissible. The impermissibility of acting on a maxim of fading to help those in 
need is shown, rather, by considering the hypothetical world in which one both 
wants to be helped and where everyone denies needed help to others. A similar 
thought experiment will show that a maxim of helping the needy is indeed possible 
to will consistently as a universal law, for one would will both that one helps those 
in need and that when one is in need one obtains the help of others. Despite what 
Nagel suggests, the simple truth that every person has a perspective does not show 
anything about the Kantian test one way or the other. What matters is whether one's 
particular perspective is one that could be the perspective o f everyone 
simultaneously; on these grounds, charitable giving is required while refusal to give 
to those in need is forbidden.
Another objection to O'Neill's project is voiced by Partha Dasgupta, who reasons 
as follows:
[O'Neill's Faces of Hunger ] is an exploration of our obligations 
towards the alleviation of hunger in distant lands. ... O'Neill rejects 
both rights-based and beneficence theories, on the grounds that they 
are not helpful for her purposes, and pursues instead an obligation- 
based theory derived from Kant. Unfortunately, the implications she 
is able to draw from her own analysis are singularly weak, to wit 
that agencies like the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund should not be deceitful in their dealings with poor countries, 
and that they should not coerce them into pursuing policies not in 
their interest. I find it difficult to think that we need an elaborate 
ethical structure if this is all we conclude. The World Bank, for 
example, was created explicitly to help countries reconstruct and 
develop. Duties of international organizations are written into their 
charters, and they are forbidden to deceive and coerce. That they 
both may have practised deceit and coercion is not the point here,
and no high-powered ethical theory is needed to be invoked to 
condemn them if they have.28
Simply stated, Dasgupta's objection is that O'Neill's theoretical apparatus is 
unnecessary for the derivation of her conclusions about institutional practices 
around the world. Her main conclusions are that major institutions have perfect 
duties not to deceive or coerce vulnerable countries in their dealings with them. It is 
true, as Dasgupta says, that we do not need a Kantian universalizability argument to 
show that deception and coercion are not options, for this sort of objectionable 
behaviour is ruled out by the very charters which define the purposes of these 
institutions. But I think O'Neill could properly reply that the charters could have 
been different, for instance, they might not have ruled out certain forms of coercion 
as a means of bringing about desired states of affairs. In that event, O'Neill's 
arguments can be introduced and used to show that, in spite of what the charter 
happens to say, deception and coercion are immoral practices and hence can form 
no part of the purposes of institutions engaged in international (or domestic) 
activity.
And O'Neill can make another, different response as well. It is that Kantian 
reasoning does not reveal merely that there are duties not to deceive and coerce, it 
also shows that there are positive duties to help poor countries (even though, on 
O'Neill's account, those duties do not correlate with rights).29 Again, Dasgupta is 
correct that it is, in one sense at least, unnecessary in the present context to point 
out that these duties can be justified by appeal to a Kantian argument, since the 
World Bank already has duties to help poor countries. However, Dasgupta is 
mistaken here, for something like O'Neill's argument is in fact necessary; the 
reason for its indispensability is that we need some line of moral reasoning to 
justify the obligations to which we can (as it happens) otherwise appeal simply by 
pointing to charters. In the absence of an argument along these lines, one can have 
no reason to object to proposed changes in the charter of the World Bank, apart 
perhaps from an appeal to stability and the value of settled expectations, for one is, 
on this view, content to stop arguing at the level of mere appeals to existing 
documents. (I do not claim that Dasgupta believes that justification should be 
restricted in this way; I only maintain that his dismissal of O'Neill's approach is too 
quick because it implies that this restricted conception of justification is adequate.)
I now turn to two further objections to the Kantian account of international 
obligations. The first weakens that account considerably, while the second seems to
28 Partha Dasgupta, An Inquiry into Well-Being and Destitution (Clarendon: Oxford, 1993), 27.
29 I say that O'Neill can respond in this way, despite the fact that she is less than explicit (most of 
the time) about the existence of these more positive obligations.
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render it deeply unsatisfactory. O'Neill sees that the second objection is serious, but 
her attempt at answering it does not silence doubts about the question-begging 
nature of the Kantian test for the moral acceptability of maxims. Accordingly, 
O'Neill's project lacks a satisfactory defence of its core idea.
There is a criticism of O'Neill's theory that says it suffers from a debilitating 
indeterminacy concerning the obligations to provide assistance to those in need, and 
therefore cannot properly guide the agencies in a position to help. O'Neill's 
arguments generate clear duties of noncoercion and nondeception for agents and 
agencies operating within countries and across borders. But isn't the theory too 
vague about the amount of positive help these agencies are required to provide? We 
are correctly advised that helping is a moral requirement and not an optional extra or 
an heroic sacrifice, but if the duty to relieve suffering says nothing more than that 
we should provide aid on some occasions, leaving it to the agents to decide in what 
way aid should be given and how much help to give, then the theory's implications 
are importantly indeterminate. Now this indeterminacy could be seen as a positive 
feature of the theory, since it accords with the commonsense idea that there should 
be some room for agents to decide for themselves both when and to whom to 
provide assistance. But this indeterminacy is neither unavoidable nor acceptable, for 
an adequate account of international obligations will mention specific positive duties 
which thereby rule out some options left open by O'Neill's account. If one's goal is 
to help needy individuals, then if one is rational one will take the most efficient 
means to that goal, and that entails ensuring that properly accountable collective 
agencies exist (or are brought into existence) whose purpose is to help those in 
need. To leave it open to individuals to discharge their duties of aid merely by 
uncoordinated individual actions is, it seems, to allow some needy people to 
undergo avoidable suffering. This seems like straightforward prudential 
irrationality, and this is directly relevant here, since both Kant and O'Neill properly 
require maxims to pass two tests, one for prudential rationality (the hypothetical 
imperative test) and one for morality (the categorical imperative test).30
I now come to the most important objection to O'Neill's project. A serious 
problem for the Kantian test of the acceptability of maxims is that some 
nonuniversalizable maxims seem to be morally permissible, in which case the 
Kantian criterion would condemn acceptable practices. Allen Wood gives an 
illustration of a maxim of this sort: "I will occasionally accompany others through a 
doorway, and on those occasions I will always go through the door last."31 One's
30 See Jerome B. Schneewind, 'Autonomy, obligation, and virtue: An overview of Kant's moral 
philosophy', in Paul Guyer (ed.), Cambridge Companion to Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), 320, for a helpful account of the two-test strategy.
31 Allen Wood, Hegel's Ethical Thought (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 157.
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maxim is simply one of showing consideration for others, but it seems that 
Kantians would be led to judge this maxim impermissible because its 
universalization yields a world in which no one goes through a doorway (or that 
one is obligated to be sure to be alone when one does so)!32 This example shows 
that passing the universalizability test is not a necessary condition of a maxim's 
moral permissibility: the politeness maxim is not universalizable and yet the maxim 
is permissible, therefore a maxim can be morally acceptable even though it fails the 
Cl test. This point weakens considerably the utility of that test as a method for 
determining global obligations, since some activities may be permitted though the 
Kantian criterion rules them out.
O'Neill's reply to this criticism appears to be that it does not focus on the 
"fundamental principles" on which an agent acts, and so mistakenly takes a maxim 
to be nonuniversalizable when in fact it can quite easily be universalized without 
contradiction. In the specific case of an agent's maxim that he will go through a 
door last (when others are accompanying him through a door), the maxim as we 
have stated it is too specific and therefore fails to pick out what it is about the 
agent's proposed action that guides him. We get a better idea of what the agent's 
maxim is by asking what reason he has for proposing to act as he does, and in this 
case the reason would mention his plan to be courteous to others. However, if 
one's maxim is, 'I will show others consideration and respect', then the 
universalizability test will be passed with flying colours.
But how do we tell how specific or general a maxim should be? The decision to 
interpret the maxim in the foregoing case in one way rather than another seems to 
gain its plausibility from an appeal to our considered judgements about what is 
morally acceptable: it is pretty clearly permissible to let others go through a door 
first when one is accompanying others through a door. But then it is our moral 
intuitions which are doing the work in this case, and not the universalizability test. 
Why, in short, should we accept the claim that the fundamental principle on which 
the agent acts in this instance is that one ought to be polite and considerate to others, 
and not that one ought to go through doors last when others are going through the 
same door? What could a Kantian say to someone who stubbornly maintained that 
his maxim made essential reference to the necessity of going through doors last?
And for that matter -  and this is a general problem with this entire approach to 
moral argumentation -- what are we to do when it is unclear what the maxim is on 
which an agent acts? One reply is that this may present problems of interpretation,
32 If politeness is indeed the agent’s motivation in this case, one should be wary of the possibility 
of forcing others to be impolite by going first. So a more reasonable, and universalizable, maxim 
would be: “I will always offer to go last, but I will not insist on it if the other person strongly 
prefers to go last.” Nevertheless, if the maxim is as Wood says it is, the objection still applies.
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but we can still argue about what the maxim in question actually is, or what our best 
guess is as to its content; and in this way grounds for the assessment of maxims, 
and therefore of actions, are provided. Nonetheless, there presumably will be cases 
in which a maxim can be identified and yet, despite its evident permissibility, it fails 
to be universalizable and hence is judged by the Kantian test to be forbidden.
These should be familiar criticisms to those versed in the debates about Kantian 
moral philosophy, but they are not therefore less compelling. The main point to take 
from this discussion is that nothing in O’Neill's original contribution does anything 
to quell the doubts one has about some of the traditional problems with the Kantian 
enterprise.
O'NeiH's Kantian strategy fails, despite its being on the right track. It fails 
because some permissible maxims are not universalizable, so a maxim's moral 
acceptability cannot be equated with its capacity to be universally conceivable or 
universally willable without contradiction. Nevertheless, the idea that permitted 
maxims of action should be subject to a veto on reasonable grounds is an important 
notion for moral and political theory. A better strategy than O'Neill's, deriving from 
this same idea, is simply to compare, in cases of conflict of interests, the values in 
conflict and to favour the more important value. In this sort of case, no right is 
absolute, including the right not to be coerced; therefore, even for cases in which 
O'Neill would claim that human beings have rights, those rights can be put aside in 
emergencies, in favour of the more fundamental interests persons have, such as 
meeting their basic needs.
O'Neill appears to countenance this sort of move (again, despite herself) in her 
penetrating discussion of problems of population growth and their relation to issues 
of global justice. She allows that, though coercion should be avoided, it may be 
permissible where engaging in it is necessary to protect each person's basic interest 
in satisfying her or his material needs or, in other words, where it functions to 
protect against the deeper, more "fundamental coercion of widespread destitution 
and hunger."
... the prospects of population growth (and the methods of 
population control appearing in some parts of the world) are 
alarming enough to raise the question of coercion. If noncoercive 
public policies fail to reduce population growth, would more 
coercive measures be unjust? Kantian justice rejects fundamental 
reliance on coercion or deception, but in harsh circumstances lesser 
coercion might be the only way to avoid fundamental coercion. If it 
was clear that the fundamental coercion of widespread destitution 
and hunger could not be avoided without limited coercion of 
procreative decisions, a case might be made for limited coercion. 
However, the case could only be plausible when other less coercive
87
ways of avoiding or averting fundamental coercion and deception 
had been exhausted.33
Policies designed to check population growth in a noncoercive manner can be 
effective, but "if such policies fail, and just productive and redistributive measures 
too cannot meet needs, direct coercion of procreative decisions would not be 
unjust."34 Hence if there are rights not to be coerced, empirical circumstances can 
justify overriding these rights; but then rights to noncoercion are indistinguishable 
in this respect from subsistence rights, for which the same overriding conditions 
apply.
4.5. Cosmopolitanism and Communitarianism
We have reached the end of Part One of this work, and we have seen in some 
detail the pros and cons of three central cosmopolitan theories of justice: human 
rights theories, utilitarianism, and O’Neill’s maverick Kantianism. The preliminary 
conclusion I want to assert here is that a theory of basic human rights is a plausible 
approach for the cosmopolitan to take to the problems of international distributive 
justice. However, there are several approaches to these issues that point to the value 
of communities of smaller scale than the entire human race, and the communitarian 
approach to global justice needs to be assessed before we can reach any considered 
judgement on the plausibility of the case for basic human rights. Can cosmopolitans 
account for the ethical value of ties to particular groups of persons? Does 
cosmopolitanism unacceptably override the ethical claims that can be made on 
behalf of nations, or nation-states, or sovereign states more generally? In Part Two, 
I will outline and assess some of the central communitarian approaches to 
international ethics, concentrating especially on their capacity for dealing with the 
obligations of distributive justice.
33 Faces of Hunger , 158, emphasis in original.
34 Ibid.
Part Two
Communitarianism
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Chapter Five: Patriotism and Justice
5.1. Introduction to Part Two
Part Two of this thesis investigates various challenges to the universalist 
ambitions of the arguments defended in Part One. In general, we can understand the 
topics discussed in Chapters Five through Eight as being concerned with several 
sorts of limitation arguments, that is, arguments designed to show that, contrary to 
the conclusions of defenders of universal human rights, there are good reasons for 
limiting the scope of the obligations of justice to some subset of humanity. A 
limitation argument is designed to prove that the pretensions of cosmopolitans are 
illusory, incoherent, overridden by some morally more important considerations, or 
otherwise wrong-headed. Constitutive theorists, whose leading representatives are 
discussed in Chapter Eight, maintain that, while there are perhaps good grounds for 
recognizing the claims of human beings qua human beings, cosmopolitans fail to 
take proper account of the value of what we might call certain intra-species 
collectivities, most importantly, sovereign states. Since sovereignty is a value, and 
since cosmopolitan arguments appear to ride roughshod over the sovereignty of 
states, it follows that the sort of moral universalism embodied in the basic human 
rights approach (i.e., my favoured version of cosmopolitanism) overlooks a value 
of great significance — at least in contemporary circumstances and for the 
foreseeable future — and is consequently mistaken in its conclusions. Relativists, 
one of whom is considered in Chapter Seven, hold that justice, and morality in 
general, are subject to community-relative standards that make cross-cultural 
comparisons impossible. Hence, universal claims to justice make no sense. 
Defenders of nationality are my main focus in Chapter Six, where I look at the best 
attempt to base conclusions on the ethical value of the 'nation', and to claim that 
distributive justice can be discussed properly only within the context of a given 
national community. On this view, justice can gain no footing in the absence of 
some group the members of which experience various sentiments toward each other 
on the basis of their shared history, language, and territory. In other words, there is 
no such thing as cosmopolitan justice; there is only what we might call national 
justice. In the present chapter I assess the views of patriots, who emphasize 
devotion to one's country as a primary moral virtue, and conclude that such 
devotion, in practice, entails favouritism for compatriots and, therefore, at least 
potentially, the denial of some of the claims of non-compatriots. If such a view 
requires the denial of the full force of human rights claims, then patriotism conflicts 
with cosmopolitanism.
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In the main, I deny the claims of constitutivists, relativists, nationalists, and 
patriots in their strong forms. Yet we will see that there are distinctions to be made 
that might make it possible to hold on to some forms of each view. There might be 
ethically defensible forms of patriotism, nationalism, and constitutive theory, yet 
they do not in any way permit violations of the rights of foreigners, non-nationals, 
or non-citizens of one's state. And there might even be a plausible version of 
relativism, but it is not sufficiently strong to rule out the sort of moral universalism 
that I defend. In this chapter, then, I begin my investigation of limitation arguments 
by analyzing the merits and demerits of patriotism.
5.2. Exclusionary Patriotism. Compatriot Favouritism, 
and Morality
Two important questions, for our purposes, are:
(i) Is there an ethically defensible form of patriotism? And, if there is,
(ii) What does patriotic loyalty imply about duties of justice to non-compatriots?
Accordingly, I will first assess competing conceptions of patriotism, arguing that
patriotism need not be an overtly immoral doctrine — it can be consistent with a 
defensible account of morality. However, I find no airtight arguments in favour of a 
blanket version of what I will call Compatriot Favouritism. Supposing, for the sake 
of argument, that patriotism can be ethically justified, I then propose to look at the 
status of international justice in light of the legitimate patriotic commitments persons 
may accept.
Patriotism is love of one's country, and patriotic loyalty is the species of loyalty 
that requires devotion to one's country and a willingness to sacrifice one's own 
interests to some degree for one's fellow countrymen or countrywomen. Hence the 
patriot is someone who believes that he is justified in extending greater concern to 
some persons — compatriots — than to others — non-compatriots or 'foreigners.'1 
Beyond this very basic characterization of patriotism, opinions diverge, and it is the 
inclusion or exclusion of additional features that generates competing conceptions 
of patriotism.
The first extra characteristic that some writers include as constitutive of patriotism 
is the view that one should concern oneself only with the well-being of one's own 
compatriots. To say that patriots "extend greater concern" to compatriots is, on this 
reading, to say that non-compatriots falls outside the sphere of ethical concern
1 In this chapter, I focus on the general question of heightened concern for one's compatriots, 
understood here as co-citizens of a nation-state. I therefore place no special emphasis on the 
distinction between co-nationals and co-citizens. Since the differences between these two types of 
group are potentially of great ethical importance, I turn in Chapter Six to the issue of nationality 
as an ethical value for persons as distinct from the value of shared citizenship, and to the relation 
between nationality and global justice.
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altogether. This implies that "foreigners" count for nothing, morally speaking, and 
we can therefore label this view exclusionary patriotism. This total exclusion of 
outsiders from consideration is no doubt an element in the set of commitments of 
some real-life (so-called) patriots, but I think it is uncontroversial to conclude that 
such a form of patriotic concern is not ethically defensible, for the simple reason 
that it could legitimate any action or policy done in the name of one's country 
without taking any account o f non-compatriots. One need not be a moral 
cosmopolitan — i.e., a defender of impartialist, egalitarian individualism — to reject 
the idea that citizenship is the sole criterion of moral considerability. One odd 
consequence of accepting exclusionary patriotism is that it would seem to commit 
one to the belief that gaining membership in a country would somehow have the 
effect of turning one into a subject of ethical concern (from the perspective of those 
who are already members). This would lead, in turn, to our attaching monumental 
significance to immigration procedures!2 But this bizarre implication is not the real 
reason why we should reject this view. For, more simply put, on this conception of 
patriotism, patriots are those who believe that they are justified in pursuing policies 
that, from their own perspective, further the interests of their country, even though 
they do so only by enslaving or killing persons in other countries, because these 
exterior effects count for nothing in the moral assessment of the legitimacy of such 
policies. If this is patriotism, then it should be rejected outright.3 Even if we 
conclude that a country is in general a proper object of its citizens' loyalty, there are 
limits to the sorts of actions and policies it is legitimate to pursue in its name, and 
part of the rationale of those limits is that non-compatriots should count to some 
extent.
Some versions of 'realism' in international relations theory and practice are 
indefensible in part for the reason that they exemplify the exclusionary approach to 
inter-country interactions. If individual egoism is unacceptable because persons are 
required to recognize the interests of other persons, then by similar reasoning state 
egoism or national selfishness is not credible, since states — which are made up of 
individuals each of whom has obligations to consider others to some extent — must 
recognize that there are other states with interests similar to their own. So wholesale 
renunciation o f duties to other states is not plausible.
2 Of course, I am not denying that the granting of citizenship to immigrants can be, and often is, 
an extremely important matter, both for the admitting country and the applicant. My point is 
simply that its importance is not what it would be if, as the exclusionary patriot maintains, the 
granting of citizenship to a person were at the same time the recognition of that person as a moral 
subject.
3 Stephen Nathanson, 'In Defense of "Moderate Patriotism"', Ethics 99 (1989), 538, similarly 
rejects what he calls "extreme patriotism," whose defining feature is its wholesale exclusion of 
non-compatriots from ethical concern.
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Fortunately, a better conception of patriotism is available. According to this 
alternative view, patriots express their love of their country by showing greater care 
and concern for their country and compatriots than they do for other countries and 
non-compatriots, though the latter also count for something. By "greater care and 
concern" here it is allowed that some concern should be shown to non-compatriots, 
but the level of concern will be less than that accorded to compatriots. The patriot, 
then, believes that, ethically speaking, "compatriots take priority."4 I will call this 
view compatriot favouritism (CF). Now our question is whether there is a sense in 
which this sort of favouritism is ethically defensible.
One reason why we might think not is that, on the face of it at least, compatriot 
priority flies in the face of certain pervasive features of commonsense morality. For 
instance, it is commonly thought that adopting a moral perspective involves looking 
at any particular conflict of interests from a neutral position, and thereby exempting 
oneself from viewing matters from the particular perspective of any one of the 
parties to the conflict. The reason why this abstraction from any one viewpoint is 
considered to be justified is that it enables one to judge the dispute without 
favouring one party's interests over those of any other. In short, morality seems 
often to require impartial concern and the consequent non-accordance of priority to 
any particular individual or group. Consider, on the other hand, the vice known as 
bigotry, "the groundless downgrading of some selected subset of humanity."5 
Priority for one's compatriots can seem like the flip side of this coin: compatriot 
favouritists appear to upgrade groundlessly some selected subset of humanity. How 
can this be justified?
The challenge to cosmopolitanism that compatriot favouritism represents is to 
show, not that morality can apply beyond nation-state boundaries, but rather that 
these boundaries do not constitute a legitimate point at which to decrease somewhat 
the pull that generates a person's moral obligations. The cosmopolitan must, that is, 
give some account of the special ethical relationships compatriots are alleged to 
share. In doing so, he must aim to resolve the difficulty represented by the claim 
that some persons, those identified as compatriots, are due greater concern than 
others, a claim that on the face of it seems to contradict a root idea of 
cosmopolitanism and of much moral philosophy and commonsense moral thinking 
as well, namely, the idea that all persons are due equal moral consideration.
4 Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence. Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1980), 131-32. Shue is not himself a defender of compatriot 
favouritism.
5 Samuel Gorovitz, 'Bigotry, Loyalty, and Malnutrition,' in Peter G. Brown and Henry Shue, 
Food Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1977), 133.
Let us be clear about what is at issue here. There is a contradiction, at least on the 
face of it, between:
(i) a dominant moral tradition according to which each person is the moral equal 
of every other person and so merits equal consideration, and
(ii) the demands of patriotic commitment, which say that compatriots legitimately 
count for more than non-compatriots.
This conflict needs to be resolved, and there are several possible alternative 
resolutions. First, one could deny that morality requires impartial concern for each 
person. This is not a realistic option. Impartiality is an important moral value, since 
it requires us not to make an exception of ourselves when deliberating about what it 
is right to do. We should retain the idea that morality forbids deliberative processes 
that take account only of the subject of deliberation, or make that subject 'special' in 
such a way that general rules governing human behaviour do not apply to him. 
Moreover, when interests conflict, a stable resolution is not likely unless it is 
possible to abstract from one's own particular perspective and see the potential 
legitimacy of the interests of all sides to the dispute; but it is just this sort of 
abstraction that impartiality requires.6 A second possible resolution would be to 
deny that compatriot favouritism is ethically acceptable. This is a real option, 
although it would mean rejecting a widely held belief. Thirdly, one could attempt a 
reconciliation of (i) and (ii), thereby holding out the possibility of retaining them 
both in some form. Defenders of this third option might effect this move by 
distinguishing different levels at which morality applies to our lives: at one level, 
preferential treatment can be justified, while at a second level we must take up a 
perspective of impartial consideration of competing interests. The trick is to show 
that one of these levels has moral primacy and that, from that level, taking up the 
supposedly conflicting attitude can be defended (though only at its proper level).7 
This resolution of the apparent conflict allows impartial concern to co-exist with 
special ties to compatriots, within the limits imposed upon the actions those ties 
may legitimately generate. The most important such limits are that basic rights- 
violations are not permitted in the name of acts done in support of one's 
compatriots. It should be emphasized, however, that this reconciliation of 
compatriot favouritism with impartial concern shows only that the two are 
compatible, not that there are any independent reasons to be a compatriot favouritist 
in the first place. The third option, if successful, would have shown only that
6 Stephen Nathanson, Patriotism. Morality, and Peace (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman &
Littlefield, 1993), 67.
7 Cf. Marcia Baron, 'Patriotism and "Liberal" Morality', in D. Weissbord (ed.), Mind. Value and 
Culture (Northridge, California: Ridgeview, 1989), 269-300.1 have also been influenced by what 
is now the best discussion of the partiality/impartiality dispute: Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), Part III.
compatriot favouritism is consistent with the impartial concern required of 
conscientious moral agents; this is not to say that compatriot favouritism is 
independently plausible.
We can put the problem in the form of a set of claims, one of which must be 
rejected if the others are to be maintained.
(1) The version of patriotism known as compatriot favouritism (CF) permits and 
often even requires persons to accord higher priority in their ethical deliberations 
and actions to the interests and needs of compatriots than to the similar interests and 
needs of non-compatriots.
(2) Adopting a moral perspective involves abstracting from any particular 
individual's (or group's) interests, thereby viewing matters from an impartial 
standpoint.
(3) From the impartial standpoint of morality, it is impermissible for the interests 
and needs of any one individual or group to be accorded any ground-level priority; 
each party is thereby shown equal consideration.
From these three claims it follows that CF permits or requires deliberation and 
action which is ruled out from the viewpoint of morality. The priority claim pressed 
in (1) is disallowed by (3) (which elaborates on (2)). Hence it looks as though we 
will have to give up either (1) or (3). We can call the present objection the purported 
immorality o f compatriot favouritism. But is it an accurate portrayal of the options 
to say that we must choose between priority for compatriots on the one hand and 
commitment to morality on the other?
Some reason for admitting special ethical relationships into one's picture of an 
acceptable account of morality can be seen if we consider an objection one sort of 
impartialist might make to compatriot favouritism. This objection is a generalized 
version of the criticism we have been considering, since it questions compatriot 
favouritism by rejecting special duties as an entire class. This is the special 
relationships objection. The argument is that, since impartial moral concern requires 
equal consideration of everyone affected by an action or policy, special 
relationships that require unequal consideration, in the way of special concern for 
some people rather than others, are incompatible with morality.
With special reference to patriotism, the argument says that patriotism is immoral 
because, first, it consists essentially in a form of special concern for some 
circumscribed group of people and, secondly, such special concern for some others 
is inconsistent with a proper moral consideration of each person equally. This line 
of reasoning is ultimately unacceptable because its second premiss, although it is 
both relevant to and (along with the first premiss) sufficient to generate the desired 
conclusion, is, as stated, too strong and is therefore implausible. To accept the 
second premiss, we must believe that no form o f special concern fo r  some
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particular person or group o f people is ever morally justified. This would require us 
to believe that the desires and actions constitutive of parent-child relationships, for 
instance, are in fact lacking any sound moral justification. While I will not here 
provide any extensive explanation of why such desires and actions are morally 
legitimate and indeed morally required, I can safely say that any theory that 
mandates their abolition is deeply flawed in some way. Compatriot favouritism 
might not be, in the end, an acceptable view, but the fact that it is an instance of the 
view that special consideration for some others is morally legitimate is not sufficient 
to show that it is a morally unacceptable view. In fact, the reality is quite the 
opposite. We tend to think that the special duties parents owe to children, for 
instance, are morally required, not merely permitted.8 Nonetheless, the patriotic 
version of special ties is not necessarily defensible simply in virtue of the 
plausibility of its familial analogue.
To see this last point more clearly, I will mention briefly one type of argument for 
special concern for compatriots that works by appealing to the meaning of the 
relation in question. Compatriot favouritism might be taken to be reasonable 
because the relationship co-citizens bear to one another necessarily involves special 
duties. I think this is an unsatisfactory way to defend special duties to compatriots, 
but it is important to see how the argument might proceed and where it goes wrong. 
Some special relationships are necessarily associated with particular obligations. As 
Samuel Gorovitz points out, "[t]o be a friend is to have certain obligations in regard 
to the object of one's friendship; to reject such obligations is to reject participation 
in that form of association known as friendship."9 To be a friend is to assume 
certain duties toward one's friend, and the rejection of such duties means that the 
relationship itself does not hold: these obligations are definitive of the friendship 
relation. It would be implausible to say that A is a friend of B even though A would 
not 'put himself out' for B any more than A would for anyone else. Unfortunately 
for compatriot favouritism, the obligations of citizenship are importantly different 
from the obligations of friendship. The whole question of what is required of 
compatriots is debatable, and it has changed over the past few hundred years — 
where paying taxes for the funding of a substantial, national welfare state, for 
instance, is now usually thought to be acceptable where once it was not — to such 
an extent that we are unlikely to find any uncontroversial duties that are defining of 
the special relationship compatriots share. Consequently, it seems that compatriot 
favouritism cannot be defended by reference to an appeal to what the compatriot 
relation definitionally requires.
8 Stephen Nathanson, Patriotism. Morality, and Peace , 27.
9 Samuel Gorovitz, 'Bigotry, Loyalty, and Malnutrition,' 135.
In response to this last argument, we can say that what is required of friends and 
family members has likewise changed over time, though this does not show that 
friendship and family relationships are not, of necessity, forms of group 
favouritism. We can admit that there are different conceptions of citizenship, 
friendship and families, while consistently maintaining that any such conception 
will be a form of favouritism. This response is important, but it fails to show that 
compatriot favouritism is a morally justified version of special concern. This result 
is unsurprising, for we should not have expected the patriot's justificatory task to 
be performed successfully by simply appealing to a definition.
We should consider some of the other arguments relevant to the acceptability of 
patriotism. I take up this task in the sections entitled 'Compatriot Favouritism: 
Further Clarification' and 'Compatriot Favouritism: For and Against', but we 
should first consider the claim that compatriot favouritism will be fatally flawed if it 
cannot respond to the problem I have called the purported immorality o f compatriot 
favouritism. In the next section I turn to a solution to this problem.
5.3. Is Patriotism Consistent with Impartial Concern?
Patriotic loyalty demands that persons deliberate in a partial manner, according 
moral priority to compatriots. But a dominant strand of commonsense moral 
concern demands that no one should specially privilege their own interests or those 
of people with whom they have special ties. We have seen that the rejection of 
special relationships as a class cannot be successful, but we have also noted that 
this does not necessarily help compatriot favouritism. If we take seriously both the 
particularist understanding of community co-member relationships and the 
universalist claim that everyone is morally entitled to treatment as an equal to 
anyone else, we are led to a contradiction. On the one hand, people are permitted, 
and sometimes required, to show special concern for their compatriots, but on the 
other hand, people are obligated to show equal concern for any person, regardless 
of the citizenship of either one. If this contradiction cannot be overcome, we will 
have to give up one of these claims, both of which have evident appeal. 
Fortunately, we can make a distinction that dissolves the supposed conflict and 
allows us to retain, in a suitably qualified form, both compatriot priority and 
impartial concern for all persons.
The resolution of the conflict is achieved in a manner described by Alasdair 
MacIntyre (though MacIntyre does not himself think the resolution is successful). 
MacIntyre says that "patriotism and all other such particular loyalties can be 
restricted in their scope so that their exercise is always within the confines imposed 
by morality. Patriotism need be regarded as nothing more than a perfectly proper 
devotion to one's own nation which must never be allowed to violate the constraints
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set by the impersonal moral standpoint."10 The idea is that patriotic deliberation is 
often permissible or required; we can legitimately reason that we want to pay an 
extra tax to benefit our compatriots, or support a particular cause, even a war, 
against another country, but we must also be prepared to acknowledge that 
deliberation and action of this type is defensible for citizens of other countries in 
circumstances similar to our own. That is, from an impartial or impersonal second- 
order perspective, I must see that first-order thoughts such as 'This is my country!' 
can figure in the legitimate ethical thinking of any person. Defensible partiality, 
then, is partiality that anyone can admit is justifiable for anyone else to act upon. If 
it is all right for me to act from the reason that it is my country whose interests are at 
stake, then I must also believe that it is all right for non-compatriots to act for that 
very same reason with reference to their country, when circumstances are similar.
Distinguishing levels of moral deliberation, beginning with first-order thinking 
and adding the crucial perspective of second-order thinking about the reasoning that 
goes on at the first-order level, dissolves the supposed incompatibility between 
patriotic special concern on the one hand and impartial consideration of the interests 
of all persons on the other.
One response to this argument is to deny that its acceptance of impartiality goes 
far enough: Why not be a. first-order impartialist? The short answer to this question 
is that first-order impartialism is a version of fanaticism, for it embodies a 
misunderstanding of the role impartial considerations should play in ethical 
deliberation and action.11 In this context, it might be helpful to consider a classical 
discussion of this issue. I also include here my own contribution to this debate, 
namely, an example designed to show that compatriot favouritism is a clearly 
distinguishable species of the genus, 'special ethical concern', and that its appeal 
cannot ride on the back of more intimate relationships between persons.
The classic case I have in mind is the Godwinian fire dilemma. William Godwin 
describes a scenario in which someone is confronted with the choice of saving only 
one of two people who are trapped in a burning building. One of these unfortunate 
individuals is an Archbishop, the other is the Archbishop's valet, who is perhaps "a 
brother, father, or benefactor" of the person who must save one of the two 
people.12 Godwin, the impartialist fanatic, opts for saving the person who is likely
10 Alasdair MacIntyre, 'Is Patriotism a Virtue?1, Lindley Lecture (Lawrence, Kansas: University of 
Kansas, 1984), 6.
11 By using the word "fanaticism" here I do not mean to engage in argumentative bullying. In the 
following paragraphs I go on to show why the word is justified in this case. That is, I think that 
first-order impartialists are overly enthusiastic about the admittedly important idea that the virtue 
of impartiality is central to a defensible account of morality, and their enthusiasm blinds them to 
the further distinctions it is necessary to make.
12 William Godwin, An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and its Influence on Morals and 
Happiness , third edition, 1798, in Political and Philosophical Writings of William Godwin ,
9 8
to produce more benefit for humankind; in this case it is presumed to be the 
Archbishop. Hence, according to Godwin, one should not save one's own father if 
one can produce more overall expected benefit by saving someone else. This is a 
version of first-order impartiality.
Bernard Williams discusses another version of Godwin's problem, in which the 
choice is between saving one's wife and saving a stranger, both of whom will 
drown if nothing is done.13 Abstracting from Godwin's utilitarianism, it seems 
clear that first-order impartialism would require that one cannot appeal to any 
ground-level reason for favouring one person over the other. Williams believes 
that, not only is the impartialist conclusion incorrect, but the whole idea that there is 
a need for a general, reasoned justification for saving one's wife is mistaken. My 
view is that both Godwin and Williams reason incorrectly.14 Godwin is wrong 
because, though he rightly acknowledges the value of impartial concern, he applies 
his particular brand of utilitarian reasoning to each individual's particular context of 
action.15 As we have seen, partiality in such contexts is consistent with an overall 
commitment to impartial consideration of the equal claims of all persons. Williams, 
on the other hand, is wrong because he thinks there is no scope for reason-giving in 
contexts like the fire dilemma. I think he is correct to say that it is obvious that a 
man should save his wife rather than a stranger — even an important stranger whose 
utility-producing potential is judged to be quite high (and much higher than his 
wife's potential in this regard) — however, I also believe, contrary to Williams, that 
it is necessary to understand that "in situations of this kind it is permissible to save 
one's wife."16 The fact that one does not offer such a justification before acting 
does not mean that it does not make sense to think that there are good reasons for so 
acting. After all, if we could give no reason at all, even in a cool hour sometime 
after the fact, would we not have grounds for suspicion about the ethical status of 
the act?17
edited by Mark Philp, (London: William Pickering, 1993), Volume Four. The attentive reader will 
recognize my debt to the discussion in Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality , Chapter 9.
13 Bernard Williams, ‘Persons, Character, and Morality’, in Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 
1973-80 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 1-19.
14 I should make it clear that I disagree with Andrew Belsey, World poverty, justice, and equality', 
in Robin Attfield and Barry Wilkins (eds.), International Justice and the Third World: Studies in 
the Philosophy of Development (London: Routledge, 1992), 40-42, who thinks that favouring 
one's wife in this case is necessarily a veiled form of selfishness.
15 See Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality , 219.
16 Bernard Williams, "Persons, Character, and Morality', 18. Just for the record, I think it is 
probably a moral requirement of a husband in such a case to save his wife. My substantive 
conclusion would then differ from both Godwin (who says wife-saving is in this case forbidden) 
and Williams (who says wife-saving is in this case merely permitted).
17 Perhaps Williams would agree that calm, reasoned justification is indeed necessary, in which 
case I have no quarrel with him. The problem of interpretation here stems from a fundamental lack 
of clarity as to whether or not reasons are thought to be necessary in the decision-making situation
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We can of course offer some very good reasons why 'partner-saving' — i.e., 
wife-saving, husband-saving, long-term co-habitator-saving -- is justified in fire 
dilemma cases. Sincere and committed participation in these sorts of close 
relationships fosters other virtues in a person, such as honesty and concern for 
another person's general well-being. This sort of concern may even be a necessary 
condition for having the capacity to sympathize with the suffering of people in 
faraway places. If these are the relations through which we become moral beings, 
we can hardly deny the moral obligations they involve. Intimacy is important in the 
living of a meaningful life, and it generates a need — as a means to ensuring that 
intimacy retains its authenticity — for dispositions to act in certain ways in particular 
contexts: the fire dilemma case is one such context; in fact, we can now see that if 
we take seriously the importance of intimate relationships, there is no dilemma after 
all. One should regret that both persons cannot be saved, but this does not entail 
that there is not a correct answer to the question of which one should be saved.
There is an interesting point to be made about compatriot favouritism in 
connection with the Godwinian fire dilemma. Imagine a similar case, with a 
burning building and two helpless individuals, only one of whom one can save. 
But now imagine that one is a compatriot and the other is a non-compatriot. Whom 
should you save? I think that one thing that becomes obvious as soon as one thinks 
about this sort of example is that any conclusion one might reach is very much less 
obvious than in the standard Godwin-Williams example, in which one of the 
potential rescuees is a father, mother, or wife. At least with respect to the 
conclusions reached in the traditional case, Godwin is obviously incorrect and 
Williams is just as obviously correct (although he gives an unsatisfying account of 
the reasons for his choice). In the compatriot dilemma case, on the other hand, one 
could perhaps think of reasons for saving one's compatriot before saving the non­
citizen, but those reasons would not come anywhere near securing widespread 
agreement for their proposed recommendation for action. The vital yet simple point 
is that the traditional case and the compatriot case would not appeal to similar 
reasons, since the most important grounds for preferential treatment for one's 
partner are the intimacy of this relationship and the importance of intimacy in living 
a life. But, of course, intimacy and its justificatory power cannot be wielded on 
behalf of compatriot-saving, for most compatriots are strangers to us, just as most 
foreigners are as well. The fact that compatriots are slightly less 'strange' strangers 
hardly counts as a powerful reason, certainly not in the way intimacy counted in the 
traditional case.
itself and/or in the relative calm of one's study, when one is considering what it would be right to 
do if one were faced with such an unpalatable choice. I am here interpreting Williams as saying 
that reasons are unnecessary in either case. Thus interpreted, Williams and I disagree.
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There are two upshots of this discussion. The first, general one is that first-order 
impartiality is not a reasonable view. The second is that compatriot priority cannot 
be justified in the same straightforward way that we justify priority for intimates. 
The latter conclusion in turn suggests that we should look for other reasons for 
adhering to compatriot favouritism.
5.4. Compatriot Favouritism: Further Clarification
I have just said that compatriot favouritism (CF) cannot be defended in precisely 
the same way that we justify favouritism for, say, our children or parents. But the 
defence of compatriot priority can be structurally the same as the defence of familial 
priority; this is because, as we have seen, both are forms of ethical particularism 
and there is no general reason for eschewing ethical particularism. There is no 
general objection to ethical particularism, understood as special ethical commitment 
to some person(s) rather than others, because some forms of particularism can be 
universalized. It is perfectly acceptable to show special concern for one's own 
children, but one must admit that others are justified in showing such concern for 
their children and that they need not show the same interest in your children as you 
do. Notwithstanding the structural similarity between different species of 
particularism, we still need to discover some more positive considerations in 
support of compatriot favouritism, along with the main objections to which it is 
subject. Sections 5.4 and 5.5 set out on this path of discovery. First we should say 
something more about the form taken by compatriot favouritism, my label for the 
form of patriotism that might turn out to be defensible.
As we have seen, CF says that people are justified in showing greater concern for 
compatriots than they do for non-compatriots, though non-compatriots must also be 
subjects of moral consideration. And we have shown that such a view can be 
consistent with a defensible overall account of morality. One feature of any 
plausible account of CF is especially important to mention: defenders of CF agree 
that no person should be accorded any ground-level priority over any other or 
others.18 That is, CF does not accord ground-level priority to any person or group 
of persons. Rather, it accepts that each person is ultimately on a moral par with 
every other. But it urges us to take account of the implications for our ethical 
obligations of the existence of certain public institutions in which we participate 
with a limited number of others (i.e., our compatriots). Compatriot favouritists 
point out that ground-level moral equality does not rule out superstructural special 
concern grounded in the conduct of some but not others. This point is akin to the 
general claim that what people do affects how they should be treated.
18 See section 5.2, the third of my three mutually incompatible points.
It is crucial to note, however, that the CF version of the 'conduct affects proper 
treatment' claim does not justify special treatment for compatriots. One argument in 
defence of CF might say that the fact of sharing a commitment to a set of beneficial 
institutions can render special concern for other, similarly committed persons 
legitimate. But this argument has a problem: it looks as though its defender would 
respond to an 'outsider's' claim to 'our' resources or 'our' concern by pointing out 
that it is only insiders (i.e., fellow citizens) who have contributed to the institutions 
in question and to the production of benefits those institutions have spawned. This 
may or may not be true empirically, and if it turns out to be false — say, where a 
country's GNP has been substantially enhanced by the contribution of foreign 
labour — compatriot favouritism lacks a defence. Moreover, even if we accept that it 
is only the citizens of a specific country who share the wealth they create by 
contributing to a public framework for generating co-citizen benefits, some of those 
citizens will not have contributed to the production of those benefits. Most 
interestingly, this will be true of the severely disabled citizens who nonetheless are 
usually thought to have a legitimate claim to help from compatriots. Yet the 
compatriot priority thesis itself would seem to provide no grounds for excluding 
non-contributors and explicit reason for including them. After all, handicapped 
compatriots are still compatriots. What we can call the contribution requirement — 
the demand that only those who have contributed to the production of general 
benefits have a claim on those benefits — is therefore not the key to understanding 
who does and who does not merit help from a set of public institutions.19 Insofar 
as this argument depends on something like the contribution requirement, it 
therefore provides no justification for compatriot favouritism.
Another important feature of Compatriot Favouritism is its conditionality upon the 
characteristics of the state in question. It can never be true that someone rightly has 
special obligations to his compatriots simply because both he and they share 
citizenship. Consider the implications of denying this claim. Someone who held 
that shared citizenship were alone sufficient to generate ethical priority for someone 
would have to accept that German citizens during the Nazi era had a moral duty to 
look out for the interests of, say, high-ranking Nazis -- i.e., fellow citizens of 
Germany -- before considering the plight of the non-German victims of Nazi 
oppression. I assume, on the contrary, that the opposite is in fact the case: a morally 
upstanding German citizen would have had a duty to concern himself with the 
safety and rights of the victims, even when those victims were non-compatriots.
To summarize, we have noted the following features of compatriot favouritism:
19 We have already seen that this sort of requirement is not plausible as a general basis for 
distributive justice itself. See Chapter One, where "subject-centred justice" is favoured over its 
more tough-minded alternatives.
(1) Special Concern: CF supports special concern for compatriots as against non­
compatriots.
(2) Consistency with Impartiality: This special concern need not violate the 
impartialist demands of morality.
(3) Ground-Level Equality and Superstructural Inequality: CF accepts the claim 
that each person is due equal moral consideration, regardless of citizenship. It 
urges, however, that this ground-level ethical equality does not rule out differential 
treatment of persons based on the actions which people perform as members of 
collectivities (most importantly, the nation-state of which they are citizens).
(4) Conditionality: The acceptability of CF is conditional upon the characteristics 
of the state in question. There is no such thing as a compatriot favouritist attitude 
that is justified independently of any information about the ethical character of the 
state concerned.
Apart from noting these elements of CF, we have also rejected an argument in its 
favour. Our criticism of that argument brought out the problems for CF generated 
by the third point mentioned immediately above. That is, on the one hand, 
compatriots and non-compatriots contribute to the well-being of the citizens of, say, 
the United States, so where contribution counts there is no argument for limiting 
obligations to compatriots; and on the other hand, some compatriots do not 
contribute to the well-being of their fellows, yet we think it is right to show concern 
for them regardless of their inaction.20
Having thus clarified the main features of CF, we should further pursue the 
arguments on both sides.
5.5. Compatriot Favouritism: For and Against
We have seen that compatriot favouritism can take some account of the interests 
of those outside one's borders, and that although there is no general impartialist 
reason against special relations, nevertheless this does not show that all special 
relations are justified. More needs to be said about arguments for and against 
compatriot favouritism. That is the purpose of this section 21
One point merits repeating here. Patriotism is not a general duty of persons, since 
patriotic loyalty should not be directed towards one's country unless there are 
certain characteristics present in an accurate description of that country that give rise 
to legitimate loyalty. 'My-ness' is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a
20 I am referring here, of course, to the handicapped to whom we correctly think we owe a duty of 
justice. I do not intend to defend the behaviour of free-riders who are able to contribute but choose 
not to do so.
21 A related strategy is pursued in Chapter Eight below, where I consider some prominent 
attempts to show that significant implications follow from the view that states are valid 
associations.
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justified patriotism. (It is a necessary condition because it is impossible for 
someone to have a patriotic attitude toward some country which is not her own.) 
Commitment to a non-aggressive foreign policy, or to protection of the natural 
environment, might be relevant loyalty-generating characteristics. I should add that 
there is no definite set of features the presence of which guarantees that patriotic 
loyalty will be legitimate. Rather, some qualities will count toward considering a 
country as a proper object of loyalty, and other qualities will count against doing 
so, but many features will simply call for particular actions (on the part of patriots) 
aimed either at reinforcing those features or at ending one’s country's commitment 
to them. Hence the particularity of patriotic loyalty is conditioned by the need for 
any virtuous patriotism to include the citation of some admirable characteristics 
which add some credibility to the (always elliptical) claim that 'I should be loyal 
because it is my country.'
There is one central reason, then, why compatriot favouritism might be desirable 
from an ethical point of view: One's country could have admirable characteristics 
that call forth support from its members. If loyalty to one's country is, in part, 
dependent upon an appreciation of the features of the country that make it worthy of 
one's devotion, then the need for individuals to support valuable collectivities will 
go some way toward justifying love of one's own country over others. Note again, 
however, that patriotic loyalty is on this view conditional upon one's country 
possessing features that themselves either permit or require persons to take up the 
position of loyal supporter. And conditionality does not merely weaken the potential 
grip of patriotism, it also threatens to support anti-patriotism. If a citizen of country 
A should show special concern for country A because it exemplifies certain virtues 
in its everyday practice, then a citizen of country B — a country more vicious than 
virtuous, or a country whose virtues pale in comparison to those of country A -- 
should not be a compatriot favouritist. On the contrary, citizens of country B should 
show special concern for country A and therefore ought to be non-compatriot 
favouritists! Consequently, what appeared to be a strong reason for adhering to CF 
turns out on examination to provide a reason for pledging allegiance only to the 
country (or countries) that pass some more objective ethical test; so there can be no 
general defence of CF grounded on this argument.
Good reasons for acknowledging the ethical importance of close bonds with 
one's community are not hard to find, however. And these reasons could provide 
some defence of compatriot favouritism in a specific instance. Individuals gain a 
• sense of themselves only in the context of their particular communities. Each of us 
probably needs to feel that we belong somewhere, and to participate to some degree 
in a culture. Being "at home" in a culture and a society provides us with some of the 
elements necessary for living a meaningful human life, and it seems inevitable that
persons who develop cognitively, socially, and emotionally in a certain social and 
cultural context will come to regard the distinctive aspects of that context — of their 
country — with special affection. To the extent that one's culture is enabled to thrive 
by state support, one would have good reason to show special concern for one's 
state.
Further insight into the grounds for compatriot favouritism can be gained by 
attempting to answer the following question: Why should we care more for some 
people than we do for others? One plausible answer is that some people are 
especially vulnerable to us and our actions. It is this vulnerability which explains 
why special duties are properly assigned in one way rather than another by an 
adequate moral theory.22 The problem for compatriot priority, as it relates to this 
argument, is that many foreigners are highly vulnerable to our actions, perhaps 
more vulnerable than our compatriots are. In that case, of course, the vulnerability 
argument recommends favouring non-compatriots over compatriots. This sort of 
argument is different from one in which co-membership te //ju s tif ie s  special 
obligations. Here, rather, it is the supposed correlation between citizenship and 
some other, morally relevant characteristic (i.e., vulnerability) that justifies 
compatriot priority. If that correlation fails -- as, it is claimed, it does when non­
citizens are more vulnerable to our actions than citizens are — the argument's 
conclusion is that (as long as the vulnerability relation remains as it is) non­
compatriots take priority. Therefore, even if we accept the vulnerability model of 
special obligations, that model provides no general rationale for compatriot 
favouritism. Where there is in fact a high correlation between vulnerability and 
citizenship, this model would support CF, but we would still have no reason for 
supposing that CF is, in general, a plausible account of our ethical responsibilities 
in this regard. All that would follow would be the wisdom of discovering degrees 
of vulnerability; and even where we find the aforementioned correlation, it is the 
vulnerability and not the shared citizenship that is doing the moral work of 
generating duties. Compatriot favouritism would be an alternative way to describe 
what we should call, more accurately, special concern for the vulnerable. And 
shared citizenship would be a decidedly secondary part of any satisfactory moral 
explanation, i.e., an explanation of why persons have the moral obligations they are 
properly said to have.
With regard to this discussion about vulnerability, there arises an interesting and 
important point about the proper focus of a citizen's concern: if one's own state 
can, by its actions, significantly affect the well-being of non-compatriots, then, as a
22 Robert E. Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable: A Reanalvsis of Our Social Responsibilities 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985) develops the vulnerability model at some length. 
However, he thinks it provides support for compatriot favouritism only within certain limits.
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citizen who accepts the vulnerability criterion, one should take the most effective 
means to ensuring that those persons are not made to suffer. In democratic states, it 
follows that citizens should especially concern themselves with the policies of their 
own government wherever those policies impinge upon foreigners, since one’s goal 
(to protect those vulnerable to one) is best promoted by focusing one's energies in 
those places where they are likely to have the most significant effect. But this 
special concern for the policies of one's own country is not to be confused with 
partiality in favour of the individuals who are one's compatriots. Again, the ethical 
work here is being done by the vulnerability of persons to the actions of one's 
government, and if one accepts the moral importance of the vulnerability relation, 
uncontroversial considerations of rationality dictate that one should concern oneself 
with the policies of one's own state. This concern is, however, only a means to 
protecting the vulnerable.
Let us now turn to some other considerations relevant to judging the acceptability 
of compatriot favouritism. Foremost among these considerations is the claim that 
individuals maintain various degrees of allegiance and loyalty to numerous, often 
rival communities.23 This simple point is potentially devastating to compatriot 
favouritism because it might turn out on examination that some community or 
communities other than one's country take ethical precedence in many important 
contexts, thereby relegating compatriot favouritism to a secondary status. People 
are loyal to fellow members of religions, races, and ethnic groups, for instance, and 
nothing has yet been said to support compatriot priority in cases where it conflicts 
with allegiances to any of these groups. Why should moral significance be accorded 
to the borders of nation-states when doing so would override loyalties to one or 
more of these collectivities? We know why co-religionists feel attachments to one 
another: they share beliefs about fundamentally important aspects of human 
existence such as the origin and meaning of life; consequently, they naturally feel a 
bond with others who share such deep commitments (regardless of the truth of their 
shared beliefs or the ultimate rationality of those commitments). Since compatriots 
do not necessarily share beliefs and commitments in this way, it is unclear why 
anyone should favour compatriots over co-religionists when it is necessary to make 
a choice between one group and the other.
We can call this the problem o f conflicting loyalties. It is the problem of 
determining the ethical implications of the fact that people have deep attachments to 
more than one group — for instance, someone could consider herself both a Jew 
and a Canadian. We can imagine circumstances in which loyalty to one of these
23 This is pointed out by, among others, Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence. Affluence, and 
U.S. Foreign Policy , 137-8, and George P. Fletcher, Loyalty: An Essay on the Morality of 
Relationships (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 58.
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groups requires action that would violate a requirement recognized by that same 
person in her capacity as a loyal member of the other group. The dilemma, then, 
concerns deciding which way to turn. This sort of problem shows — what many 
would take to be evident in any case — that nation-states are not obviously the 
supreme objects of loyalty in the modem world. The upshot of this point for 
international justice is as follows. The restriction of duties of justice most often 
recommended in current discussions is a restriction of concern to compatriots, i.e., 
fellow members o f one's state. But if state membership lacks sufficient ethical pull 
in many contexts to override attachments to a religious group or intra-state national 
community, then it is unclear why citizenship should be the proper feature for 
determining the obligations of justice. Even if there are grounds for limiting concern 
to some group, why should that group be the citizens of one's state? Since there are 
various individuals and groups toward which we can show legitimate devotion, 
prioritizing one's country becomes an unrealistic demand, especially in cases of 
conflicts of loyalty.
In the context of severe global deprivation and poverty, we need to understand 
what could provide a reason for thinking that one's compatriots are the group 
toward which one should recognize the strongest moral obligations. We have seen 
that family ties and the bonds of friendship, each of which are constituted by 
legitimate special responsibilities, are grounded in the importance of intimacy or 
depth of participation in close-knit relationships. Are compatriot relations analogous 
to these? Another potential foundation for heightened concern for compatriots is the 
presence of community-wide attachment to a set of values or principles. Sharing a 
commitment to principles with one's compatriots might constitute a reason for 
caring more for other adherents to these principles than one does for non­
adherents.24
These two possible grounds advanced for moral priority are, first, intimacy and 
deep personal involvement, and secondly, agreement about basic principles or 
values. The first sort of ground may be priority-generating, as in the case where we 
say that spouses can with justification show deeper ethical concern for one another 
than they do for those with whom they are unacquainted. But, as we have seen, this 
is not likely to provide much support for compatriot priority, since people are not, 
nor could they be, intimate with all of their fellow countrymen and countrywomen. 
Even if intimacy and depth of involvement generate special obligations, this is no 
help to the compatriot favouritist.
24 These potential foundations for compatriot priority are discussed by Henry Shue in Basic 
Rights: Subsistence. Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy , 135.
The second kind of reason for priority, i.e., co-membership in a "community of 
principle," is similarly unlikely to correlate with co-membership in a nation-state. 
The reason for this is — as is all too clear — compatriots are often deeply divided on 
questions of devotion to basic principles, values, and goals. This is, of course, one 
reason why liberals recommend that peaceful and stable political arrangements 
should not require that everyone be committed to the same basic values or 
’conceptions of the good.' Public order itself perhaps demands that proposed 
solutions to disputes about such large issues should not be made matters of 
government policy. But it is not only that there is disagreement between compatriots 
about moral and political principles, there are also fundamental principles 
attachment to which people share with foreigners but not with compatriots. Nation­
states are certainly not, in general, communities of principle in any sense that would 
exclude outsiders from the special duties owed to co-adherents to a given set of 
principles. It might be objected that everyone in a liberal society must share a 
commitment to the society's principles of justice, if not to some unified account of 
the good life for human beings. The answer to this charge is that citizens need only 
act in conformity with those principles, they need not believe them to be true.
5.6. Patriotism and Global Justice
We have failed to find any cogent arguments in support of compatriot 
favouritism. CF is not necessarily an immoral doctrine, for its particularism does 
not itself render it guilty of any violation of morality; however, CF is just as clearly 
lacking any general, defensible rationale. We should be open to other arguments, of 
course, but so far we are right to reject it. Having said this, I now want to suppose 
for the sake of argument that compatriot favouritism is justified. On this basis we 
can assess the relationship between patriotism thus conceived and the conclusions 
about global distributive justice reached in Part One of this thesis. Even if we are 
correct to remain skeptical about the strength of claims for patriotic loyalty, I will 
here suppose that patriotism can be a virtue and assess the implications of accepting 
this claim for the questions of international distributive justice. This strategy has the 
additional virtue of permitting us to evaluate the arguments of some prominent 
compatriot favouritists, so we will be able to continue to look for reasons to accept 
that widely held but weakly defended doctrine.
The main claim I want to emphasize is that no defensible form of patriotism 
justifies denying the basic human rights of persons. It can be morally permissible, 
even required, that one be patriotic and loyal to one's country, but such permissions 
and requirements can never override the demands of impartial justice. I propose in 
this section to assess attempts on the part of some compatriot favouritists to show 
that justice is not the sort of virtue that can properly extend beyond one's
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compatriots. These attempts, by Alasdair MacIntyre, George P. Fletcher, and 
Daniel Bell, constitute explicit denials of the central positive claims I have made.
Alasdair MacIntyre and Inter-Community Conflict Over Scarce 
Resources
Alasdair MacIntyre offers an argument against the very possibility of maintaining 
both
(i) commitment to one's country, and
(ii) commitment to principles of impartiality.
This is a radical criticism inasfar as it says that even a limited compatriot 
favouritism is not possible so long as one acknowledges the impartial perspective. 
MacIntyre claims that so-called patriots who at the same time accept "liberal 
impersonal morality" would show their lack of true patriotism when faced with 
certain kinds of difficult choices. Interestingly, for our purposes, MacIntyre gives 
an example of a dispute between two communities over the use of scarce and vital 
natural resources.
Imagine two communities, both requiring the same essential resources for their 
survival or flourishing as a community. According to MacIntyre, each community 
should strive to further its own interests in this matter, and in fact, "... patriotism 
entails a willingness to go to war on one's community's behalf."25 Someone who 
acknowledges the claims of impartial morality, on the other hand, will not be able 
simply to opt for his own community when faced with this sort of conflict. In 
violation of patriotic loyalty, he will choose "an allocation of goods such that each 
individual person counts for one and no more than one."26 We can see, then, that 
MacIntyre's patriotism denies the basic moral idea that each person counts equally 
from a moral point of view. But it is implausible to hold, as MacIntyre does, that no 
account needs to be taken of the interests of persons in the community whose 
interests conflict with one's own. We have distinguished between compatriot 
favouritism and exclusionary patriotism, but MacIntyre's patriot seems to be of the 
exclusionary variety. Moreover, even if one adopts the compatriot favouritist 
standpoint, why should it follow that one's community is not required to settle this 
sort of dispute through an impartial negotiating process? MacIntyre seems to see no 
merit in arriving at a settlement that satisfies both communities, but he gives us no 
reason to agree with him on this point. This is especially troubling since compatriot 
favouritism, if it is at all defensible, permits special concern for compatriots only 
with respect to some of their interests; it does not necessitate total denial of the basic 
human rights-claims of outsiders. Cosmopolitan arguments have been adduced in
25 Alasdair MacIntyre, 'Is Patriotism a Virtue?', 6.
26 Ibid.
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support of the importance of basic human rights, but MacIntyre's account offers no 
grounds for overturning the prima facie case we have made in Part One, apart from 
his claim that patriots literally cannot take up the impersonal perspective of morality. 
This last claim, however, is patently false.
MacIntyre commits the notorious fallacy of incomplete disjunction. He offers us 
only two alternatives, but he ignores a third option which is not only available but is 
in fact correct. He assumes that persons devoted to their country, that is, committed 
patriots, cannot take up a detached perspective from which the claims of conflicting 
parties can be adjudicated.27 Hence MacIntyre's scenario presents us with a stark 
choice: either we can support our country in its struggle with another country over 
control of resources or we can detach ourselves from the perspective of a patriot, 
thereby exposing our true lack of commitment to our country. It follows, according 
to MacIntyre, that someone who opts for the second alternative — the alternative 
favoured by anyone who acknowledges the claims of compatriots and of non­
compatriots — is not a true patriot. But there is a third alternative: patriots can be 
specially concerned with their fellow countrymen while at the same time 
recognizing that other communities have the very same need for the particular scarce 
resources in question. MacIntyre might object that his patriot can do this; it is 
simply that he attaches no moral weight to the needs of others. But nothing in 
MacIntyre's argument shows that recognizing the legitimacy of the claims of non­
compatriots is impossible, nor that it is unjustified.
The upshot of this brief discussion is to re-emphasize what we have seen earlier. 
First, exclusionary patriotism is indefensible. Secondly, it is possible for patriots to 
assume an impartial perspective, especially when faced with conflicts of interest. If 
this were not possible, such conflicts would be settled by force alone.28 But there is 
no need to equate concern for one's compatriots with support for muscle-flexing. 
Indeed, one benefit of compatriot favouritism (as identified by the third alternative 
above; and, of course, assuming it can be defended on other grounds) is that it 
holds out the hope of resolving conflicts by a process of discussion in which all 
interlocutors show consideration for one another.
George Fletcher, Patriotic Loyalty, and Justice
Is cosmopolitan justice in the end a credible doctrine? One good reason for trying 
to understand the pros and cons of compatriot favouritism is that some of its 
defenders have offered arguments to show that cosmopolitans are fundamentally 
mistaken in various ways. George P. Fletcher, for instance, cautions that "[i]t 
might be an ideal to extend our loyalty to everyone on the planet, but nourishing
27 See Stephen Nathanson, Patriotism. Morality, and Peace , 82.
28 Of course, self-interest may dictate peace, but only where the state with whom one's own state's 
interests conflict is strong enough to withstand attack.
utopian visions about faraway places sometimes makes people indifferent to the real 
suffering next door."29 Cosmopolitans can make two responses to these claims. 
The first has to do with the possible objects of loyalty implicit in them. The second 
concerns the assertion about the neglect of local suffering that it is claimed will 
follow (sometimes) from the adoption of a more expansive view.
First, then, the point about loyalty itself. Perhaps loyalty is the sort of 
commitment that loses its proper sense when faced with very large numbers of 
people.30 So it might indeed be utopian to recommend that each of us should feel a 
sense of loyalty to everyone else, including those in "faraway places." But, then, 
the cosmopolitan is not claiming that we should be loyal to the group of all human 
beings. He is, rather, committed to acknowledging the equal claims of all persons 
on everyone else, despite the fact that we experience a sense of loyalty to less 
inclusive groups. The point the cosmopolitan is trying to emphasize here is that, 
even though the demands of loyalty cannot and should not be denied with respect to 
many of the claims we make on one another, there are some claims — most notably, 
claims to the protection of one's vital interests -- the content of which renders them 
immune to the (partly countervailing) ethical pull created by group loyalty. What we 
might call 'Basic Interest Immunity' protects persons in other countries from the 
otherwise justifiable claims of patriotic loyalty that compatriots make on one 
another: the basic interests of badly-off individuals in country A cannot be subject 
to dismissal by an argument from a relatively well-off citizen of country B that 
appeals only to the value of compatriot relations.
Fletcher suggests that we should think of the patriot-versus-impartiahst dispute as 
one of conflicting loyalties, where we must choose between the undeniable 
attachments of the "historical self' to his compatriots, on the one hand, and, on the 
other hand, the utopian ideal of "loyalty to everyone on the planet." My point, in 
response to Fletcher, is that the issue is not one of deciding which of these two 
potential objects of loyalty has more compelling ethical credentials. Instead, the 
cosmopolitan impartialist should grant that loyalty is a virtue, when it is so, only for 
circumscribed groups, but refuse to conclude on that basis that the vital interests of 
some persons should count for less simply because they do not belong to the 
favoured group.
My second response is as follows. As a reason against extending ethical 
commitment to all persons, regardless of citizenship, Fletcher says that doing so 
"sometimes makes people indifferent to the real suffering next door." Is Fletcher 
claiming that my concern for the plight of people in East Timor somehow could lead
29 George P. Fletcher, Loyalty: An Essay on the Morality of Relationships , 20.
30 On the other hand, imagine how plausible a commitment of "loyalty to everyone on the planet" 
might look as a response to an invasion of the earth by strange and violent extraterrestrials!
to my failing to care about those forced to sleep on the streets of London (i.e., those 
close to home)? I suspect that whether this claim is true depends on what the 
grounds are for my caring about how people's lives are going; and if those grounds 
turn out to be a concern for the protection of persons' vital interests, then I ought to 
care about deprivation and suffering wherever it exists; and if some people, in their 
zeal for the struggle against faraway injustice, lose sight of the importance of 
nearby suffering, it should be clear that the theory outlined in Part One of this thesis 
provides no grounds for doing so.31
Fletcher's attack on cosmopolitan justice also includes a claim about the 
connection between justice and loyalty.
Loyalty is a critical element in a theory of justice; for we invariably need 
some basis for group cohesion, for caring about others, for seeing them not 
as strangers who threaten our security but as partners in a common 
venture.32
This seems to me to set up a false dichotomy between:
(a) thinking of others as "partners" or fellow group members, and
(b) thinking of these others as "strangers who threaten our security."
According to this view, other people are either part of my group, and hence the
proper objects of my concern and devotion, or they are potential threats to the 
satisfaction of my interests as a "private self-seeking" member of a "consumer 
society."33 Reality, however, is more complicated than Fletcher makes it out to be. 
My compatriots are, after all, mostly strangers to me, but I can regard them as 
partners in a common project nonetheless. Hence, in fact, most of my national 
"partners" are strangers, in which case we have a third alternative not identified in 
(a) or (b) above, namely:
(c) thinking of others as strangers with whom I am embarked on a joint venture 
inasfar as we all register our allegiance to a set of institutions embodying reasonable 
principles of distributive justice.
Moreover, many other strangers are, of course, not participants in the common 
venture I share with my compatriots, and yet this other set of strangers, 
nonetheless, can hardly be said to threaten my security, especially if "me" in this 
context refers to a citizen of a relatively rich country. If anything, it is I — or at least 
my government — who constitute a threat to the security of deprived persons in the
31 In Chapter Six, I address a related point made by David Miller, on the question of the relation 
between fulfilling duties at home and fulfilling similar duties to outsiders. As I point out there, the 
Scandinavian countries show more concern for fellow citizens and give far more international aid 
than other countries.
32 Fletcher, Loyalty ,21.
33 Ibid.
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poor nations. It is therefore incorrect to claim that, "when we take people as they 
are," we need patriotic loyalty if we are to avoid being engulfed by self-centredness 
and mistrust. There is another alternative: we can combine a concern for one's own 
country with a commitment to helping those in need, regardless of citizenship.
But Fletcher continues to pursue his anti-cosmopolitan point. He adds: "There is 
no easy response to the idealist who insists that all five billion people constitute one 
community, with one cause. The answer must begin with an understanding of how 
we as human beings are constituted and what our natural limits of sympathy may 
be."34 Three points in reply to Fletcher suggest themselves here. First, Fletcher sets 
up a straw man when he says that his opponents see all human beings as pursuing 
one cause. Secondly, once this first point is recognized, it is clear that we need not 
choose between (i) commitment to one cause for all persons, and (ii) acceptance of 
patriotic loyalty, with its consequently weakened moral ties to foreigners. Thirdly, 
if the implication of Fletcher's remarks about the natural limitations of our capacity 
to feel sympathy for others is supposed to be relevant to a theory of international 
justice, then the proper reply is that, as human beings, we cannot (nor should we) 
feel the same sort of sympathy for every other person that we feel for those with 
special ties to us. If we did, we could scarcely go through life without constantly 
experiencing depression due to our awareness of the massive suffering our fellow 
human beings constantly endure. But the limits of human sympathy are not as 
Fletcher describes them, nor is the capacity for sympathy as straightforwardly 
relevant to global justice as might be thought. Many of us are capable of showing 
sympathetic concern for the suffering of other human beings, say, when they lack 
adequate food and water and physical security. We have a natural capacity to 
recognize that, if things had been different in various ways, we might have been the 
one's who suffered, and the fact that none of us can feel sympathy in precisely the 
same way for every person whose plight is potentially sympathy-generating, is 
entirely beside the point. What matters is only whether or not we can recognize that 
deprivation exists, and that we can understand arguments aimed at showing us that 
such deprivation calls for action designed to eradicate it.
Let me go over in more detail the three points mentioned in the last paragraph. 
First, it is indeed idealistic to maintain that the entire human population of the planet 
constitutes "one community, with one cause." It is an idealistic belief, but at any 
rate, there is nothing immediately mistaken about being idealistic. Some theorists 
would take the idealism of this view to be a point in its favour. More importantly, 
however, it is also pretty clearly false. In any case, cosmopolitans need not believe 
that there is one cause that all human beings pursue in common.
34 Ibid.
Does anyone seriously maintain that all persons constitute one community, with 
one cause? Certainly liberals do not need to maintain any such thing, for one of the 
most prominent problems motivating research in liberal political theory is the 
realization that people pursue different and conflicting causes, and a popular 
solution to this plurality of causes is to maintain that governments should be so 
constructed that such pursuits can remain live options for everyone, within the 
constraints of an institutional structure that protects against rights-violations. 
Perhaps there are those who believe that we are, all of us, pursuing "one cause," 
but this is no part of the commitment of those who believe simply that every 
person's basic interests are sufficiently important to merit protection. The 
cosmopolitan can quite consistently say that everyone should be able to pursue a 
variety of conceptions of the good life, within the limits of justice.35
Now, as I mentioned above, the fact that Fletcher has set up a straw man here 
implies that our options are larger than he suggests, for we do not need to be 
compatriot favouritists simply because there is no single cause to which the entire 
human race is committed. This is my second point: we can admit that people pursue 
various and conflicting causes, while at the same time denying that, as a 
consequence, we are justified in saying that people should favour compatriots over 
others.
My third point is that the limits of human sympathy are relevant to the 
acceptability of impartialist accounts of international moral obligations, but not in 
the way Fletcher thinks they are. Fletcher suggests that loyalty is necessary because 
it provides the basis "for caring about others," and that "our natural limits of 
sympathy" are such that we are incapable of showing concern for "all five billion 
people" in the world. Now if Fletcher's claim is that we cannot, in our daily lives, 
show equal concern for everyone else, then there is a sense in which this is true and 
a sense in which it is false. It is true that we cannot, as individuals, (nor should we) 
show the same concern for strangers' children that we show toward our own. But it 
is false to assert that we cannot both realize that each person is equally a proper 
object of concern and respect, and undertake to support institutions whose purpose 
is to ensure that everyone has their vital interests protected. Consider a domestic 
analogue of this point: redistributive welfare states do not require each citizen to 
have an identical attitude of sympathy toward each and every compatriot. The fact
35 These points are related to Terry Nardin's defence of international society as a practical, non- 
purposive association in Law. Morality, and the Relations of States (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1983). International society might be understood to be committed to a common 
cause, if by this we mean that the demands of justice must be met by every state. But if this is 
Nardin's view, it would seem to be a long way from an Oakeshottian account of international 
politics (i.e., Nardin's aim), according to which, one would have thought, meeting those demands 
would constitute a commitment to an illegitimate enterprise. For further discussion of Nardin's 
views, see Chris Brown, International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches , 124ff.
that we cannot extend similar sympathy to each person in a country populated by 
hundreds of millions of people does not entail that principles of justice cannot 
include this entire population within their scope.
More generally, I think that Fletcher's argument overlooks that fact that in serious 
ethical thinking there is a complicated "interaction of sentiment and principle." 
Henry Shue suggests, "with apologies to Kant, that sentiments unconstrained by 
principles lack authority, principles unsupported by sentiments lack effect. 
Sentiments, both in others and in ourselves, can be judged critically. The 
expression in action of some sentiments is to be welcomed, the expression of others 
is to be discouraged. For assessing sentiments one needs principles."36 The point, 
in brief, is that we no doubt need sympathetic identification with others to support 
our conclusions about moral obligations, but criticism of our sentiments is 
necessary to judge whether such identification meets the criteria suggested by moral 
principles. Applying this type of move to the present point, we might ask whether 
someone's claim that he cannot sympathize with the suffering of the distant poor is 
based on (i) some fundamental feature of human nature (from which it might follow 
that he cannot extend his sympathy so far), or (ii) a convenient refusal to consider 
that the ethical principles he actually accepts might require that he extend his 
sympathy further. In the second case, if he can show equal concern for all other 
persons, then his stubborn refusal to do so amounts to nothing more than stubborn 
refusal. Of course, if there is some principled reason for limiting one's sympathy to 
compatriots, it can be introduced at this point in the argument; but Fletcher does not 
offer any such principled reason.
Another point that some compatriot favouritists are apt to make is that we must 
accept a tradeoff between commitment to our country, on the one hand, and our 
adherence to independent critical thinking about the requirements of justice, on the 
other. Again, Fletcher puts the point succinctly: "The moral challenge for every 
devotee of a cause is to find the proper balance of loyalty and independent moral 
judgment."37 This suggests that we must strike a balance between two competing 
ethical values, loyalty on the one hand and independence of judgement on the other. 
On the contrary, however, I think there is no head-to-head conflict of the sort 
Fletcher hints at here, for the "independent moral judgment" to which he refers 
should always, I submit, take priority where possible. If appeals to such judgement 
fail to support the loyalist, then loyalty is not in that case justified; but if loyalty is 
shown, by independent judgement, to be justified, then the two standpoints 
coincide. In the latter sort of case, it is incorrect to say that a balance has been
36 Henry Shue in Basic Rights: Subsistence. Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy , 146.
37 Fletcher, Lovaltv , 35.
struck between loyalty and independent moral judgement, since both lead to the 
same conclusion, and Fletcher gives us no plausible examples where one should 
remain loyal to some country while eschewing critical assessment of the reasons 
one can muster for such commitment. Fletcher's problem of striking a balance 
between loyalty and independent moral judgement most clearly arises in cases 
where one has a sense that the object of one's loyalty (e.g., one's country) might 
not be worthy of one's devotion, but it is in precisely those cases that "independent 
moral judgement" is called for. Moreover, the outcome of critical evaluation of 
one's country could well be that one is justified in explicit denial of the claim that 
one's country is a proper object of loyalty.
Analysis of Fletcher's views has led to the following conclusions. First, loyalty is 
indeed a special attachment to some person or group, so that it is implausible in 
normal contexts to maintain that one should be loyal to all human beings. But this 
point does not refute the cosmopolitan assertion that some human interests are 
sufficiently important to generate protections which no appeal to the value of loyalty 
can override. Secondly, care and concern for faraway suffering need not result in 
blindness to deprivation close to home. Thirdly, we should be wary of attempts to 
portray compatriots on an analogy with co-members of more close-knit groups. 
Most of my compatriots are strangers to me, so it is inaccurate to say that we must 
make a choice between compatriots whose closeness generates mutual trust, and 
others who are threats to our well-being. The reality is that increased physical 
distance does not necessarily coincide with increased threats to our security. 
Fourthly, cosmopolitans are not wedded to the view that all human beings are 
pursuing one cause; they need only believe that no human being's interests should 
be excluded from equal consideration. Finally, there is no unbridgeable conflict 
between loyalty to compatriots and critical moral judgement, for this sort of loyalty 
(as any other) is not criterionless; accordingly, there is always room for evaluation 
of any object of loyalty.
Daniel Bell, Communitarianism, and Bounded Justice
Daniel Bell's recent book, Communitarianism and Its Critics , is in the form of a 
dialogue between a liberal, Philip Schwartzberg, and a communitarian (and 
compatriot favouritist), Anne de la Patrie.38 Judging from the book's introduction, 
Bell himself sympathizes with the communitarians, especially on the question of the 
scope (national versus global) of distributive justice. At one point, Bell has Anne 
say the following:
Any effective scheme of distributive justice, as I see it, presupposes a
bounded world of people deeply committed to each other's fate -- most of
38 Daniel Bell, Communitarianism and Its Critics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).
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us will not agree to enshrine generous actions in law, and to live by those 
laws, if we can't identify in some way with recipients of those generous 
actions — and it just so happens that the nation-state has emerged, for 
whatever concatenation of historical reasons, as the unit within winch our 
sense of solidarity is strongest.39
Anne is mistaken. Three features of these claims call for comment. The first has 
to do with an apparent confusion between the descriptive and the normative, the 
second concerns Anne's point about solidarity, which I believe is correct but does 
not prove her larger point about "bounded" justice, and the third concerns the 
notion of generosity and its relation to the virtue of justice.
First, then, the claim that the nation-state is the de facto centre of solidarity can 
help to explain why the nation-state is generally thought to be the proper site of 
distributive justice. However, no claim about the way things are is conclusive in the 
context of an argument whose concern is with the way things ought to be. The 
presumed fact that allegiances do not presently extend beyond national boundaries 
does not make it reasonable to deny appeals for the extension of those allegiances to 
all human beings.
The second, related point is that Anne proposes the reasonable idea that 
identification with the recipients of welfare assistance is necessary if people are to 
agree to give up some of their own wealth and resources. But then, if one can 
present plausible arguments for the view that each person should, at some level, 
identify with every other person, the ground is laid for implementing a global 
redistributive regime. The burden of the argument for basic human rights is to show 
that there are indeed reasons for identification across the entire class of persons. In 
this context it is important to remember the history of arguments for patriotic 
loyalty. Because justifications of patriotic loyalty have (historically) attempted to 
show the arbitrariness of devotion to local groups, those arguments have 
themselves made it possible to argue, in turn, that loyalty to one's country and 
loyalty to more local groupings are arbitrary in much the same way. If there was 
good reason to give up parochial attachments to clan and town in favour of nation­
state allegiance, then it might be reasonable to give up patriotism in favour of global 
moral concern. What we might call the expansionary momentum of these arguments 
from moral arbitrariness could very well make it reasonable to believe that nation­
state allegiance lacks a credible defense of its restricted special regard for one subset 
of persons.40
39 Ibid., 137-38.
40 Cf. Stephen Nathanson, 'In Defense of "Moderate Patriotism"', Ethics 99 (1989), 549.
And finally, Bell's use of the word "generous" in this context suggests, 
misleadingly, that the actions required by the demands of distributive justice exhibit 
a special sort of kindness, or a commitment to sharing that goes beyond that which 
might normally be required. But generosity comes into play only after the claims of 
justice have been met, and the meeting of rights-claims can be demanded without 
requiring "generosity" on the part of duty-bearers. People are generous when they 
give more than they are strictly obligated to give, but justice focuses on more strict 
obligations, therefore to be generous is to exemplify an attitude quite separate from 
any required for the demands of justice to be met.
Bell not only sympathizes with Anne's claim about the restricted character of 
distributive justice, he also cites Richard Rorty on "the point that identification with 
'fellow human beings' seldom provides the motivational force for generous 
actions."41 Rorty's offers an interesting piece of evidence against the possibility of 
global solidarity in the name of justice.
'Consider... the attitude of contemporary American liberals to the unending 
hopelessness and misery of the lives of the young blacks in American cities. 
Do we say that these people must be helped because they are fellow human 
beings? We may, but it is much more persuasive, morally as well as 
politically, to describe them as fellow Americans — to insist that it is 
outrageous that an American should live without hope .... [Our] sense of 
solidarity is strongest when those with whom solidarity is expressed are 
thought of as 'one of us', where 'us' means something smaller and more 
local than the human race. That is why 'because she is a human being' is a 
weak, unconvincing explanation of a generous action.'42
And Daniel Bell continues in the same vein:
That our sense of solidarity is strongest where 'us' means something 
smaller and more local than the human race provides a strong argument 
against the feasibility of a world-wide system of distributive justice 
(regulated by law), but of course it doesn't follow that the range of 'us '  
can't be extended in the direction of greater human solidarity for more 
narrow purposes, e.g. making people more sensitive to instances of cruelty 
in faraway lands (Rorty thinks that novels, with their detailed descriptions 
of particular varieties of pain and humiliation, are particularly suited for this 
purpose) 43
By responding to several of the points made in these passages, we can gain a 
better grasp of the commitments of cosmopolitans on the question of international 
distributive justice.
41 Daniel Bell, Communitarianism and Its Critics , 150.
42 Richard Rorty, Contingency. Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), 191, emphases in original.
43 Daniel Bell, Communitarianism and Its Critics , 150-51.
On the last point, that novels are well-suited for the purpose of increasing global 
sensitivity to suffering, this is no doubt true, but it is also important to take note of 
the reports of Americas Watch, Africa Watch, Amnesty International, and similar 
human rights organizations, since these are vital organs of information about torture 
and suffering around the world. Simple awareness of the facts of suffering is likely 
to generate widespread concern, even without literary devices of sentiment- 
building.
But, more importantly, why can the extension of solidarity towards all human 
beings embrace only sensitivity to cruelty? If we can sympathize with the plight of 
persons who are victims of torture in faraway lands, why can we not also 
sympathize with those far-off persons who lack access to basic nutritional 
requirements, adequate housing, education, and health care? That is, there is 
nothing in this argument that explains why expressions of concern should be 
limited to "instances of cruelty." But if no 'limitation argument' can be given, then a 
"world-wide system of distributive justice" seems a plausible option.
Rorty's central claim, that it is best to point out that those who suffer are part of 
our community, seems to me to be a point about strategy rather than a point of any 
substance on the question of why it is that the destitute should be helped. If it is the 
case that this strategic move is properly recommended, this could signal at least two 
things.44 First, it could signify moral shortcomings in the addressees of these calls 
for help, i.e., the (relatively) wealthy and powerful Americans, who according to 
Rorty lack the moral vision to see that human suffering calls for ameliorative 
measures 45 Secondly, and somewhat less plausibly, Americans could be appealing 
to their sense, as Americans, that they should not neglect co-participants in their 
great national project. I say that this option is less plausible because, if we take a 
serious look at American history, it is evident that blacks in the United States were 
not considered co-participants in that project at all. Consider merely a small sample 
of evidence from the history of the treatment of blacks in the United States. John 
Locke's Fundamental Constitutions o f Carolina^ 1669), for instance, say that "every 
freeman of Carolina shall have absolute power and authority over his negro 
slaves,"46 and in 1850 the morally indefensible Fugitive Slave Act was passed by
44 There is, of course, good reason to doubt the effectiveness of pointing out that "it is outrageous
that an American should live without hope." If it is maintained that this sort of claim is "morally 
as well as politically" persuasive, one would have to point to instances where this strategy had any 
noticeable effect.
46 One of the problems with Rorty's view is that he does not think that the need to put one's 
arguments in terms of 'us' rather than 'human beings' suggests anything morally amiss with the 
prevailing condition of moral debate.
46 Cited in Howard Zinn, Declarations of Independence: Cross-Examining American Ideology 
(New York: HarperCollins, 1990), 234.
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Congress, signed by the President, and approved by the U.S. Supreme Court.47 
The hopes of black Americans for equal treatment remain, in many ways, 
unrealized, and it is no wonder that the black Supreme Court Justice Thurgood 
Marshall, speaking at the Bicentennial of the Constitution in 1987, said: "Some may 
... quietly commemorate the suffering, struggle, and sacrifice that has triumphed 
over much of what was wrong with the original document, and observe the 
anniversary with hopes not realized and promises not fulfilled."48
These elementary features of the American black experience threaten the 
credibility of Rorty's claims. There is, therefore, no moral argument we have yet 
seen which supports the restriction of arguments about justice to compatriots.
This discussion of Bell and Rorty has generated at least four positive conclusions. 
First, the fact that the prevailing view is that the nation-state is the proper focus of 
justice-related solidarity does nothing to show that this is the way things ought to 
be. Argument on this score is needed if the claim is to be maintained in the face of 
widespread global deprivation and suffering. Secondly, if solidaristic identification 
with others is a necessary condition for dependable commitment to a scheme of 
justice, cosmopolitan justice is precluded only if it can be shown that such 
identification is not possible with non-compatriots. That impossibility claim is 
deeply implausible. Thirdly, once it is admitted that it is both possible and desirable 
to show concern for the victims of cruelty in faraway countries, there is no obvious 
reason for limiting concern and opposition to acts of cruelty alone. It then becomes 
possible to recommend a world-wide scheme for the protection of basic human 
rights. And finally, despite claims to the contrary, it is not true that an argument 
from justice cannot appeal to the fact that it is wrong fo r a human being to suffer 
needlessly. If we phrase our arguments in terms of compatriots, as in the American 
appeal to the wrongness of 'American' suffering, this can only be for strategic 
reasons which themselves suggest something about the moral corruption of 
contemporary moral and political debate.
In closing, I want to return to another prominent discussion of one of the main 
issues addressed in this chapter. Richard Rorty has recently addressed what he 
takes to be the question most in need of answering by "moral educators": "Why 
should I care about a stranger, a person who is no kin to me, a person whose habits 
I find disgusting?"49 The following answer Rorty finds unconvincing: "Because 
kinship and custom are morally irrelevant, irrelevant to the obligations imposed by
47 Ibid., 237.
48 Ibid., 232.
49 Richard Rorty, 'Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality,' in Stephen Shute and Susan 
Hurley (eds.), On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993 (New York: Basic Books, 
1993), 111-34, at 133.
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the recognition of membership in the same species." The problem with this answer, 
according to Rorty, is that it is question-begging, it assumes that "mere species 
membership is ... a sufficient surrogate for closer kinship.50 If this is meant as an 
attack on a certain mode of cosmopolitan argument, it fails, for it misrepresents the 
role played in that argument by appeals to the fact of membership in the class of 
persons. The ties that we, as persons, have to other persons, do not function as 
"surrogates" for the kinship ties we recognize (and value) towards those close to 
us. Rather, we neither can nor should renounce the close, deep relationships — and 
corresponding duties -- we share with immediate family and trusted friends. But we 
do not have to choose between only two alternatives:
(i) Retaining kinship and friendship ties, and
(ii) Giving up those ties in favour of taking on obligations to all persons equally.
Rorty's accusation of circularity works only if impartial justice demands that we
renounce kinship ties, but we have seen that impartiality, properly understood, 
requires just the opposite.
In conclusion, I should stress that the argument of this chapter is not that no 
forms of partiality are justified. Am I saying that one is never justified in favouring 
one's own child over other children? Certainly not, but it is vital to recognize that 
the type of partiality with which we have been concerned is patriotism, and our 
question has been to evaluate the case for preferring compatriots to non-compatriots 
when it comes to determining the appropriate distributions of benefits and burdens. 
While partiality is justified in the interactions of individuals with one another 
(though only where it is also consistent with impartiality), the concerns of justice 
are not addressed to this interactional level. Rather, appropriate principles of 
international justice will aim to provide the theoretical underpinning for an 
institutional framework that can be defended to each person affected by that 
framework. My claim is that there are no good grounds for setting up a distributive 
scheme in such a way that the strength of a person's legitimate claims depends on 
that person's citizenship.
50 Ibid.
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Chapter Six: Miller. Nationalism, and Distributive Justice
6.1. Introduction
In this chapter my main objective is to consider the implications for questions of 
distributive justice of theories which attach fundamental ethical significance to 
nations, and an analysis of David Miller's contribution is, I believe, a useful tool in 
reaching that objective. In recent years, Miller has been developing some 
challenging ideas on the topic of nationalism.1 National communities figure 
prominently in Miller's version of communitarianism, where special obligations to 
co-nationals are founded on the ethically valuable national community. His work 
demonstrates that there is a version of nationalism which can stand up to ethical 
criticism; however, as I hope to show, Miller's theory of nationality does not justify 
linking the duties of distributive justice so closely to membership in national 
communities.
Miller cites an exchange between the Mole and the Rat in Kenneth Grahame's The 
Wind in the Willows2 , in which the Mole is wondering what is to be found beyond 
the world of the river bank with which they are both familiar. 'Beyond the Wild 
Wood comes the Wide World,' [said the Rat]. 'And that's something that doesn't 
matter, either to you or me. I've never been there, and I'm never going, nor you 
either, if you've got any sense at all. Don't ever mention it again, please.'3 The Rat 
displays complete indifference to the world beyond the river bank, a view which is 
a source of some concern for most moral philosophers, versed as they are in the 
ideas of universality, impartiality and equal consideration of all agents, regardless 
of geographical location. Miller does not endorse the Rat's indifference, but he does 
defend the need for "some kind of equilibrium between the everyday and the 
philosophical, between common belief and rational belief, between the river bank 
and the Wide World."4 By contrast, I believe there is more to be said for the 
"philosophical Mole" (Miller's invention, since Grahame's Mole fails to jump at his 
opportunity). This Mole asks the Rat, "What's so special about this river bank? ...
1 This discussion is based mainly on four of Miller's articles: (i) 'The Ethical Significance of 
Nationality1, Ethics 98 (1988); (ii) 'In What Sense Must Socialism be Communitarian?', Social 
Philosophy and Policy 6 (1988-89). (iii) 'In Defence of Nationality', Journal of Applied 
Philosophy 10 (1993); and (iv) 'The nation-state: a modest defence', in Chris Brown (ed.), Political 
Restructuring in Europe (London: Routledge, 1994). See also, David Miller, Market. State and 
Community , Chapter 9: 'Community and Citizenship1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). 
See also, David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), which appeared too late 
to be considered in this thesis.
2 Kenneth Grahame, The Wind in the Willows (London: Methuen, 1926).
3 Ibid., 16-17.
4 David Miller, 'In Defence of Nationality', 15.
Why is this river bank a better place than other river banks beyond the Wood?"5 
Though I believe the truth lies somewhere between the two poles of national 
allegiance allied to indifference to outsiders on the one hand, and outright denial o f 
the ethical claims o f nationality on the other, I propose to show that Miller's 
arguments fail to take sufficiently seriously the claims of non-nationals.
My analysis has four parts. First I outline Miller's characterization of nationality. 
In the second part, I look at some arguments purporting to show the ethical 
relevance of national commitments. Thirdly, I discuss reasons for rejecting the 
ethically foundational character of nations, and finally, I ask what obligations go 
along with national allegiance, with special reference to the obligations of 
distributive justice. At each stage my aim is not simply to record Miller's ideas and 
arguments but also to subject them to criticism. The chapter as a whole may be seen 
as an attempt to clarify one version of nationalism and to show how the ethical 
importance of such a view does not fundamentally alter the duties persons owe to 
one another as human beings.
6.2. Miller’s Characterization of Nationality
Before embarking on an outline of Miller's views, it will be helpful to state what I 
take to be the main jobs to be done by an account of the ethical significance of 
nationality. We must distinguish two central aspects of the nationality debate, 
corresponding to two tasks for political theorists. First, there is the problem of the 
proper characterization of the principle of nationality. Dealing with this problem 
requires the statement of an ethically defensible conception of nationalism. Let's call 
this the nationalism characterization task. Secondly, and of equal importance, there 
is the problem of delineating the form, content, and strength of the duties co­
nationals owe to one another, as well as the relation between these duties and other, 
more general duties to other persons (i.e., "outsiders").6 Let's call this the duties 
formulation task. The theorist needs to formulate explicitly which duties are owed 
to whom and why. The strength of duties to fellow nationals will, of course, 
depend to a large extent upon the form of nationalism in question; similarly, 
justifications of special duties to co-nationals will appeal to the prior characterization 
of nationalism. For both of these reasons, then, the second task awaits completion
5 Ibid., 3-4.
6 This way of putting the point is not strictly accurate, since a person's general duties will not be 
owed only to outsiders and not also to co-nationals. On the contrary, the set which makes up a 
person's duties will normally include as well duties to co-nationals which are owed to them simply 
because they are persons. That is, as a Canadian, I may have some nation-based duties to other 
Canadians, and as a human being I have some generally characterizable duties to other persons — 
both Canadian and non-Canadian — duties based on the interests persons have quite apart from their 
national attachments.
123
of the first; the complete formulation of duties and the statement of their supporting 
grounds await a characterization of nationalism. Accordingly, my discussion of 
Miller's views will outline his conception of nationalism in general before 
discussing his position on the duties persons owe to one another.
Miller's characterization of nationalism can be succinctly stated: a nation is "a 
community constituted by mutual belief, extended in history, active in character, 
connected to a particular territory, and thought to be marked off from other 
communities by its members' distinct traits."7 Perhaps the central distinguishing 
feature of a nation is that "a nationality exists when its members believe that it 
does."8 Nations are communities of belief, and the particular features of any given 
nation will depend on the actual beliefs that members take as constitutive of 
membership. Since nations are belief-dependent entities, any proposed criteria of 
nationality which are independent of persons' beliefs will fail in at least some cases 
to distinguish nations from one another. For example, common language has been 
put forward as such a criterion, and it does provide one mark of nationhood in 
some instances; however, its success as a distinguishing feature depends on the 
members' belief that their fellow nationals must speak a common language. As 
Charles Taylor puts it, "nations exist not just where there is the objective fact of 
speaking the same language and sharing a common history, but where this is 
subjectively reflected in a people's identification."9
One important nation-constituting belief is that the nation is an historical 
community whose forbears have toiled to make the nation what it now is. From this 
conception of an historical community there arise obligations of present-day 
members to carry on the national tradition: because the nation extends into the past, 
and into the future, the obligations arising from national membership are not ones 
that can be renounced as one might renounce obligations voluntarily undertaken. 
National communities ground duties not only to one's contemporaries but to 
previous and future generations -- duties to the former, to carry on the national 
projects; and duties to the latter, to ensure that the national community is passed 
down to them in a healthy condition.
7 Miller, 'In Defence of Nationality', 8; 'The nation-state: a modest defence', 141.
8 'In Defence of Nationality', 6; 'The nation-state: a modest defence', 138.
9 Charles Taylor, Reconciling the Solitudes (Kingston & Montreal: McGill-Queens, 1993), 
Chapter 3, 'Why Do Nations Have to Become States?' (originally published in 1979), 56. The 
question of the relation of language to national identity is interestingly addressed by Taylor, who 
makes a strong case for taking common language to be a necessary feature (though in some cases 
only implicitly) of any national identity. Where the national identity involves reference to more 
than one language — say, in the most plausible version of the Canadian identity, where French and 
English are accorded equal respect — national identity still makes essential reference to language. 
The possibility of such national identities shows, however, that no single common language is 
necessary for a nation to exist.
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If Miller is correct about the impossibility of renouncing one's historic national 
community (or aspects of it), one might think that the ethical claims of that 
community could not be denied.10 So it is worth pausing here to question Miller's 
assertion. I believe that his denial of the possibility of renunciation is either false or 
unproven. It is false if it is meant as an empirical claim about what can and cannot 
happen, for the fact of historical continuity does not rule out of account the present 
generation's refusal to identify itself with the national community as it has come 
down to them, even though it may make it improbable. It is unproven if it is 
understood as a normative claim about what the present generation can justifiably 
do. From the fact that the nation stretches across the generations it does not follow 
that one generation can have no good reason to repudiate various claims that 'the 
nation' makes upon it. Hence while nations may be ethical communities — one of 
Miller's central claims for nations — national ethical communities do not necessarily 
generate duties which must in all cases be upheld.
The next two features are straightforward: nations are active communities, they 
engage in various activities together; and nations are tied to particular territories, 
nations are linked with homelands. The activist element seems undeniably 
important, for it would be odd to say that a community exists where 'members' fail 
to engage in activities in common. The territorial claim is slightly more 
controversial, at least in contemporary circumstances, in which there is "the real 
likelihood that, so to speak, the most powerful Croatian nationalists have no 
intention of living in Croatia, but carry Croatia around with them in North 
America."11 Still, if there were no Croatian homeland, and no appeal to one, either 
in the past or in the future, we may be hesitant to call the phenomenon in question 
nationalism at all.
The final characteristic, namely, the belief in the distinctiveness of one's nation as 
against other nations, emphasizes another element of a person's belief-set which 
must be present for the nation to exist. We should note, however, the relevance of 
the obvious point that beliefs may be false: if members of a nation have false beliefs 
about the national past or about the distinctiveness of their nation, the ethical claims 
of the nation will be weakened, at least to the extent that false beliefs are not an 
acceptable basis for contested obligations. Miller recognizes this problem and 
attempts to deal with it, and I will outline and assess his attempted move, a move
10 See 'In Defence of Nationality1, 7, and The nation-state: a modest defence', 139, for the claim 
that the nation is "a community which, because it stretches back and forward across the 
generations, is not one that the present generation can renounce."
11 Benedict Anderson, 'The Psychology of Nationalism', forthcoming in Jeff McMahan and Robert 
McKim (eds.), The Ethics of Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
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designed to save nations from ethical oblivion, in the context of assessing the main 
criticisms of Miller's principle of nationality in section 6.4.
6.3. What Reasons are there for Persons to Value 
National Communities?
With this outline of Miller's conception of nationalism in hand, we can now 
search for reasons why nations should generate ethical obligations. We need an 
answer to the question, 'Why should national communities be valued?' There are at 
least two strategies to use in answering this question. The first, which I call the 
critical strategy, is to assess the value to individuals of belonging to nations. Here 
we might imagine persons without national allegiances and then consider how their 
lives might be less attractive than those of nationally affiliated individuals. The 
second strategy is more conservative, since it rejects attempts to justify national 
allegiances, and instead favours an approach which rationalizes national attachments 
on the grounds that they accord with the way people actually think of themselves. 
On this latter approach, the search for universally applicable reasons for national 
commitments is not necessary. Miller in fact favours this strategy, especially in his 
1993 article, 'In Defence of Nationality', though — both there and in the 1988 
article, 'The Ethical Significance of Nationality' — he does discuss attempts to 
justify national allegiances on universal grounds. I now propose to describe and 
criticize what I call the conservative strategy of rationalizing national commitments.
The defence of nationality can start from the undeniable fact that people do have 
national allegiances and attachments. The role of the political philosopher, 
according to Miller, is not to reject such commitments if they lack a rational 
grounding, but rather to retain those commitments unless they can be shown to be 
flawed in some way. He should take national allegiances as given and then "try to 
build a political philosophy which incorporates them."12 In this way, Miller 
attempts to shift the burden of proof in political argument on to one who would 
deny the acceptability of undefended national commitments.
Miller's apparent claim that where we begin the task of moral and political 
theorizing will have a marked effect on how we proceed, is highly misleading. As 
Joshua Cohen has said in criticism of a view similar to Miller's -- namely, Michael 
Walzer's approach in Spheres of Justice -- there is no real disagreement among 
theorists about where the theoretical enterprise should begin.13 Kant, Mill, 
Sidgwick and countless others start their theorizing from the commitments to be 
found in everyday moral and personal beliefs; they are led to philosophy by the
12 Miller, 'In Defence of Nationality', 4.
13 Joshua Cohen, 'Review of Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice' , Journal of Philosophy 83, 
1986, 467.
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problems and contradictions which arise when the attempt is made to understand 
and defend those commonsense views. Thus, from a number of common starting- 
points the views of theorists diverge. Where disagreement begins is in the attitude 
one takes in one's theorizing toward the commitments constituting that shared 
beginning. Two main attitudes present themselves: first, one can look for ways to 
incorporate people's allegiances into one's political theory (on the grounds, 
perhaps, that since "people generally do exhibit such attachments and allegiances", 
those attachments and allegiances must have some acceptable rationale); or 
secondly, one can critically assess the ethical and other grounds for the 
commitments in question, in order to judge whether, say, (a) national loyalties as 
they are found in contemporary societies can meet objections purporting to show 
that they contradict other ethical beliefs also held by the citizens of contemporary 
nation-states — for example, sentiments of benevolence or generalized concern for 
other human beings, or (b) national allegiances fail to stand up to moral criticism 
more generally — i.e., whether or not that criticism can be shown to stem from the 
prevailing beliefs of citizens. Joshua Cohen's criticism of Walzer's approach in 
Spheres of Justice14 is that Walzer seems to want his philosophical account to end 
up by justifying the shared values of the community in question. Or, to put the 
point another way, Walzer's view fails to question the community's shared values, 
and for this reason it fails as a philosophical account of those values: the 
philosopher's job is not merely to accept the norms he discovers in his own society; 
rather, he should subject them to critical scrutiny, thereby assessing their 
reasonableness.15 The same criticism applies to Miller's preferred approach to 
political philosophy: it is unacceptable to argue that nations should be valued simply 
because people value them.
Let us return then to the first strategy of justifying national commitments, what I 
call the critical strategy. Taking this tack, we do not accept that nations are ethically 
significant communities unless there are reasons for supposing that national 
allegiances have ethical value. Of the various reasons which might be offered, 
Miller focuses on the idea that national loyalty can provide the foundation for 
sentiments of solidarity which can in turn make possible mutually beneficial 
projects requiring substantial individual sacrifice. Without the communal feelings
14 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1983). I discuss Walzer's views in more detail in Chapter Seven.
15 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 44n47, 
expresses his own indebtedness to Joshua Cohen's review of Walzer and says: "See especially ... 
p.468f., where [Cohen] argues that Walzer's view about how political philosophy should begin 
does not differ essentially from Plato, Kant and Sidgwick. The difference is where Walzer argues it 
must end up, namely, with our shared understandings." These points are relevant to what Onora 
O'Neill calls the "accessibility" of ethical reasoning; see her Faces of Hunger ,41.
that national allegiance creates, it will be much more difficult — perhaps impossible 
— to put into practice any long-term plans for social improvement which require 
persons to give up something now for benefit in the future. This consideration 
brings up the importance of trust between people, especially whenever some 
difficult or risky enterprise best serves their long-term interests. I call this the 
argument from the need for solidarity. This argument has considerable plausibility, 
and is especially significant in light of the redistributive practices now characteristic 
of modem welfare states: if solidarity with fellow nationals can render consent to 
such practices more likely, then the nation may be an important object of ethical 
commitment in contemporary circumstances.16 If, as Miller claims, "the nation is de 
facto the main source"17 of the solidarity needed to underpin duties of mutual aid in 
contemporary, largely anonymous societies, nations would appear to be 
indispensable. There is nothing in this argument, however, to rule out the extension 
of solidaristic attachments to the entire human race, regardless of national 
membership.
Another argument for the ethical value of nations points to the combined effect of 
(a) historical attachment and (b) commitment to worthwhile values. Together, it is 
claimed, these generate special ties amongst co-nationals: members of a national 
group who have shared a common historical past in which they or their forbears 
have engaged in ethically commendable activities have good reasons to recognize 
special duties to one another. The Canadian philosopher, Thomas Hurka, has 
offered a version of this argument, filling in the details by discussing the analogy 
with personal relationships.18 In the case of my relationship with my wife, it cannot 
be only her possession of admirable qualities that grounds my special ties to her, it 
is also certain facts about our historical connectedness, facts that single her out from 
anyone else with similar qualities. I wouldn't simply give up my attachments to my 
wife if I discovered another woman who possessed my wife's admirable and 
desirable qualities to a higher degree, for that would constitute a denial of the value 
of the common past we share with one another. It is important to remember, 
however, that it's not only the "particular relationship of association"19 that gives 
value to the relationship. If it were only that, then if my wife changed such that she 
no longer possessed the qualities she once did — say, she no longer showed her 
characteristic intelligence, imagination, sense of humour, and care and concern for 
others -- it would still make perfect sense for me to retain my attachments to her to
16 See Miller, 'The nation-state: a modest defence', 141-44.
17 Miller, 'In Defence of Nationality', 9.
18 Thomas Hurka, 'The Justification of National Partiality', forthcoming in Jeff McMahan and 
Robert McKim (eds.), The Ethics of Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
19 Alasdair MacIntyre, 'Is Patriotism a Virtue?', The Lindley Lecture (Lawrence, Kansas: 
University of Kansas, 1984), 4.
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the same degree. But it wouldn't make sense, for my wife's becoming uncaring and 
humourless would rightly alter my special ties to her, at least to some extent.20 
Justified partiality, whether to loved ones or to fellow nationals, thus has a "double 
basis" which includes shared history as well as favourable general qualities. 
Partiality to co-nationals depends not only on the fact that we can point to a 
common past, but also on the general features the nation displays. National 
commitment to racial discrimination is not partiality-generating, while allegiance to 
equal opportunity may be. This argument is plausible, but my present purpose is 
simply to note that it relies to some extent on the existence of a common national 
history. The objection I will now consider casts doubt on any argument that relies 
on the reality of a shared history.
6.4. Objections to Conceiving Nationalities as Ethically 
Foundational
I will now look at two objections to the view that nations have basic ethical value; 
I call them the objection from historical myth and the objection from the inadequacy 
of partiality.
The objection from historical myth runs as follows: Nations are manufactured; 
they are imaginary communities whose histories are to a large extent false. 
Consequently national loyalties are in part loyalties to communities which do not 
exist — after all, the communities in question are supposed to include those not yet 
bom and those already dead. Obligations to co-nationals thus lack a rational 
foundation.21
Miller's reply to this objection appeals to "a distinction between beliefs that are 
constitutive of social relationships and background beliefs which support those 
constitutive beliefs."22 For example, a constitutive belief in the case of friendship is 
"that each is willing to put himself out for the other." Constitutive beliefs, then, are 
necessary conditions of the relationship's existence, i.e., without those beliefs the 
relationship does not exist. Hence false constitutive beliefs imply the absence of the 
relationship. Background beliefs, however, may be false in some cases, but a 
relationship can withstand false background beliefs provided that the constitutive 
beliefs are true. Thus a family's mistaken belief that one of its beloved, supported, 
and supportive members is biologically related to the rest (where the belief is 
mistaken because of a baby mix-up at the hospital), does not negate the worth of the
20 Although it depends on the reasons why she changed, i.e., if she were suffering from 
Alzheimer's disease, my attachments would remain strong. This suggests that changes for which 
she bears no responsibility are not such as to alter our ethical ties to one another.
21 Miller discusses this objection in 'The Ethical Significance of Nationality', 653ff., and in 
Market. State and Community , 241-45.
22 Miller, 'The Ethical Significance of Nationality', 655.
familial relationships since the belief in direct genetic proximity is merely a 
background belief. As long as the constitutive beliefs of family members remain 
true — for example, they actually are committed to mutual love and support — the 
relationship retains its ethical value.
This raises the following question: Are beliefs about the historical continuity of 
the nation constitutive or background beliefs? Miller's position would seem to be 
that they are largely background beliefs,23 although "(some version of) the common 
story" of historical origin and development must be true if the nation is to be an 
ethical community, so some very "general story with many basic facts not in 
dispute" appears to count as part of a person's nationality-constituting belief-set: 
"... the constitutive belief is only that there should be some national past."24 The 
problem here is that Miller has saved nationality at the cost of reducing considerably 
the ethical attraction it might derive from an appeal to shared historical struggles. If 
the backward-looking searches of co-nationals turn up only repeated disputes 
between different elements within the national community — rather than a series of 
solidaristic joint projects carried out in the interests of all — then there may not be 
much left to ethically ground national allegiances, at least where the appeal to the 
past is concerned.25 The case of oppressed groups, those whose interests have 
been consistently ignored for generations, represents a clear case in which the 
appeal to a 'common national past' may fail to generate any sense of duty to co­
nationals.26 The objection from historical myth stands. Insofar as nations as ethical 
communities are historical fictions, they cannot legitimately generate any obligations 
on the part of co-nationals for one another.
I now turn to the objection from the inadequacy o f partiality. The idea here is that 
the appeal to nationality is ethically inadequate because it introduces an irreducible 
element of partiality into the deliberative process, and partiality is contrary to the 
widely accepted view that a moral perspective requires one to be impartial.27 To
23 Hence the falsity of some historical 'stories' does not nullify all historically-based ties between 
co-nationals.
24 Miller, 'The Ethical Significance of Nationality', 655-56.
25 The American historian Howard Zinn has claimed that the solidaristic stories of national glories 
are indeed false: "Nations are not communities and never have been. The history of any country, 
presented as the history of a family, conceals fierce conflicts of interest (sometimes exploding, 
most often repressed) between conquerors and conquered, masters and slaves, capitalists and 
workers, dominators and dominated in race and sex." Zinn, A People’s History of the United States 
(London: Longman, 1980), 9-10.
26 Cf. Stephen Nathanson, Patriotism. Morality, and Peace (Lanham, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1993), 208. On achieving community at the cost of excluding various groups from 
membership in that community, see Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An 
Introduction (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 225-29, and, more generally, Derek L. Phillips, 
Looking Backward: A Critical Appraisal of Communitarian Thought (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1993).
27 In this discussion I am assuming that the objector accepts the (to my mind incorrect) view that
explain Miller's response to this objection I need to say more about his 
characterization of the national point of view.
Miller points out that national loyalties do not fit easily into the now common 
picture of two competing ethical standpoints, the personal — where agent-relative 
reasons prevail — and the impersonal — where agent-neutral reasons dominate. It is 
now standard to say that practical reasoning should give some role to both sorts of 
reasons.28 First, we have the agent-neutral viewpoint, from which each person 
counts equally; then, there is the agent-relative viewpoint, from which an 
individual's personal goals and integrity loom large, and where a moral space is 
created in which individuals can pursue their own personal projects and 
commitments. It might seem at first sight that national allegiances require the 
creation of a third category of moral reason, which we might call 'nation-relative' 
reasons. However, Miller denies that such reasons are sui generis, for "they appear 
to represent, not a different segment of moral life, but a competing way of 
understanding the concepts and principles that make up the impartial or agent- 
neutral standpoint (consider, for example, the different conceptions of distributive 
justice that emerge depending on whether you begin from a national or a universal 
starting-point)."29 National allegiances do not fit well into the common picture of 
morally relevant perspectives, and Miller says that it is this feature of national 
loyalties — i.e., that they reorient the ideas constituting the agent-neutral or impartial 
standpoint — that explains why national allegiances directly challenge the dominant 
view of morality in our culture, namely, the universalist view of morality.
Let us be clear about what Miller is claiming. If we accept the distinction between 
agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons, Miller claims that the ethical perspective of 
nationality represents an alternative understanding of what is a relevant reason from 
the agent-neutral viewpoint. A national ethic, therefore, competes with universalist 
morality, the latter being the dominant ethical conception, at least among 
philosophers. Miller identifies the impartial standpoint with the agent-neutral 
standpoint, so we should understand him to be claiming that the national 
perspective is also an impartial one. This seems odd, since impartiality, as it is 
usually understood, rules out bias in favour of any person or group at the expense 
of any other, while the national view would seem to require such bias, at least in 
some cases. Of course, it may turn out that national favouritism can be justified — 
after all, some bias is unavoidable, and some may be required of us. But that 
possibility should not be confused with the claim that nationality is the proper
one's ethical theory cannot provide satisfactory justifications for both partiality and impartiality, 
within their proper spheres. See Chapter Five above.
28 See Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
29 Miller, 'In Defence of Nationality', 4-5.
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heading under which we should understand impartiality. I believe Miller's view 
cannot withstand careful scrutiny, and that we would be better advised to follow 
Thomas Nagel, who claims, contrary to what Miller holds here, that the national 
perspective "is just another basic aspect of the personal perspective, and it is not 
going to disappear."30 Thus, Nagel does not identify the impartial and national 
perspectives; rather, he identifies the national and personal perspectives, or rather, 
he sees the national viewpoint as one aspect of the personal. He further thinks it 
will be around at least for the foreseeable future and we should, therefore, take its 
existence into account in our theorizing.
Is there any way to account for the strangeness of Miller's nationality/impartiality 
identity claim? Perhaps Miller would respond to my criticism by claiming that I am 
begging the question, that his point is to question the dominant conception of 
impartiality and replace it with another which better corresponds with our 
commonsense notions about our obligations. In this context, my objection that 
Miller's conception contradicts the received view of impartiality merely restates 
what he is already, and admittedly, claiming. But is my objection question- 
begging? The issue here is one of the proper assignment of the burden of proof, 
and since it is Miller who is rejecting the received view of impartiality and 
substituting what appears to be a form of favouritism, it is up to him to show that 
the national perspective should be counted as a version of impartiality. In short, my 
criticism amounts to a request for an argument where none has been given.
We should accept Miller's claim that nationalism may be, but need not be, a 
reactionary doctrine; and if nationality can be philosophically respectable, perhaps 
its respectability can be found in its superior fulfillment of the requirements of 
impartiality. Nevertheless, this point goes no way toward showing how the national 
and impartial perspectives might coincide. The impartial standpoint may, in the end, 
suggest that the ethically preferred option is to accord priority to national allegiances 
and obligations. But even if this is the correct conclusion, it is distinct from the 
nationality-impartiality identity claim. There are two possibilities: (1) From an 
impartial perspective, it is plausible to encourage national loyalty, and (2) The 
impartial and national perspectives are identical. While (1) may be correct, it is 
different from (2), and if Miller is asserting (2), we have yet to see his reasons for 
doing so.
The proper conclusion, then, is to admit that the national perspective is partial; but 
this admission does not rule out accepting this kind of partiality in one's ethical 
theory. For partiality is not ruled out by a proper understanding of morality; on the 
contrary, commonsense morality, which on this point can be vindicated, "actually
30 Nagel, Equality and Partiality , 177.
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requires us to be especially attentive to the needs of people we love and have special 
attachments to."31 Some version of national partiality might be a plausible view 
(though I am not arguing that point here). What ultimately matters is that co-national 
priority does not negate consideration of outsiders, especially such consideration as 
is necessary to fulfill the demands of justice.
6.5. What Ethical Commitments Go Along with 
Allegiance to One's Nation?
I will now consider the relation between the ethical obligations one owes to co­
nationals and those owed to others. My focus is on one particular subset of moral 
duties, namely, the duties of distributive justice.
What are the implications for obligations of justice of the acceptance of the claim 
that nations are "ethical communities"?32 It seems to me that any favouritism of co­
nationals cannot, while remaining a moral appeal, make any claim about the 
absolute overridingness of obligations between co-nationals. Miller agrees. His 
defence of nationalism -- what he calls "nationality" — is conditional: it "includes the 
condition that in supporting my nation's interests, I should respect others' national 
identities (and the claims that follow from them) as well."33 This might be 
understood as the defence of only a particular conception of nationalism, rejecting 
those conceptions which allow nations to pursue any course of action as a means to 
upholding their national ideal.34 Moreover, I would add that where priority is 
given, it remains a primafacie priority, and is subject to denial whenever the claims 
of outsiders are of a certain strength. This is a fairly vague claim, but it stresses the 
important idea that, contrary to what some defenders of nationality might hold, no 
national moral priority claim has anything like an absolute hold on persons. So co­
nationals can make no exclusive claims of distributive justice on one another. That 
is, whatever increased ethical bonds exist as a result of common national status, 
they are not such as to rule out the distributive justice claims of those lacking that 
status. But why not?
In fact, Miller does believe that "[njational identities ground circumscribed 
obligations to fellow nationals."35 To assess the plausibility of this belief we need 
to look at his reasoning in some detail. Miller claims that "our sense of national 
identity serves to mark out the universe of persons to whom special duties are
31 Stephen Nathanson, Patriotism. Morality, and Peace , 27.
32 Miller, 'In Defence of Nationality1, 5.
33 Ibid., 15.
34 Such rejection is the analogue of my rejection, in Chapter Five, of the view known as 
exclusionary patriotism.
35 Miller, 'In Defence of Nationality', 3.
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owed; it may do this without at the same time determining the content of those 
duties."36 The way of life of a nation is
expressed in the public culture. Various interpretations of the public culture 
are possible, but some of these will be closer to getting it right than others, 
and this also shows to what extent debates about social justice are 
resolvable. It follows that what social justice consists in will vary from 
place to place, but not directly in line with sentiments or feelings. A Swede 
will acknowledge more extensive obligations to provide welfare for fellow- 
Swedes than an American will for fellow-Americans; but this is because the 
public culture of Sweden, defining in part what it means to be Swedish, is 
solidaristic, whereas the public culture of the U.S. is individualistic. ... 
This may still sound an uncomfortably relativistic view to some. What I 
have argued is that nationalists are not committed to the kind of crude 
subjectivism which says that your communal obligations are whatever you 
feel them to be. Membership of a national community involves identifying 
with a public culture that is external to each of us taken individually; and 
although we may argue with one another about how the culture should be 
understood, and what practical obligations stem from it, this is still a 
question to which better or worse answers can be given.37
We need to ask how we are to judge which answers are better and which ones 
worse. Why is the public culture of either Sweden or the U.S. justified at all? Miller 
has offered us no answer to this question apart from the claim that "what social 
justice consists in will vary from place to place," but this is true only if taken as a 
descriptive rather than as a normative claim. No doubt, Miller believes that the 
public culture of a nation is subject to alteration — he thinks this is one of the 
positive features of nationality -- but here he appears to be saying that the critic of 
the norms of justice embodied in the national public culture can get no foothold, for 
those norms are simply given. To be Swedish is to recognize that one has fairly 
extensive obligations for the welfare of fellow nationals; to be American is to see 
that one's obligations are less burdensome, and so on. It depends on the contingent 
fact that one's preferred answers to questions about distributive justice have been 
expressed at some earlier point in the nation's history! But why can't social 
reformers introduce new ideas about justice, ideas which have no prominent place 
in the nation's history?
Miller's answer to this question is as follows: "Philosophers may find it 
restricting that they have to conduct their arguments about justice with reference to 
national identities at all. My claim is that unless they do they will lose contact 
entirely with the beliefs of the people they seek to address; they must try to 
incorporate some of Hume's gross earthy mixture, the unreflective beliefs of
36 Ibid., 14.
37 Ibid., 14.
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everyday life."38 But how much of Hume's gross earthy mixture gets incorporated 
into a justifiable account of obligations of justice depends on the reasons that can be 
offered in support of the earthy mixture, and it is unnecessarily restricting to allow 
only certain sorts of reasons to be relevant in such discussions. Hence we return to 
Miller's idea that "the unreflective beliefs of everyday life" must be given their due, 
even, it seems, if those beliefs lack a coherent rationale. To this claim I reply that 
philosophers — and non-philosophers too -- can engage with everyday beliefs 
without accepting them. To realize that such views are the data from which political 
argument must begin is simply to acknowledge that argumentation must, if it is to 
convince, proceed from shared premisses. But the point of such argumentation is 
very often to show the weaknesses in accepted opinions and to change those 
opinions for the better. We are thus returned to the earlier point about the proper 
conception of philosophical starting-points, and again I maintain that the place from 
which we begin is not sacrosanct, especially since those disadvantaged or treated 
unfairly by the institutions justified by commonly accepted views have a legitimate 
claim to a hearing for their dissenting opinions.
Elsewhere, Miller voices his opposition to "a naive form of internationalism that 
is grounded on an inadequate view of ethics and that appears to offer a simple 
solution to the problem of international obligations but does so at the cost of losing 
touch with the way we actually think about such issues."39. This is question- 
begging, for the arguments against the ethical principle of nationality — at least 
insofar as that principle offers a justification for co-national favouritism — may, if 
they have sufficient strength, lead us to change "the way we actually think about 
such issues."
Miller maintains that we owe duties of distributive justice in the first instance to 
fellow nationals. As an example of a claim of distributive justice, Miller considers 
the principle of distribution according to need. He says:
We do not yet have a global community in the sense that is relevant to 
justice as distribution according to need. There is no consensus that the 
needs of other human beings considered merely as such make demands of 
justice on me, nor is there sufficient agreement about what is to count as a 
need. It is therefore unrealistic to suppose that the choice lies between 
distributive justice worldwide and distributive justice within national 
societies; the realistic choice is between distributive justice of the latter sort, 
and distributive justice within much smaller units — families, religious 
communities, and so forth.40
38 Ibid.
39 'The Ethical Significance of Nationality', 648, emphasis added.
40 Ibid., 661.
Miller's appeal to a lack of consensus is taken as evidence for denying cross- 
border duties of distributive justice. But, again, this begs the question against his 
opponents, since it is that very lack of consensus about whether every person's 
needs should make some demands on all persons that is the object of dispute. Miller 
apparently does not think he is begging any important question here, for he 
continues as follows:
We may still be tempted to reply: if distributive justice can only function 
within communities with predefined memberships, so much the worse for 
distributive justice. Our concern should be with the sick and the starving 
regardless of membership and regardless of how we conceptualize our 
obligations to them. The question this raises is whether we should think of 
ethical concern as a commodity in limited supply, such that if we intensify 
our concern for our fellow countrymen, we diminish our concern for those 
outside our borders. I have no space here to tackle this question properly, 
but it is worth saying that the picture of ethics implied in it is far from self- 
evident. Indeed a very different picture is intuitively more plausible: so long 
as different constituencies do not impose conflicting demands on our ethical 
capacities, a strengthening of commitment to a smaller group is likely to 
increase our commitment to wider constituencies. Empirically it does not 
seem that those most committed to distributive justice at home are in 
consequence less inclined to support foreign aid.41
Let us outline the dialectic of this passage. The imaginary objector accepts 
Miller's (contentious) view of the conditions necessary for the assignment of 
obligations of distributive justice, but claims that we should care for the most needy 
first, regardless of membership in any communities, national or otherwise. Miller 
replies that ethical concern is not a commodity in limited supply, since caring deeply 
for the plight of co-nationals can actually strengthen our concern for outsiders. 
Hence commitments to fellow members of one's nation can actually make it more 
likely that one will show concern for those beyond national borders.
I have a reply to Miller's reply. We may accept the empirical claim he makes 
about the relation between local and global concern for others. A comparison of the 
foreign aid records of Sweden and the United States provides some evidence for 
that claim. Moreover, if commitment to co-nationals disappeared, it is not obvious 
that felt obligations to humanity would result; rather, there will be the danger of "a 
narrowing, rather than a broadening, of the scope of people's sympathies and moral 
concerns," where individuals focus only on themselves and their families or 
particular racial or ethnic groups 42 But, as Miller admits, there will be a problem 
where "different constituencies ... impose conflicting demands on our ethical 
capacities." We will in many instances have to choose between seeing to the needs
41 Ibid., 661-62.
42 Stephen Nathanson, Patriotism. Morality, and Peace , 21.
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of fellow nationals and of outsiders, and (since, as I have said, Miller's refusal to 
accept worldwide obligations of distributive justice is question-begging) if more 
pressing needs make stronger claims, then foreigners will rightly take priority. 
From his words we may infer that Miller sympathizes with the claim that the sick 
and the starving should be helped, for he responds to the criticism not by denying 
this claim but by denying that national favouritism — i.e., co-national priority ~  
leaves the foreign sick and starving out in the cold. My point is that, where a choice 
must be made between meeting the needs of co-nationals or of outsiders, it will 
often be preferable to favour the outsiders. Miller might agree with this in some 
cases, but I see no reason for denying that the claims of outsiders are in these cases 
claims of distributive justice. The problem is that i f  faced with the prospect of 
bringing about "distributive justice at home" when that can only be achieved by 
withholding foreign aid, is it then correct to maintain that there is a prima facie claim 
in favour of the domestic obligation?
In closing, one point needs emphasis: nationalist attachments need not contradict 
the claims of cosmopolitan morality. This is a claim made most clearly by Charles 
Beitz, who argues that cosmopolitanism "need not be indifferent to particularistic 
values such as the loyalties and affiliative sentiments characteristic of membership 
in cultural or national groups. If it is a fact (as normally it is) that membership in a 
distinct political community has value for the members of that community, then, on 
a cosmopolitan view, this fact should matter for practical reasoning. The important 
question is not whether it should matter, but how. ... In fact, if membership in a 
flourishing community of a certain kind is a value for people, cosmopolitanism 
requires us to bring it into account."43 Hence national attachments can find a place 
in the cosmopolitan picture of the moral landscape; of course, bringing the 
importance of national values into account does not imply acceptance of all 
nationalist claims. The main point to make is that no nation-based ethical 
commitments can ever constitute the entire sphere of a person's legitimate 
obligations. Where the legitimate interests of outsiders are of sufficient strength, the 
duties fellow nationals owe to one another will be overridden by duties to outsiders. 
The basic claims of distributive justice — what I earlier called the basic rights to a 
moral minimum (security, subsistence, and liberty) — are the most important case of 
claims with the requisite strength.
Miller himself acknowledges the role of the cosmopolitan perspective:
Although I have been resisting cosmopolitan attempts to deal with the issues 
of sovereignty and state borders entirely in terms of universal principles 
such as individual rights, individual consent and distributive justice, I
43 Charles Beitz, 'Cosmopolitan liberalism and the states system', in Chris Brown (ed.), Political 
Restructuring in Europe , 129-30.
should be the first to concede that trade-offs have to be made. The case for 
the nation-state is not that it spontaneously satisfies all the political ideals we 
might want to espouse, but that it uniquely embodies a distinct value that 
has no less a claim on us than these others.44
My only disagreement with this passage is that it contends that the value of the 
nation-state is equal to the values embodied in the claims of distributive justice.45
The philosophical Mole asked the question, 'What's so special about this river 
bank?'. We have seen the problems with the conservative strategy of answering this 
question, and we have noted the difficulties with Miller's arguments for the special 
claims of co-nationals. The topic of the justification of national partiality has hardly 
been addressed in this chapter, but I have shown that is it mistaken to simply 
assume the ethical relevance of nationality. We can therefore conclude that, even if 
the nation can in the end be the legitimate focus of some ethical claims, the 
philosophical Mole has been vindicated.
44 Miller, 'The nation-state: a modest defence1, 158-59.
45 I agree with many of Michael Freeman's criticisms of Miller in his 'Nation-State and 
Cosmopolis: A Response to David Miller', Journal of Applied Philosophy 11 (1994), 79-87. But 
I think his account suffers from one central confusion, namely, he identifies UN 'cosmopolitan 
liberalism' with the liberal universalist position to which Miller opposes his own view. But this 
identification is inaccurate because it places the debate at the wrong level. If Miller gives us an 
account that is intended to justify the nation-state, his arguments should be countered by 
alternative accounts which give us reasons to question the moral legitimacy of the nation-state. 
UN liberalism is perhaps justifiable by such an alternative account of our obligations, although it 
does have the added feature of accepting the sovereignty of nation-states, hardly a view opposed to 
Miller's. The proper alternative to Miller's ethical perspective is indeed a cosmopolitan view, but 
by that I mean a general moral position that requires impartiality and the inclusion of all local 
points of view. See Beitz, 'Cosmopolitan liberalism and the states system', 124.
138
Chapter Seven: Walzer. Relativism, and Universalism
"Distributive justice is relative to social meanings." -  Michael Walzer1
"A given society is just if its substantive life is lived in a certain way — that is, in a 
way faithful to the shared understandings of the members." — Michael Walzer2
"... these citizens of Prague [during the revolution of 1989] were not marching in 
defense of utilitarian equality or John Rawls's difference principle or any 
philosophical theory of desert or merit or entitlement. ... What they meant by the 
"justice" inscribed on their signs, however, was simple enough: an end to arbitrary 
arrests, equal and impartial law enforcement, the abolition of the privileges and 
prerogatives of the party elite — common, garden variety justice." -- Michael 
Walzer3
The challenge to cosmopolitan justice that I will now consider comes from an 
influential version of relativist doctrine. My aims in this chapter are, first, to 
identify certain salient features of ethical relativism and subject them to criticism, 
and secondly, to examine Michael Walzer's approach to international justice, 
bringing out its relativist as well as its universalist features, and showing exactly 
how Walzer goes wrong in partially denying the validity of the sort of transcultural 
human rights principles I would defend.4
7.1. Ethical Relativism
For the ethical relativist, moral rightness for a culture or society is determined by 
that society's accepted moral standards. To act rightly one must conform to the 
standards of one's society, and it is a mistake to try to apply one society's moral 
code as a tool for judging the ethical acceptability of a different society's code. 
Clearly this type of relativism threatens any universalist moral claims such as those 
put forward by defenders of cosmopolitanism.
My chief concern here is with the implications for global justice of the relativist 
theory defended by Michael Walzer, but I first want to make three claims in 
connection with ethical relativism in general. Each assertion supports the need for 
the development of universal moral principles. The three claims are:
(1) Diversity of moral codes between societies is not necessarily indicative of the 
relativity of core ethical values.
1 Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (Notre Dame and 
London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 26.
2 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1983), 313.
3 Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin , 2.
4 The first two quotations at the head of this chapter exhibit Walzer's relativizing tendency, while 
the third appeals to some notion of justice that seems to apply across societies.
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(2) The universalist appeal to reason does not require the imposition of a single 
code of morals upon all societies. On the contrary, defenders of human rights to 
liberty, subsistence, and security will encourage the development of cultures 
through their various internal dynamic processes, objecting only to those features of 
a culture which violate human rights.
(3) Ethical relativism has certain prima facie unpalatable implications. For 
instance, it seems to rule out completely any cross-community ethical criticism, and 
it unnecessarily restricts the possibilities for moral progress.
Cross-Cultural Variation and Relativism
Ethical relativism is sometimes defended by appealing to the actual variation of 
moral beliefs across communities; and I think it is undeniable that particular 
manifestations of certain basic values will vary across societies. This, however, 
does not amount to relativism, at least not at the level of the basic values, which 
might still hold for every society. The fact that specific moral rules differ in 
different societies does not, then, prove that morality is "relative" in any sense that 
challenges cosmopolitan morality. Diversity of moral opinion does not necessarily 
entail disagreement about moral values at any deep level.
The evidence for this claim is as follows. The supposed deep diversity of moral 
views around the world is put into question if we distinguish between the specific 
rules followed by particular societies and the general principles of which those rules 
are the manifestations. There may be different ways of protecting the very same 
values, depending on the conditions specific to any given culture. Hence cultural 
differences at the level of specific mles could be explained by differences of context 
or belief rather than differences in evaluative judgements. An undeniable relativity 
would then be no evidence of any deep value conflict, so we can dismiss any direct 
move from cross-community disagreement to ethical relativism. Cosmopolitan 
morality is not therefore threatened by the presence of global dissensus concerning 
specific moral rules.
Imposing Justice?
The world consists of countless cultures, each with its own characteristic outlook 
on the world and its own distinctive moral views. Is the cosmopolitan really 
justified in imposing his preferred moral views upon members of cultures whose 
ethical commitments conflict with cosmopolitan morality? What are human rights 
theorists to make of the fact that some cultures deny that such rights exist? Would 
human rights theorists run roughshod over cultures that deny the rights they 
recognize, imposing their rights on everyone regardless of the opinions of those 
subject to this imposition?
In response to this challenge, the defender of human rights says (or should say) 
that, not only is the variety characteristic of human cultures acceptable to the human
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rights theorist, but this variety is actually encouraged by any defender of the various 
freedoms to which persons are taken to have rights.5 This point is related to 
another, namely, that one can be a moral universalist without believing that there is 
a "single moral code" with specific rules which every human society must follow. 
The point is that, within the constraints set by human rights protections, it is 
permissible and even laudable that different cultures carry on their social life in 
distinctive ways.6
Some Implications of Relativism
A third and final point to notice about relativism is its evidently unsavoury 
implications. If it were true that the only correct standards of justice are those of 
one's own society, it would be impossible to judge the justice of arrangements in 
other societies. So, for example, racist or slave societies would be immune from 
criticism by those in other societies, or indeed by those within those racist or slave 
societies who disagree with the prevailing moral code. Of course, the main point of 
assessing relativism is to question this assumption, so I do not claim to have refuted 
it here. The present point is simply to note one important implication of relativist 
claims about morality and justice; this entire chapter may be understood as my 
response to this point. At any rate, it will hardly do to define morality or justice so 
that it follows from the definition that cross-cultural judgements are impossible, for 
that begs the very question at issue.
Moreover, accepting a relativist view about justice leaves us with an impoverished 
conception of moral progress.7 On the relativist account, moral reformers cannot 
challenge the prevailing principles of justice; they may only point out 
inconsistencies between those principles and the practices current in their society. 
As we will see below, this criticism seems to apply to some statements of Michael 
Walzer's conception of morality and justice.8
7.2. Shared Understandings and Global Justice
Michael Walzer has defended the view that there is no account of distributive 
justice that applies to the world as a whole. As he puts it, "[ejvery substantive
5 Cf. Peter Jones, Rights (London: Macmillan, 1994), 214.
6 The differences between relativism, a defensible universalism, and the "single moral code" view, 
are discussed in Stephen Nathanson, Patriotism. Morality, and Peace , 98.
7 There is an excellent short statement of this point in James Rachels, The Elements of Moral 
Philosophy , second edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), 22.
8 Brian Barry, 'Spherical Justice and Global Injustice', in David Miller and Michael Walzer (eds.), 
Pluralism. Justice and Equality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 75, points out that 
Walzer does want to say that we can criticize fifth-century Athenian society, but only with regard 
to the ideals of fifth-century Athens and not with regard to the ideals of twentieth century American 
society.
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account of distributive justice is a local account."9 My main purpose in this chapter 
is to question this claim. More generally, Walzer's views have attracted various 
objections, the most prominent of which are: his conception of justice contains two 
main ideas, an appeal to shared meanings and a requirement of spherical separation, 
and these ideas are inconsistent with one another; the shared meanings on which he 
would base his theory of justice are indeterminate; Walzerian justice is too 
conservative in its implications. I endorse these criticisms, but I consider them here 
only where they affect the credibility of Walzer's theory of international justice.10
Walzer claims that justice for any given society or community is determined by 
the shared understandings of that community about the social meanings of the 
goods whose distribution is potentially in dispute. The idea here is that a 
community's shared beliefs about justice tell us what is actually just for that 
community. However, an inconsistency is raised by the fact that, when we consider 
the Walzerian claim that justice is relative to shared social meanings, it seems that 
Walzer does not heed his own advice on this matter. I propose to focus solely on 
Walzer's claim that justice is relative to shared social meanings, independently of its 
relation to his equally central spherical separation thesis, for if the social meanings 
thesis can be maintained, international distributive justice would appear to be an 
impossibility.
The first thing to say about Walzer's shared meanings thesis is that Walzer 
himself, wisely in my view, does not seem to take it seriously when he engages in 
analyses of specific problems. That is, as Joseph Carens has pointed out, Walzer 
does not himself follow his own advice, that conclusions about justice should be 
derived from the interpretation of a political community's shared meanings: "... 
Walzer says that it is wrong for new states formed after the demise of colonialism to 
expel current inhabitants who do not share the race or ethnicity of the newly 
established dominant majority. The sort of case he has in mind presumably is the 
expulsion of Asians from Kenya and Uganda in the 1970s. But he makes no appeal 
to African or even Asian understandings of community and of responsibilities 
towards those seen in some way as outsiders. Instead, he cites Hobbes."11 This is 
an interesting and revealing point about Walzer's theorizing; it might even show that
9 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice ,314.
10 For the claim that there is, at least potentially, an internal conflict in Walzer's theory between 
the separation of spheres (or anti-"tyranny") on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the appeal to 
a community's shared understandings, see Susan Moller Okin, Justice. Gender, and the Family 
(New York: Basic Books, 1989), 62-68; James S. Fishkin, The Dialogue of Justice: Toward a 
Self-Reflective Society (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992), 63-66; and Brian 
Barry, 'Spherical Justice and Global Injustice', in David Miller and Michael Walzer (eds.), 
Pluralism. Justice and Equality , 74-75.
11 Joseph Carens, 'Complex Justice, Cultural Difference, and Political Community', in David 
Miller and Michael Walzer (eds.), Pluralism. Justice and Equality , 49-50.
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Walzer, in his discussion of specific problems, implicitly recognizes the difficulties 
of his theoretical position. Nevertheless, I will evaluate the theoretical view itself in 
what follows.
The shared meanings on which Walzer would base his theory of justice are 
themselves indeterminate, and his privileging of the political as against the 
philosophical fails to take account of the fact of disagreement at the political level, 
and so underestimates the need for philosophical argument in disputes about justice. 
Let us for the moment assume that Walzer is correct in saying that justice is rooted 
in a community's shared understandings. What follows for those of us in the 
capitalist democracies of Europe and North America? Are we required to eschew 
criticism of other political communities on the grounds that "[t]he questions posed 
by the theory of distributive justice admit of a range of answers"?12 And what is 
demanded of those in the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Central and 
South America? May they not object to the distributive decisions we make? Even to 
ask these questions puts Walzer's wider theory in doubt, for we can and do readily 
understand the notion that 'the capitalist democracies of Europe and North America' 
constitute some kind of community within which it makes sense to ask questions 
about justice in distribution.13 Consider the implausibility of the alternative, say, 
that British citizens can have nothing relevant to say about the acceptability of 
American "shared meanings" about justice. In short, Walzer's idea that distinct 
political communities are the only legitimate arenas for meaningful moral debate is 
deeply implausible.
But there is a deeper problem with the idea of shared meanings itself: it is often 
unclear just what the shared understandings are on any given topic. Precisely how 
do we determine what a community's shared understandings about justice are? Do 
we come to know the shared understandings about the distribution of wealth in a 
society by determining what the accepted practices are and (historically) have been? 
Or is the shared understanding to be extracted from some underlying principle(s) 
that, in certain circumstances, justifies particular practices?14 The proper way to 
understand to what the notion of a "shared understanding" refers is, in any case, a 
secondary issue. Far more important, and more troubling, is that whichever option 
is taken, Walzer believes that the understandings shared by a society are fo r that 
very reason judged to be just. Of course, the attempt to condemn criticism of 
established understandings about justice and morality in general will not work in
12 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice , 5.
13 Many European countries already constitute a community in a more formal sense, for the 
European Union countries contribute money partly for the purposes of redistribution to the poorer 
member countries.
14 See Joshua Cohen, ‘Review of Spheres of Justice’ , Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986).
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societies like ours in any case, for it is part of our tradition in liberal-democratic 
societies to question and criticize moral positions.15 I return to this point below.
Perhaps Walzer's criterion for justice is derived from his opposition to 
philosophical arguments that do not resonate with a given population. Walzer 
emphasizes the political as against the philosophical, and this would rule out 
international justice, since political questions are defined by Walzer in such a way 
that they can be asked and answered only by members. Walzer believes that 
philosophical questions, such as 'What principles of justice would be fair for inter­
society relations?', are misplaced. On the contrary, he thinks questions are always 
asked by those already within some political association or other. Members can 
properly ask about the purpose and structure of their government,16 but there can 
be no single, general right answer to the question of which form of organization is 
better than any other, nor can there be any question about the ethics of inter-society 
relations.
Is it wrong to judge a particular community by criteria derived from philosophical 
argument which appeals to universal standards of justice? Is Walzer correct to 
dismiss such criteria in favour of standards which emerge from democratic political 
processes within particular communities? To see what is wrong with Walzer's claim 
here we need to point out that the attempt to present philosophical arguments for, 
say, a list of basic human rights, is in part motivated by a recognition of dissensus 
at the political level with respect to the content (or even the existence) of these 
rights. Therefore it is incorrect to believe, as Walzer does, that 'politics' can do 
what philosophy can never do — namely, settle questions of justice. Political 
deadlock will be broken only where it is possible to engage in some degree of 
abstraction from endless appeals to vested interests. This abstraction is therefore 
quite proper; indeed, it is a necessary condition of doing justice at all.17
7.3. Unjustified Moral Conservatism
I have defended a conception of justice concerned with basic human rights, and 
this approach, if carried through consistently, will likely support significant 
changes in global institutional arrangements. While there is no single correct 
recommendation for institutional change, there can be no doubt that change of some 
sort will be demanded by the conclusions reached at the level of moral theorizing. 
Opposed to this view is Walzer's conservative approach to arguing about justice. I 
will now argue that those critical of their own society's institutions and practices
15 See Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 219.
16 Michael Walzer, 'Philosophy and Democracy', Political Theory 9 (1981), 379-99, at 393.
17 A similar point, without the present emphasis on international justice, is made by Chandran 
Kukathas and Philip Pettit, Rawls (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 115-16.
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would do well to reject the 'justice as shared understandings' thesis, for it limits the 
scope of social criticism and is, therefore, too conservative in its implications for 
political argument. This is relevant to the problem of international justice because 
Walzer's thesis would support the denial of the legitimate claims of the foreign poor 
to the wealth of those in the rich countries, on the grounds that the latter have 
reached a consensus to the effect that the former have no claims of justice against 
them.
Walzer recognizes the problem of conservatism represented by his shared 
meanings thesis, and he proposes to defend interpretation "against the charge that it 
binds us irrevocably to the status quo — since we can only interpret what already 
exists — and so undercuts the very possibility of social criticism."18 We need to 
assess the claim that Walzerian interpretation is inherently conservative, but notice 
that it is not true that being limited to interpreting what already exists undermines 
"the very possibility of social criticism." The limits imposed by interpretation allow 
criticism of practices and institutions on the grounds that they contradict accepted 
understandings of what is morally permissible or required. The important objection 
is not that Walzer's interpretive method makes social criticism impossible; it is 
rather that his approach rules out criticism that cannot be tied in some way to moral 
views already accepted at some level in the society in question. It seems that 
Walzer's methods would allow for social criticism, but would restrict it severely. 
Hence I will now examine the claim that Walzer's conception of social criticism is 
unduly conservative, despite his claims to the contrary.
Walzer believes that deep social criticism is possible, despite the fact that one's 
values are ultimately derived from one's community. The problem with this view is 
that it leaves little room for innovative criticism, since objections to the status quo 
must stem from principles and commitments that are either explicitly or implicitly 
already accepted within the community.19 Moreover, as we have seen, where a 
distributive practice is disputed within a community, the best solution will require 
some rationale beyond simply showing that it can be derived from shared 
understandings, since that much is likely already true of competing solutions.
Walzer might be interpreted as saying that recommendations for action should 
avoid being utopian. They should, instead, take full account of current conditions 
and not require too great a deviation from the duties now recognized. Walzerian 
justice would then exemplify a pragmatic attitude to social criticism. If this were 
correct, then we would not recommend being too critical of widespread views, for
18 Michael Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism (London: Harvard University Press, 1987), 
3.
19 Cf. the point made earlier in this chapter concerning the limited notion of moral progress 
implied by relativist accounts of moral values.
instance, that rights-based duties should be accorded to compatriots while 
foreigners are to be seen merely as beneficiaries of charitable actions.
Moral duties might be restricted in this way because moral understanding is itself 
tied to particular cultures. From this it follows that abstraction from the culture in 
which recognized duties are embedded is simply not possible, that Platonic escape 
from the cave in which we live cannot provide the basis for effective criticism of a 
community. Such criticism must remain true to the shared understandings of the 
community in which it is made.
From this perspective, basic human rights claims look like irrelevant and wildly 
idealistic notions that will have no impact on current debates. On these grounds, 
then, internationally recognized and enforced rights (of avoidance, protection, and 
aid) are literally beside the point. But, again, the danger of taking this Walzerian 
tack is that it limits moral and political debate to considering questions that do not 
stray too far from prevailing opinions. Hence, if (in a given society) the view that 
women and men should have the same civil, political, and economic rights is 
widely regarded as beyond the pale, then offering that view as the most reasonable 
position on the rights of women is doomed from the start. Walzer therefore seems 
to limit moral criticism in ways that make his position virtually indistinguishable 
from more openly conservative perspectives.
In general, Walzer appears to be too concerned with political success, to the 
detriment of any focus on moral legitimacy. Against this, Will Kymlicka has rightly 
urged that "the efficacy of a justice claim and its legitimacy are two separate 
questions."20 And Brian Barry adds the following set of claims to his general attack 
on Walzer's approach:
[T]he search for influence is at best distracting and at worst corrupting. 
Political philosophers should say what they think is right, whether what 
they have to say is popular or unpopular. Perhaps they will with luck 
eventually extend the boundaries of what is politically thinkable. But even 
this is not likely to be achieved if we start by flattering our audience by 
telling them that if enough of them believe the same thing it makes no sense 
to say they are all wrong.21
Walzer's "realism" about politics is in fact nothing of the sort. On the contrary, 
his appeal to politics and to social meanings renders his arguments unpersuasive to
20 Will Kymlicka, 'Some Questions about Justice and Community1, Appendix I, in Daniel Bell, 
Communitarianism and its Critics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 215. And see, for the 
opposing view, Daniel Bell's defence of Walzer at ibid.. 65-66.
21 Brian Barry, 'Spherical Justice and Global Injustice', 80.
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anyone who takes a critical stance toward the shared understandings of his own 
community.22
7.4. A Paradoxical Walzerian Defence of Human Rights
Walzer's particularism, on one interpretation, rules out moral judgements about 
nonmembers of specific political communities, but Walzer himself wants to make 
such judgements. One way to interpret Walzer's theory is to see it as making a 
particularist claim about the impossibility of universal moral judgements. The 
argument would say that, given that moral principles originate within particular 
cultures, and that those principles are addressed only to members of those cultures 
and not to others, it is impossible to adopt a perspective from which all cultures, or 
the individuals who make up those cultures, can be viewed as objects of equal 
moral concern. Moral judgements, including judgements about justice, are 
judgements about the moral relations between members of a particular community; 
there is no scope for judgements about nonmembers.
This argument has a problematic consequence. It does rule out
(i) impartial consideration of all persons regardless of their community 
attachments,
but at the same time it rules out the claim that
(ii) every community ought to be especially concerned with its own members.
The second claim is ruled out because it is itself a universal claim, to the effect
that intra-community special concern is justified.23 As we will see, there is some 
reason for denying that Walzer holds this particularist view of moral argument, for 
he does want to make the universalist claim identified by (ii).
The shared understandings of justice in contemporary Western societies are 
themselves disputed, but to the extent that universal human rights are accepted by 
the members of these societies, Walzer's methodology must, paradoxically, 
generate a defense of human rights. Consider Walzer's claim that " [individual 
rights (to life and liberty)... are somehow entailed by our sense of what it means to 
be a human being.... [They] are a palpable feature of our moral world."24 This is 
nothing less than a universalist view of human rights, but how does this position 
relate to the more relativist notions also to be found in Walzer's work? In the 
present context, the relevant point is that the reference to "our moral world" seems 
to be, for Walzer, a nod in the direction of his favoured 'community-consulting'
22 My discussion, in Chapter Six, of the conservative and critical strategies of political argument 
is part of my attempt to clarify and defend a more plausible approach to these issues.
23 Cf. Thomas Hurka, 'The Justification of National Partiality', forthcoming in Jeff McMahan and 
Robert McKim (eds.), The Ethics of Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
24 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 54.
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method for defending principles of justice. If it is the case that a commitment to 
universal human rights constitutes a central feature of the shared understanding of a 
contemporary Western society like the United States, then it follows that, from the 
Walzerian particularist perspective, we have a reason to accept that commitment to 
universal human rights. This is because the particularist character of arguments 
about justice does not allow for external assessment of a community's moral 
consensus. Showing that this is in fact the social consensus of the society would 
then provide an argument in favour of universal human rights. I think, however, 
that this endeavour would be a waste of the theorist's time, for it turns out that this 
form of argument — the argument from community consensus — is inherently 
faulty, because it allows for the justification of any practice whatsoever if that 
practice is supported by the community's consensus.
The same sort of point can be made by noting the irrelevance of communal 
dissensus to substantive conclusions about justice. Suppose that some cultures or 
societies are committed to the denial of universal human rights. What is the proper 
response to this state of affairs? If before we were claiming that there is more 
agreement about values than it appears, we should now say that the fact of value 
disagreement hardly constitutes a good reason for giving up one's assertion that the 
values expressed in human rights claims hold universally, quite apart from that 
disagreement. It is no refutation of a moral claim to say that there is no consensus in 
its favour in every culture in the world, nor is a moral claim plausibly defended by 
citing only its widespread appeal (though its popularity might, depending on other 
factors, count in favour of it). Moral views are properly judged not by determining 
how many people (or cultures) subscribe to them, but by the plausibility of the 
reasons adduced in their favour. Cross-cultural value disagreement does not refute 
the claim that human rights are universally valid, especially when we can (and have) 
presented arguments to show why it is plausible to accept that all human beings 
have basic rights. But those arguments are not best framed in terms of a given 
community's shared understandings, for human rights are properly understood as 
linked to particular contents (e.g., basic human interests), whereas a community's 
understandings need not make any essential reference to these contents.
7.5, An Unwanted Implication of Walzerfs Thesis
I now want to argue that one implication of Walzer's shared understandings thesis 
is that its grounds for denying international justice constitute equally plausible 
grounds for dismissing intra-community justice as well. If it is the absence of 
consensus about distributive questions at the international level that leads Walzer to 
dismiss the notion of international distributive justice, then he is committed to 
denying (on pain of inconsistency) what he cannot and does not want to deny -- that
there is anything properly called domestic or intra-community justice. Brian Barry 
has argued that "the most obvious objection to Walzer's conventionalism" is that 
there are no shared understandings about justice within any given society.25 I note 
this as a serious problem for Walzer, but its implications for international justice 
seem at least as worrying for his theory.
Consider the following point. At times Walzer seem to want to claim — and, note 
here that I'm not sure this is what he wants to claim (see below) — that international 
justice is impossible because there are no shared understandings within international 
society (or across national communities) about what justice requires. As he puts it, 
"The only plausible alternative to the political community is humanity itself, the 
society of nations, the entire globe. But were we to take the globe as our setting, we 
would have to imagine what does not yet exist: a community that included all men 
and women everywhere. We would have to invent a common set of meanings for 
these people ...."26 If that is indeed his view about international society, then — if 
he is correct about international society -- he is required to reach similar conclusions 
about justice within any given nation-state. For shared understandings are missing 
in both cases, so consistency demands that Walzer give the same answer to the 
question of justice in both sorts of case. If, for Walzer's reasons, there is no 
international distributive justice, then it follows — if, that is, we employ Walzer's 
argument — that there is no 'national' or nation-state distributive justice either. But, 
of course, Walzer does not want to maintain the latter claim, and he is correct not to 
want that. My point, however, is that this line of reasoning simply shows that 
Walzer has not shown that, by accepting his premisses, it follows that international 
distributive justice is impossible. If it did show that, it would also have shown that 
domestic justice is similarly out of the question.
7.6. Flirting with Universalism
Let us now consider the following claims:
1. Walzer's unWalzerian defence of universalism conflicts with the relativist 
strand of his theory.
2. The universal elements of Walzer's view are given an unnecessarily weak 
defense while being too limited in their implications.
3. The entire Walzerian universalist edifice rests on a questionable basis.
Somewhat uncharacteristically, Walzer has claimed that there is a kind of justice
that applies universally. Relativists are always in danger of defending a 
universalism which prioritizes social conformity or tolerance of other cultures.
25 Brian Barry, 'Spherical Justice and Global Injustice', 78.
26 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice , 29-30.
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Walzer falls into both traps, since he seems to believe (i) that justice must always be 
consonant with social meanings, and (ii) that toleration for other communities' ideas 
about justice is itself an ethical obligation.
According to Walzer (in some moods), if there is widespread agreement within a 
society about what is just, then criticism of the content of that agreement is 
impermissible. As he puts it, "A given society is just if its substantive life is lived in 
a certain way -- that is, in a way faithful to the shared understandings of the 
members.... To override those understandings is (always) to act unjustly."27 Quite 
clearly, this is not a consistently relativist view, since it holds to an absolute 
principle, namely, that it is always unjust to challenge a conception of justice that 
constitutes the shared understanding of a society.
If one holds, as Walzer seems to hold, that the moral approval o f the community 
is the criterion of justice, then such approval is the ground for justice within any 
given community. But imagine that a community approves of some practice that we 
(Western universalists) take to be morally disgusting, such as the slavery of the 
indigenous female population. What can Walzer say to those who engage in this 
practice? The answer seems to be: Nothing at all, at least so long as it really is the 
overwhelming consensus of that community that enslavement of their female 
population is a just practice.28 To override that consensus is always to act unjustly, 
according to Walzer. Part of the problem with Walzer's view is that it divorces the 
justifiability of principles of justice from their content, with the consequence that 
principles with any content whatsoever may be justifiable, if only they form part of 
the community's shared understandings about justice.
If conformity with the overwhelming social consensus is taken to be a value of 
non-relative importance, then anyone skeptical of this view is entitled to question it 
by pointing out other candidate non-relative values which he deems morally more 
important than conformity. For instance, an opponent of Walzer's position could 
say that the value of protecting innocent life should prevail over conformity when 
conformity dictates that innocents should be killed whenever anyone pleases. When 
following accepted standards conflicts with values such as protecting innocent life, 
it is reasonable to hold that it is right not to follow those standards.
Walzer's claim that it is wrong to override local understandings about justice 
suggests that he puts significant value upon tolerance of other communities. We 
should therefore evaluate the appeal to tolerance as a moral and political value. 
There is an uneasy relationship between ethical relativism on the one hand and, on
27 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice , 313-14.
28 As we shall see, however, Walzer does want to say that slavery is wrong because it violates 
minimalist moral constraints. My point here is that there are no grounds for such a judgement in 
Walzer's shared meanings thesis.
the other hand, a tolerant attitude toward the norms accepted by outsiders. 
Relativists believe that the validity of ethical claims is community-relative, that 
validity depends upon whatever is customary within a particular community. 
Despite the frequent links made between relativism and tolerance for other 
communities or cultures, it is important to note that nothing about the value of 
toleration of other cultures and ways of living is implied by this type of relativism, 
nor by relativism in any of its other forms. The acceptability of toleration must 
depend, for the relativist, upon prevailing attitudes to toleration: cultures which are 
tolerant would demand toleration of other cultures, but intolerant cultures would 
require members to be intolerant toward other cultures. If relativists attempt to deny 
this, they run into the further difficulty of adopting a claim that purports to apply 
universally, i.e., the claim that toleration of alternative cultures and forms of life is 
an ethical requirement. But this claim is itself incompatible with relativism because 
the main point of the doctrine was supposed to be that there is no transcultural 
vantage point from which anyone can make any such claim about universal 
applicability.
We can see this potential tension between relativism and tolerance in the work of 
Walzer. This is brought out by statements such as the following: "Justice is rooted 
in the distinct understandings of places, honors, jobs, things of all sorts, that 
constitute a shared way of life. To override those understandings is (always) to act 
unjustly."29 If Walzer wants to argue that the "shared way of life" of a community 
should be respected by outsiders, then he needs to say why toleration is in order 
where that way of life includes what many would view as morally abhorrent 
behaviour. Defending toleration as a value in itself, while in many ways attractive, 
is not a relativist position; and once we have given up relativism we can concentrate 
on the issue of precisely when toleration of another society's (or one's own 
society's) practices might be wrong. Of special interest to the defender of basic 
human rights would be a case in which a society does not recognize the claims of 
persons to have their security protected. Are we, in our society, then required to 
judge that this other society does not engage in an unjust practice?
Reasons for doubt on this matter stem from a point made by Joseph Carens, who 
notes that toleration of other cultures is a feature of our own societies, not of all 
societies, and that tolerance is not the only value embraced by our societies: "... the 
fundamental question is not really what do they think is right, but rather what do we 
think is right or what should we think is right? Our conception of justice includes 
respect for cultural difference as one of its components, but one that is balanced
29 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice , 314.
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against concern for human rights ... among other things."30 Toleration is our value, 
and moreover, it is not always of overriding importance.
Walzer's relativism, as a normative position, seems to be a disguised form of 
universalism. If this is so, then we do best to focus on the type of universalism in 
question -  namely, the supposed attractions of conformity to shared values -  rather 
than the merits or demerits of relativism. Many (theoretical) relativist positions seem 
in reality to be contestable forms of universalism.31 If the relativist claim is that the 
most important ethical values for any community are determined by the culture of 
that community, then the position is no longer a version of normative relativism.32 
Defenders of universal human rights would then be opposed to a universal claim to 
the effect that anti-human rights cultural attitudes which prevail in particular 
societies are, to the extent that they actually do prevail, ethically worthier than 
attitudes supportive of human rights. If the foremost ethical norm is that any given 
culture should be able to follow its traditional values and standards, then human 
rights will rightly be overridden whenever a particular culture embraces racist or 
sexist values, or when a culture permits or requires cruelty toward specific 
individuals. It is difficult to see any appeal in this sort of moral conformism.
As I have mentioned before, Walzer now defends an explicitly universalist 
version of justice, in which a minimum moral code is valid for everyone regardless 
of the particular society in which they five.33 This conception is not compatible with 
the emphasis on local justice in Walzer's earlier work. We have noted that Okin, 
Fishkin, and Barry argue that the two central elements of Walzer's project threaten 
to conflict with each other: separation of the spheres of justice will collapse when a 
community's social meanings about various goods dictate the pursuit of boundary- 
crossing. My present claim is the different one that Walzer offers conflicting 
accounts of what justice demands, even if  we ignore his claim about the need for 
spherical separation. He claims that shared meanings about goods within a 
particular community determine just distributions for that community. But he also 
believes that justice, at some level, is truly universal, and hence, it seems, not 
completely relative to shared meanings after all.
30 Joseph Carens, 'Complex Justice, Cultural Difference, and Political Community', in David 
Miller and Michael Walzer (eds.), Pluralism. Justice and Equality , 65, emphases in original.
31 We saw one instance of this with Walzer's alliance of an explicit relativism with an equally 
explicit call for inter-community tolerance. The latter is a universalist claim and so conflicts with 
the relativist element of his position. Below I consider a more obvious internal conflict between 
relativism and universalism in Walzer's theory of justice, namely, the incompatibility of local 
justice with "minimalist universalism."
32 Rhoda E. Howard, 'Cultural Absolutism and the Nostalgia for Community', Human Rights 
Quarterly 15 (1993), 315, calls this view "cultural absolutism."
33 See for instance, Interpretation and Social Criticism , 24. This type of universalism is to be 
distinguished from universalist appeals to tolerance or to consistency with locally shared 
understandings.
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We therefore could ask a question requiring a yes/no answer: Does Walzer hold 
that there are any universally valid principles of justice? In Spheres of Justice , the 
answer was No, since Walzer says there that justice is always local, never 
universal. But, as David Miller points out,34 by the time Walzer gave the Tanner 
lectures in 1985,35 he was saying that killing, deception, and torture are ruled out 
by principles which hold universally. So there are some universally valid moral 
principles. Miller maintains that this is a qualification of Walzer's earlier view, but it 
is more than that, for it amounts to a denial of the claim that no principles of justice 
are universally valid. Minimalist justice is, after all, still a species of justice.36
If Walzer believes that this minimal moral code derives its universal validity from 
the fact that, as Miller puts it, its requirements "run across all cultures," then his 
universalism depends on an empirical assessment of cross-cultural systems of 
moral belief. This is a risky position to hold, however, for two reasons. First, the 
fact that everyone believes that some practice is morally wrong is certainly evidence 
for thinking it actually is wrong, but widespread belief does not make it so. On the 
contrary, if the beliefs are true, one might be tempted to believe that it is the 
wrongness of the practice that makes them so. Similar reasons apply to agreement 
about moral rightness: universal agreement about the moral rightness of slavery 
would not be a good reason for taking slavery to be a morally acceptable practice. 
The notion of a social consensus is itself in need of critical scrutiny, and a brief 
consideration of its possible underpinnings suggests that it should not be accorded 
special respect even when it can be identified.
Consensus about a particular distributive question is not an appropriate basis for 
the legitimacy of views about justice when that consensus has been achieved by 
questionable means, most importantly, by unequal media access. Brian Barry 
makes the point that the existence of consensus in itself tells us next to nothing 
about the defensibility of the views about which there is consensus, since (apart 
from much else) "unequal access to the means of persuasion" will ensure that those 
who control the mass media will have an overwhelming impact on community 
opinion.37 Not surprisingly, the interests of groups (i.e., corporations) whose
34 David Miller, 'Introduction', in Miller and Walzer (eds.), Pluralism. Justice, and Equality , 2.
35 Reprinted as the first two chapters of Interpretation and Social Criticism .
36 The universal validity of "moral minimalism" is a prominent feature of Walzer's recent work. 
See, for example, Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin , especially Chapters One and Two. Walzer's 
discussion makes it clear that he considers murder to be not only morally wrong but also unjust. 
See Thick and Thin , 26.
37 Brian Barry, 'Spherical Justice and Global Injustice', 77. For evidence of the influence of the 
sphere of money in the sphere of communications, see Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, 
Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1988).
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economic resources dominate media operating on market principles -- where money 
buys influence — will be very well-represented, not to say all-encompassing.
More generally, any theory such as Walzer's that emphasizes the normative 
relevance of prevailing beliefs must take seriously the possibility that the belief- 
generating process is skewed by power inequalities. As Jon Elster points out, 
Walzer identifies common understandings about justice and offers normative 
recommendations about distributive practices, but he fails to give any explanatory 
account of why people generally believe what they do about distributive justice. 
This is an important omission, for it permits us to overlook potentially objectionable 
means of generating consensus.38 And this is true even if we admit, with Walzer, 
that "the path of interpretation" does not consist merely in the description of 
prevailing opinions, that there is often a complex interpretive exercise required to 
render in a clear way the moral beliefs of a given community.39
The second reason why Walzer's opinion-based universalism is risky is that it is 
open to refutation by the discovery of some society in which, say, murder is 
thought to be morally right.40 But should such a discovery really dissuade us of the 
claim that murder is wrong, regardless of the cultural beliefs of those in the society 
in which it is committed? (In any case, there is reason to question whether there 
could ever be a society which did not recognize some prohibition on murder.) In 
sum, moral opinions are relevant to moral theory, but they do not in themselves 
constitute evidence sufficient to justify any assertions about the status of moral 
claims and arguments.
7.7. The Importance of Thinness
I now want to emphasize the importance of minimal or so-called "thin" morality 
as against the thicker ethical conceptions favoured by Walzer. I maintain that 
Walzer's 'hotel room argument' fails in its attempt to privilege thick cultural 
systems of belief and action over the minimal requirements of universalism.
Walzer tells a story about the difference between the thick morality of a particular 
culture and the (thinner) "principles of cooperation" adopted by those seeking
38 Jon Elster, 'The Empirical Study of Justice’, in David Miller and Michael Walzer (eds.), 
Pluralism. Justice, and Equality , 81. In a similar vein, Simon Caney, in 'Liberalism and 
Communitarianism: A Misconceived Debate', Political Studies XL 1992, 287-88, rejects Walzer's 
appeal to the consent of the community because he rightly recognizes that Walzer "relies on a 
naive social theory."
39 Michael Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism , 3, 29-30.
40 Walzer accepts that his view is susceptible to refutation in this way: he says that the 
prohibitions that constitute the universal moral code are "almost universal," since "the odd 
anthropological example" would overturn any view lacking the qualifier "almost." Interpretation 
and Social Criticism , 24.
agreement from behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance.41 According to Walzer, the 
latter principles will not be part of the morality of "people who already share a 
moral culture."42 Implementing such principles in ongoing, real-life cultures would 
be like taking a hotel room "as the ideal model of a human home."43 Walzer says 
that "[a]way from home, we are grateful for the shelter and convenience of a hotel 
room." Refugees, of course, appreciate the importance of hotel rooms: "They need 
the protection of the rooms, decent (if bare) human accommodation. They need a 
universal (if minimal) morality, or at least a morality worked out among strangers. 
What they commonly want, however, is not to be permanently registered in a hotel 
but to be established in a new home, a dense moral culture within which they can 
feel some sense of belonging."44
There is here some acknowledgement of the claims of universal moral principle, 
but the 'hotel room argument' seems to constitute a denial of full-bodied 
universalist morality by way of an appeal to a metaphor. When we ask what the 
metaphor could mean in this case, I think we will see that the cosmopolitan need not 
be dissuaded from his position by this argument. To see why this is so, consider 
what hotel rooms and proper homes have in common. In both cases, individuals 
have some assurance that the basics of existence are protected: food and shelter are 
goods common to the two arrangements. Now the universalist does not have to 
deny that "some sense of belonging" is necessary for a fulfilled human life; his only 
point here would be to emphasize that no accommodation is adequate if it does not 
provide the basics. A hotel room that does so is superior to a 'home' that (for 
whatever reason) does not. Walzer's metaphor carries weight only by assuming that 
the moral minimum is taken care of in any thick moral culture, but this is not 
necessarily true. To use Walzer's metaphor to explain my own view, the morality 
of basic human rights maintains that no home is satisfactory unless it protects the 
vital interests catered to by hotels; homes are preferable to hotels, but only where 
both meet the minimal criteria.45
41 Michael Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism , 14-16. The words "thick morality" do not 
figure in this particular telling of the story, though I think the idea is best conveyed by the 'thick 
and thin1 metaphor on which Walzer relies in his more recent work.
42 Ibid., 14.
43 Ibid., 15.
44 Ibid., 15-16.
45 Walzer uses the architectural metaphor again in Thick and Thin , 52. He there concludes that 
"rightness is relative to architectural occasion.... Perhaps a minimalist universalism also 
develops, an international style — in hotel design, say — though this is unlikely to reflect the best 
architectural work." Returning to the disputed case — the analogue in some respects confuses the 
issues -  my view is that universalist moral minima do not necessarily represent "the best work" 
on justice; rather, I maintain only that no work is up to standard if it fails to ensure that these 
minimal requirements are met. We might sum up by reverting to the metaphor: Any building that 
does not meet minimal safety standards ought to be condemned!
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Related to the argument we have been considering is Walzer's conception of 
minimalist morality itself, which I take to be a misdescription because it gives the 
false impression that the universal minimum moral code is merely a framework or 
set of background conditions, lacking in substance. On the contrary, I claim that the 
substance of that code is its very point and purpose. In a similar vein, Walzer now 
argues that human rights impose limits upon any scheme of distributive justice. The 
problem with this claim is that it fails to recognize that a commitment to rights- 
protections itself generates wide-ranging distributive (and, in contemporary 
circumstances, re-distributive) responses. Human rights are a part o f  the theory of 
distributive justice. Moreover, once this is acknowledged, it upsets the view that 
justice cannot cross-boundaries, for human rights attach to persons regardless of 
their citizenship status.
According to Walzer, minimalist morality is concerned with basic prohibitions — 
of murder, deception, betrayal, gross cruelty.46 Moreover, he claims that "[b]y 
themselves, though, these universal prohibitions barely begin to determine the 
shape of a fully developed or livable morality. They provide a framework for any 
possible (moral) life, but only a framework, with all the substantive details still to 
be filled in before anyone could actually five in one way rather than another."47 But 
Walzer's conception of the role of moral minimalism is inaccurate. Adherents of 
universal moral principles do not have to believe that the content of basic human 
rights provides all that is required for a thriving moral culture. A pluralism of moral 
beliefs and traditions can be accepted and even encouraged; the point is that human 
rights provide the background conditions for the development of thicker moral 
systems. Walzer misleads when he says that all the substantive details of morality 
remain to be filled in after the minimalist universal framework is put in place. 
Protections against killing and (on my theory) against lack of food and shelter 
provide much detail and substance, and it undermines the credibility of the 
cosmopolitan project to suggest that they do not. Walzer's claim can seem 
persuasive only if its misdescription of cosmopolitanism is taken to be accurate.
Walzer believes that "[m]urder, torture, and enslavement are wrongful features of 
any distributive process — and they are wrong for reasons that have litde to do with 
the meaning of social goods. We need a theory of human rights (or its functional 
equivalent in other cultures) to set the basic parameters within which distributions 
take place."48 This looks like a simple concession to the view that any set of 
distributive arrangements is unjust if it does not protect the basic rights of everyone,
46 Michael Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism , 23-24.
47 Ibid., 25.
48 Michael Walzer, 'Response', in David Miller and Michael Walzer (eds.), Pluralism. Justice and 
Equality , 293.
156
i.e., it appears to concede that the view I have defended is correct. But to say that 
human rights are "basic parameters within which distributions take place" suggests 
that protecting those rights does not itself have distributive implications. The truth 
of the matter, of course, is that if people are going to have their rights protected and 
promoted, there must be a public commitment to distributing goods and services in 
a way that will ensure the protection and promotion of those rights. In short, it is 
worth repeating that human rights are a part of the theory of distributive justice, and 
they accordingly set limits on what any society may decide to do in the way of 
allocative arrangements. This point upsets any view that justice cannot cross 
boundaries.
7,8, Is Justice Merely Negative?
Walzer has now retracted, at least in part, the basic idea of Spheres of Justice , 
but his emphasis on the negativity of universal justice leaves that conception 
incomplete while giving no reason for restricting it in the way he does. We have 
seen that, in his recent work, Walzer qualifies his relativism, but he continues to 
limit universal morality to certain prohibitions, leaving positive requirements to hold 
sway only within communities. These points are brought out by the following 
passage, in which Walzer expands on the main idea of Spheres of Justice .
I came to the basic idea of Spheres of Justice by reflecting on examples ... 
in which the governing principles did not seem to have the universal reach 
that philosophers commonly look for. The basic idea is that distributive 
justice must stand in some relation to the goods that are being distributed. 
And since these goods have no essential nature, this means that it must 
stand in some relation to the place that these goods hold in the (mental and 
material) lives of the people among whom they are distributed. Hence my 
own maxim: distributive justice is relative to social meanings. I now hasten 
to add, given the storm of criticism this maxim has provoked, not relative 
simply, for justice in distributions is a maximalist morality, and it takes 
shape along with, constrained by, a reiterated minimalism -- the very idea of 
"justice," which provides a critical perspective and a negative doctrine. 
Murder as a way of distributing life and death, for example, whether it is the 
work of a neighbourhood thug or the secret police, is everywhere ruled 
out.49
Walzer thus admits that there is a type of justice that applies universally. He says 
that "the very idea of 'justice’ ... provides a critical perspective and a negative 
doctrine." Hence, murder "is everywhere ruled out."50 Walzer therefore seems to 
acknowledge that justice -  or, at least, justice in its "minimalist" sense — provides 
the grounds for criticism of prevailing practices, even when those practices are 
widely accepted. He would agree, then, with the cosmopolitan claim that there are
49 Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin , 26.
50 Ibid.
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universally valid moral principles. However, Walzer's addition of the claim that 
justice, in its minimalist incarnation, is "a negative doctrine," is puzzling. Is this 
meant to restrict the application of universal principles to some relatively short list 
of "Thou Shalt Nots"? If so, some argument is needed to exclude from 
consideration various positive requirements, such as a duty to ensure that no one, 
anywhere, goes hungry when there is more than enough food available to feed 
everyone. It will hardly be convincing to respond to appeals based on human 
subsistence rights to be told that food has "no essential nature," and therefore that 
universalist claims about the basic human interest in obtaining food for subsistence 
purposes are invalid.51
7.9. Injustice and Past Intervention
Walzer's most recent statement on the question of international distributive justice 
reveals his belief that prior engagement of outsiders in the internal affairs of a 
community is a necessary condition of that community's deprivation constituting an 
injustice. While the practical implications of his current view might not stray too far 
from those recommended earlier in this work, I will now raise some doubts about 
Walzer's entitlement to say what he now says, given his other published positions 
on this question.52
In a recent response to his critics, Walzer addresses the question of "the injustice 
of current international distributions."53 He claims that global inequalities in wealth, 
resources, and living standards are unjust only if those inequalities have been 
brought about by external intervention in the internal affairs of some otherwise 
properly self-determining group, nation, or country. Injustice arises from "imperial 
wars; conquests, occupations, and interventions; the political control of trade, and 
so on."54 For Walzer, the only factor relevant to a positive judgement that a given 
inequality is unjust, in such a way that demands an international response, is that 
the country on the losing end has not been the determiner of its own law and policy. 
Internally manufactured injustice demands only domestic response. But when 
external determination of policy has "deleterious social and economic
51 I should note here that, while Walzer correctly points out that food "carries different meanings 
in different places" (Spheres of Justice , 8), no assertion about the variable social meanings of food 
in different communities entails that some human beings lack a vital interest in obtaining a certain 
minimum nutritional intake.
52 Of course, I do not object to anyone changing his mind after reconsidering the arguments. My 
point is that Walzer seems now to deny his former stress on localism.
53 Michael Walzer, 'Response', in David Miller and Michael Walzer (eds.), Pluralism. Justice and 
Equality , 292-93.
54 Ibid., 292.
consequences, then remedial measures are required. And these may well extend to 
far-reaching redistributions of wealth and resources."55
Like David Miller, Walzer believes that "similar measures" are required as a 
response to serious inequality and suffering, but he denies that the problem is one 
of injustice. Presumably international aid (or international action of some kind) is, 
for Walzer, an expression of charity, for "justice is not the whole of morality." 
Again, unjust inequalities stem only from cases in which "we can tell a story of 
engagement and responsibility." In conclusion, Walzer thinks that "for now at least, 
ordinary moral principles regarding humane treatment and mutual aid do more work 
than any specific account of distributive justice."56
There are two separate questions raised by Walzer's argument. The first is the 
semantic question of the preferred use of the word "justice." In that dispute, Walzer 
disagrees with my position. Where I think it is unjust that millions suffer needlessly 
when so many others have more than they could ever use, Walzer thinks it is not 
unjust. On his view, this state of affairs is morally wrong but not unjust. This 
issues does not, perhaps, require settlement at the theoretical level, since we appear 
to agree about the practical upshot. But it is worth pointing out that if we consider 
the notions of rights and justice to be conceptually linked, so that we think of the 
latter in terms of the former, then Walzer's view would constitute a denial that 
people have rights not to suffer or be severely deprived. Others, including 
foreigners, would have duties to help them, but they would have no rights to be 
helped.
Secondly, there is the substantive question of what is to be done about the global 
problems of severe deprivation and large-scale inequality. On the evidence of the 
passage under discussion, Walzer believes that "far-reaching redistributions of 
wealth and resources" are required in order to respond properly to this problem. I 
of course agree with this conclusion, but I have trouble determining whether 
Walzer's claim in this instance is consistent with his overall position about the 
strictly local character of moral principles. We can make sense of Walzer's position 
if we take him to be saying that it is only justice that is restricted to specific 
communities, whereas other aspects of morality travel relatively easily 57 But then it 
follows that fewer areas of social life are covered by the concept of justice than 
might have been supposed. For instance, the claim that people have rights to 
subsistence, security, and liberty could be accepted by Walzer, but in each case the 
claim in question would not be a matter of justice but only a matter of the larger
55 Ibid., 293.
56 Ibid.
57 Even this claim, however, is contradicted by the third quotation at the head of this chapter.
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picture of morality — which, it seems, is properly universalist in character. (This 
position, however, does appear to be inconsistent with his recent emphasis on 
"reiterative universalism," i.e., the idea that universal moral principles derive their 
universality from their having been independently adopted by successive groups 
across historical time and geographical space.58)
7.10. Sticking With Relativism
Walzer's recent rejection of relativism in fact constitutes an elaboration of the 
relativist position he has previously occupied. The universalism he now defends is 
decidedly uneasy, for he still maintains that justice requires deference to thick moral 
cultures, if only those whose moral development has not been distorted by coercive 
methods of opinion formation. To the extent that his position remains relativist, it 
still suffers from all the problems associated with that view.
In his latest work, Walzer refers again to his earlier discussion of "the cure of 
souls and the cure of bodies in the medieval and modem West," and argues that 
"the fact that [in medieval Christian societies] wealthy and powerful men and 
women had access to medical treatment unavailable to anyone else" does not 
constitute an injustice.59 As he puts it,
none of this seems unjust to me — and this is not because I am bound by my 
"relativist" maxim to defer to the conventions of the age (any age). For if 
these conventions were imposed by force, the mere ideology of the ruling 
class, the idea of social meaning might usefully be deployed in criticism of 
them. But what we have here is a maximalist morality, a thick 
understanding of life and death, a human culture. To this we ought certainly 
to defer, for it makes no moral sense to wag our finger at medieval 
Christians, insisting that they should have had our understanding of life and 
death.60
Walzer thinks he is not bound to say that justice depends on deference to the 
conventions of the age; he therefore takes himself to be denying that his position is 
straightforwardly relativist. But why does he deny that justice is simply a matter of 
convention? The answer is that "if these conventions were imposed by force, the 
mere ideology of the ruling class, the idea of social meaning might usefully be 
deployed in criticism of them." So Walzer is claiming not that we ought not to defer 
to conventions, but that we ought not to defer to conventions which have been
58 See Michael Walzer, 'Nation and Universe' (including 'Two Kinds of Universalism' and 'The 
National Question Revisited'), Tanner Lectures 1989, in Grethe B. Peterson (ed.), The Tanner 
Lectures on Human Values (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1990), 509-56.
59 Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin , 28-29. Walzer says that this is his favourite example from 
Spheres of Justice , and "one that I would like, someday, to develop at length."
60 Ibid.. 29-30, emphasis in original.
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imposed by force. His view, then, is that forced acceptance of conventions does not 
guarantee that the corresponding social meanings will be legitimate.
But Walzer's relativism remains intact, for he thinks that "we ought certainly to 
defer" to any freely accepted "maximalist morality," with its "thick understanding" 
of ethical requirements. We therefore should not (it would "make no moral sense 
to") criticize medievals for their views on the justice of restricting health care to the 
private sphere, for they have different beliefs about life and death from our own.
This relativist conclusion might seem plausible when applied to the case of the 
medieval Christian view of the world -- though even in that case we might doubt 
Walzer's claim -- but when we consider the implications of Walzer's position for 
contemporaneous cross-community criticism of views on the justice of the 
distribution of basic goods (food, physical security, and so on), he seems to be on 
very shaky ground. For Walzer would have to say, for instance, that if  a 
community really does assign to food a social meaning according to which its 
distribution is in part determined by race membership, then "we" -- who from our 
perspective find such a view morally abhorrent -- should not "wag our finger" at 
that community. To say that is to embrace relativism and deny that outsiders have 
any role to play in debates about justice. This relativist position is not defensible, 
and it is moreover inconsistent with the minimalist universalism Walzer defends 
elsewhere.
In closing, we should register agreement with Walzer's assertion that 
philosophical arguments appear to be unending, but we should reject the 
implications for theory which he wants to draw from this assertion. Potential 
interminability provides no reason for giving up the attempt to develop general 
arguments for conclusions about justice. Walzer offers further reason to deny that 
the appeal to general theoretical issues is helpful in deciding disputes about justice: 
"The leap from inside to outside, from the particular to the general, from 
immanence to transcendence, changes the terrain of the argument, but I know of no 
evidence that the argument marches more readily toward closure on its new terrain. 
Even people who read the same books (of moral philosophy, say) are likely to 
disagree about which abstract and general theory is really the best."61
But non-relativist social critics are not as Walzer characterizes them. Consider the 
critic who appeals to values whose defence is not confined to searching for links to 
shared understandings. She does not have to (nor should she) hold that her 
arguments ought to bring an end to the debate — i.e., achieve what Walzer calls 
"closure" — once and for all. Walzer glosses over an important distinction between
61 Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin , 48.
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(i) the idea that social criticism should not be limited to the shared social meanings 
of a particular community, and should therefore be open to arguments framed in 
more general terms, and
(ii) the belief that appealing to general theoretical considerations will settle 
questions of justice by pointing to the 'one true theory' which any reasonable 
person must accept.
I affirm (i) but deny (ii). Accordingly, it must be possible to dismiss Walzer's 
relativism in favour of a more general approach without thereby believing that one's 
own preferred conception of justice must be imposed upon everyone. Anti­
relativists can retain an appropriately humble attitude toward their own favoured 
conclusions, though this need not deter them from developing their arguments.
Having considered the pros and cons of ethical relativism, as well as the twists 
and turns of Walzer's shifting understandings about justice, we have been given no 
reason to give up our commitment to basic human rights. The appeal to supposed 
local understandings -- if they can be uncontroversially identified -- clearly has 
some role to play in determining the appropriate moral relations between human 
beings. And we should always remain humble concerning suggestions about the 
ethical status of practices in cultures with which we are unfamiliar. But where local 
understandings allow or bring about severe deprivation such as the denial of the 
food and shelter without which life itself ceases, then the local views should be 
condemned.
162
Chapter Eight; Neo-Hegelianism. Sovereignty and Rights
My aim in this final chapter is to consider the prospects for a reconciliation 
between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism in international political ethics. A 
promising means to this end is the neo-Hegelian or "constitutive" theory defended 
by Mervyn Frost and Chris Brown.1 The promise of this approach lies in its ability 
to defend the ethical value of the state while retaining a commitment to the moral 
importance of the individual. Several questions suggest themselves. First, how 
important is the state, from an ethical point of view, and what is entailed for 
international justice by the requirement to take states and state membership 
seriously? Secondly, what is the distinctive contribution of the constitutivists in 
answering these questions? And thirdly, is their proposed reconciliation of 
cosmopolitanism and communitarianism successful?2
I concur with the judgement of Chris Brown that "the most central of all issues 
addressed by normative international relations theory [is] the question of the moral 
value to be assigned to state autonomy."3 The purpose of assessing neo-Hegelian 
international theory is to judge the worth of a promising approach to this issue. 
Once we have seen what sort of defence of state sovereignty can be derived from 
this account, we can ask about its implications for international distributive justice. 
Two of my aims in this chapter are to outline the neo-Hegelian or constitutive 
theory of politics and then to show that, so understood, it is either compatible with 
cosmopolitanism or, if it is incompatible with cosmopolitanism, it is unacceptable.
8.1. What is Neo-Hegelian International Theory?
How should we judge the ethical importance of sovereign states? Should state 
boundaries be accorded basic moral importance, or should we rather treat them as 
"historically determined but morally arbitrary features of the earth's political 
geography"?4 One approach to answering these questions is to set out a 
demythologized Hegelian political theory — i.e., a Hegelianism lacking Hegel's 
metaphysical commitment to "Geist" and its necessary historical development.
1 In this chapter I will use the terms "neo-Hegelian" and "constitutive" interchangeably.
2 In asking this third question, I do not mean to suggest that the constitutivists view their own 
work in this way. It is my own idea that this approach is, at least potentially, capable of 
reconciling the two sides, although we shall see that this idea is suggested by Mervyn Frost's 
attempted reconciliation of the norms of sovereignty and human rights. See Section 8.4 below.
3 Chris Brown, International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches (Hemel Hempstead: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), 15. Hereafter cited as Chris Brown, International Relations Theory .
4 Charles Beitz, 'International Justice: Conflict', in Lawrence C. Becker and Charlotte Becker 
(eds.), Encyclopedia of Ethics (London: Garland, 1992), 623.
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The development of individuality, according to neo-Hegelianism, depends upon 
the individual's participation in three social institutions: the family, civil society, 
and the state. In ethically valuable families, children are recognized as valued 
members and thereby gain a sense of themselves as worthy individuals. This sense 
of self-worth, however, depends merely upon family membership and is, 
moreover, dependent upon feeling, and is therefore lacking the requirements for a 
more robust self-conception that only participation in the society as a whole — i.e., 
beyond the micro-society that is the family — can provide.
Civil society "includes not only the modem market system but also the legal and 
judicial system, a public authority responsible for social and economic regulation 
and the provision of welfare, and a system of voluntary associations."5 It enables 
persons to develop their individuality by, for instance, choosing their own way of 
life and entering into reciprocally voluntary relations with others. But the rules of 
civil society are held by its participants to be restrictions on individual freedom; it is 
the role of the state to overcome the subjective experience of the rules necessary for 
social life as constraints to be grudgingly accepted as the price for individual 
welfare-seeking. "The state provides the element of unity necessary if the individual 
is to overcome the separateness inherent in civil society."6 The Hegelian claim 
seems to be that the state does not undermine individuality because, as Brown puts 
it, "for Hegel the ethical state is a constitutional state."7
Further insight into the Hegelian view is to be gained by mentioning the 
distinction between Moralitat (morality) and Sittlichkeit (ethical life). Brown notes 
that "some such distinction is commonplace in moral philosophy; the distinctiveness 
of the Hegelian position is that because individuals are constituted by the 
community, the demands of social ethics override — and should override -- the 
imperatives of conscience."8 It is important to emphasize that the claim that the 
requirements of the community should override "the imperatives of conscience" is 
more plausible than the claim that community demands should trump individual 
rights. If Hegelians are making the first assertion, their view could in some cases be 
granted, since that involves nothing more than denying the argumentative force of 
appeals to conscience. This denial is plausible because an individual's conscience 
can be mistaken and so lacks any strong justificatory power. It does not follow,
5 Michael O. Hardimon, Hegel's Social Philosophy: The Project of Reconciliation (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 191.
6 Chris Brown, International Relations Theory , 63.
7 Ibid.. 64. "The ethical family, civil society and the corporation, and the institutions of a 
constitutional state provide, according to Hegel, a context in which the freedom of the individual is 
fully achievable without that loss of affective community thought unavoidable on the 
Enlightenment account of the conditions for human autonomy." (Ibid.. 65)
8 Chris Brown, International Relations Theory , 62.
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however, that all conscience-based moral assertions are properly overridden by the 
community, since it is the content of those claims that determines their ethical force. 
But even if we grant that some appeals to conscience are rightly taken to be weaker 
than conflicting claims made by, or on behalf of, the community, the strength of 
that Hegelian argument goes no way towards supporting the state when doing so 
requires the denial of individual rights, for the role of the state on Hegel’s theory is 
precisely to provide the preconditions for the full development of individuality.
One question to which we will return in the course of this chapter is: Does the 
modem state really make possible an ethical life that accords freedom to every 
citizen? Hegelians either answer this question in the affirmative or maintain that it is 
only in case an affirmative answer can be given that the modem state is truly ethical. 
I will suggest that the latter option is more plausible and that the ethical importance 
of the state is, in fact, weakened by certain features of contemporary international 
political life.
8.2. On the Value of the State
We now turn to the question of the accurate representation of communitarian 
accounts of the state: Are states intrinsically valuable or only instrumentally so? Are 
states the sort of things that can be, in certain circumstances, objects of 
unconditional loyalty?9 Cosmopolitans and communitarians approach political life 
from different perspectives. As Brown puts it: "From a cosmopolitan perspective, 
the role of the state is essentially instrumental and it is as such an inappropriate 
object for more than a conditional loyalty."10 Implicit in this claim is, I take it, a 
further assertion that communitarians — who, we may suppose, take issue with the 
fundamental beliefs of cosmopolitans — view the state as (i) potentially of intrinsic 
value (assuming it is a state that is organized in a particular way), and (ii) a proper 
object of unquestioning attachment or unconditional loyalty.11 I think this contrast 
is instructive, but it is inaccurate in one important respect. Neo-Hegelian 
communitarians, as participants in debates about international ethics, see the state as 
itself an object of intrinsic value, but only potentially so; the emphasis is on the 
potential significance of states. Not just any state organization will be judged 
intrinsically valuable, and this is especially so in the modem period, when the
9 These two questions are distinct, since someone could value some X intrinsically (i.e., not as a 
means to anything else), yet such valuing could at the same time be conditional.
10 Chris Brown, International Relations Theory , 53.
11 I do not claim that Brown intended to characterize communitarianism in this way. I maintain 
only that, if cosmopolitanism and communitarianism conflict with respect to their fundamental 
commitments, then it seems to follow from this characterization of cosmopolitanism that, for  
communitarians, the state is intrinsically valuable and that individuals should be unconditionally 
loyal to it.
165
claims of individuals quite properly populate public spaces. States must protect 
those claims; a state that does not do so is certainly not a proper object of 
patriotism. Hence modern-day communitarianism, in its neo-Hegelian or 
constitutivist guise, does not consider the state to be an object of unconditional 
loyalty. In taking what is to some extent a critical stance toward the state, 
constitutive theory therefore rejects direct appeals to tradition, local practice, or 
relativism as justificatory strategies in support of citizen loyalty. These moves are 
also rejected by cosmopolitans, however, so it is not here that we will find the 
appropriate contrast between cosmopolitanism and neo-Hegelian 
communitarianism.
How, then, do constitutivists understand the value of states? Brown notes that 
"[t]he root notion of communitarian thought is that value stems from the 
community, that the individual finds meaning in life by virtue of his or her 
membership of apolitical community."12 But if value originates in the community, 
it is nonetheless value fo r individuals that matters for communitarianism so 
understood. Political membership is meaningful insofar as it provides a context and 
structure for the lives of individual persons who are members of states, i.e., for the 
lives of citizens. There is no suggestion here that communities are valuable in 
themselves, apart from what they contribute to the lives of individuals. And this is 
true even if we admit that political communities are indispensable for the living of a 
meaningful life by any person in modem circumstances. Political communities, 
then, are never intrinsically valuable.13 Rather, they are often thought to be 
instrumentally valuable, but in a very strong way. Specifically, these communities 
are sometimes taken to be necessary conditions for the achievement of meaningful 
lives for the individuals who live in the contemporary world. On this 
understanding, states are necessary conditions for properly human lives; this makes 
states extremely important — in fact, indispensable — but it does not entail that they 
are intrinsically valuable.
Cosmopolitans and neo-Hegelian communitarians, therefore, do not disagree on 
the importance of individuals for political morality. Where they might in some cases 
diverge is on the question of the necessity of separate sovereign states for the living 
of individual worthwhile lives. (I say "might" here because it is possible for moral 
cosmopolitans to agree that separate states are necessary for the living of 
meaningful individual lives. Their answer will depend on their assessment of the
12 Chris Brown, International Relations Theory , 55.
13 This contradicts my characterization in the previous paragraph, but I think the notion of strong 
instrumentalism might amount to an assignment of importance to the state that some 
communitarians would rather characterize as equivalent to holding the state to be intrinsically 
valuable. However we describe it, the idea -  that (a certain form of) the state is a necessary 
condition of the development of individuality — remains the same.
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capacity of a system of sovereign states to meet the demands of cosmopolitan 
justice.)
8,3. On the Community-Individual Relation
Brown points out that neo-Hegelian or constitutive approaches to international 
ethics "see the state as a manifestation of community, and see community as 
possessing moral value, distinct from the value to be assigned to the individuals 
who constitute this community."14 Brown's statement is insufficiently precise, and 
might therefore give a misleading impression of the ethical status of the individual- 
community relation according to constitutive theory (or, at least, according to a 
rationally defensible constitutive theory).
In the interests of clarity, we should distinguish between three conceptions of the 
ethical status of community, only the second of which is acceptable. They are:
(i) Pure Instrumentalism
Communities should be ethically assessed purely instrumentally, according to 
their capacity to protect the pre-existing interests of individuals.
(ii) Constitutivism
Communities are integral parts of individual interest-protection. While 
communities should be ethically assessed according to their capacity to protect 
individual interests — since communities do not themselves have interests in any but 
a derivative sense -- the pure instrumentalist view found in (i) overlooks the fact 
that communities are constitutive of individuality itself, since some individual 
interests are both generated and provided for only in communities.
(iii) Non-derivative Communitarianism
Communities have interests in their own right, i.e., interests not derived from the 
interests of individuals, and therefore there might be instances in which community 
interests rightly override the interests of individuals, in the sense that the 
community should be favoured despite some opposing set of individual interests.
Pure Instrumentalism is indefensible since it fails to take full account of the 
ineliminable importance of certain communities in the creation and maintenance of 
individual interests. This perspective is a type of crude atomism according to which 
individuals are thought to be capable of developing asocially. Social development 
is, on this view, simply an option that we should assess by weighing its benefits 
against its costs. Non-derivative Communitarianism is wrong because it appears to 
rest on an implausible metaphysical commitment to 'communities' as entities whose 
existence merits ethical consideration independently of the individuals who
14 Chris Brown, International Relations Theory , 117.
167
constitute them. The second, constitutive view is closest to the truth here, since it 
acknowledges the role of communities in constituting individuals. It will be 
acceptable, however, only if it also recognizes that the constitutive relation goes in 
the other direction as well, i.e., just as communities (in some sense) constitute 
individuals, so individuals (in a more straightforward sense) constitute 
communities: they are its elements, without which there would be no community at 
all. It is the failure of position (iii) to accept this second constitutivity claim that 
renders it incredible as an account of individual-community ethical relations. There 
is a further point to be made here in connection with our continuing focus on basic 
rights. There can be no question of "the community" overriding the vital interests 
persons have in avoiding starvation or torture. The very possibility of a common 
attachment to social life presupposes that the individuals who commit themselves to 
their community are guaranteed certain protections without which that commitment 
cannot honestly be given or expected.15
It is worth emphasizing what, on reflection, should be obvious: that human 
individuals are social creatures. We can, and should, grant the claim that individuals 
are (at least partly) who they are in virtue of their membership and participation in 
societies, and that some of their interests are therefore properly understood as being 
necessarily tied to that membership and participation. In other words, individuals 
are not social atoms; some of their interests will be overlooked if one considers 
them as naturally pre-social creatures who have joined societies only from a desire 
to protect a set of interests which does not expand upon their entering society. Such 
"entering" never took place. Individuals can develop a sense of themselves and an 
ability to follow reasons only in the context of some community.
Having granted this much, we should note, further, that a certain kind of state -- 
one based on the rule of law and the recognition of each member as a citizen of 
equal status to all the others — fosters an individuality in persons of a greater 
complexity and depth than is possible under less differentiated social arrangements 
(for instance, those in which family, civil society, and state are not clearly 
distinguished). Hegelian political theory does not oppose the interests of individuals 
to the state's interests; rather, it recommends a reconciliation between these two sets 
of interests. As Allen Wood puts it, "it is a serious distortion of Hegel's meaning to 
think that the good of individuals is supposed to be swallowed up in, or sacrificed
15 Cf., on this last point, Jeremy Waldron, Nonsense Upon Stilts: Bentham. Burke and Marx on 
the Rights of Man (London: Methuen, 1987), 207.1 should add that my defence of human rights 
does not commit me to the view that presocial individuals have rights, since I — along with Hegel 
-- do not believe in presocial individuals; but I use no such beings in my arguments for human 
rights. On the contrary, my defence depends in large part on the recognition by every person of 
their duties to everyone else, and these duties are dependent on the interests we all share as 
vulnerable, needy, social beings.
to, some quite different end. Hegel maintains that the modem state works only 
because the universal life of the state provides for the subjective freedom and 
particular happiness of its members."16 But if this interpretation of Hegel's 
conception of the modem state is accepted, we may still ask whether contemporary 
states do provide for their members as Hegel's theory rightly thinks they should (if, 
that is, they are to be ethical states). If, on examination, we discover that they do 
not, then we have good reason — and good Hegelian reason — to ask after the 
source of the state's inadequacy on this score and to attempt to remedy this 
inadequacy.
8.4. Frost and the Conflict of Settled Norms
Mervyn Frost's constitutivist account of international relations focuses on the 
"settled norms" of international relations.17 Frost identifies a list of eighteen norms, 
and this of course raises the possibility of a conflict of norms. This is what we in 
fact find: for example, the norm supporting state sovereignty is likely to conflict 
with the norm supporting human rights (for example, when a state's claim to 
sovereign immunity from external interference precludes outside help for citizens of 
that state whose human rights are being infringed by that very state).18 If Frost is to 
carry out his project of showing how these settled norms cohere with one another, 
he therefore owes us some method for settling conflicts of norms; but if he opts for 
assigning priority to the norm of protection for a society of sovereign states, he 
asserts the ethical primacy of sovereignty over human rights. This is a problem for 
Frost's account, unless he can defend this primacy on other grounds. Frost's 
(Hegelian) position is that he can do this, while at the same time fully reconciling 
rights and sovereignty within his overall theory of international relations.19
Again, one could reply to Frost by arguing that, since there is no available means 
of reconciling sovereignty and human rights, given the standard background 
justificatory theories, then reconciliation is not possible. But this conclusion is too 
quick, for we need to assess the capacity of constitutive theory to overcome this 
conflict. Frost holds that, since people do take sovereignty to be valuable, we 
should not reject it on the grounds that it does not satisfy our theoretically derived 
criteria for ethical acceptability. But I believe that the assignment of value to
16 Allen W. Wood, Hegel's Ethical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 28.
17 Mervyn Frost, Towards a Normative Theory of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986), especially Chapters Four and Five.
18 I am here understanding by "sovereignty" what F.H. Hinsley calls "the idea that there is a final 
and absolute political authority in the political community ... and no final and absolute authority 
exists elsewhere." F.H. Hinsley, Sovereignty , Second edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1986), 26, emphases in original.
19 There is a helpful account of Frost's view, an account of which Frost himself approves, in 
Chris Brown, International Relations Theory , 118-21.
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sovereignty, while not properly dismissed outright, is not unsusceptible to critical 
examination. And it might turn out, after the arguments have been assessed, that the 
value people assign to sovereignty is misplaced.20 The demands of distributive 
justice, understood here to involve protection for the rights of individuals, will play 
a central role in assessing the moral importance of state sovereignty.
Hegel's project was to reconcile modem individuals with their social and political 
lives. The reconciliation that Frost attempts is different. It amounts to a solution to 
the problem of sovereignty and justice, i.e., it is an attempt to show that continued 
commitment to sovereignty is consistent with the modem attachment to human 
rights.
The sophistication of Hegelian political theory can be seen in its indirect 
endorsement of state autonomy. As Brown notes,
Hegelian thought does not simply endorse the right of all states to 
autonomy. Hegel's account of the necessity for state sovereignty is based 
on the role of the state in the constitution of individuality, and it is only the 
modem, rational, ethical state that can perform this constitutive role. A key 
issue is the extent to which actual states conform to the structures of the 
rational state, and whether the degree of conformity of actual and real is 
such as to pass on to existing states the moral immunity from external 
interference that only the truly ethical state can claim as of right.21
If state sovereignty is in some cases sufficient for the constitution of individuality, 
there remains nonetheless a crucial Hegelian challenge to sovereignty in cases 
where the state does not meet the standards of rationality proposed by the theory,
i.e., cases in which sovereignty is not sufficient for individuality. In addition, if it 
turns out that state sovereignty is not even necessary for the development of 
individuality, then the ethical case for sovereignty will have failed.22 Our focus 
should therefore shift to the degree to which modem states do in fact live up to the 
standards of ethical life imposed by Hegelian political theory, and the degree to 
which alternative political arrangements might also meet those standards.
Part of Frost's strategy is to show that alternative -- i.e., non-constitutivist — 
background theories fail to reconcile the settled norms of international society. For 
example, utilitarianism as a background theory — i.e., a utilitarian justification for 
the settled norms of international society ~ fails because (in Brown's words) "even 
if maximising aggregate utility is a coherent goal (and Frost thinks it is not), there is 
no reason to believe that the norms of the current international system promote this
2 0 1 do not doubt that states assign value to sovereignty, but that is hardly probative of any claim 
in support of sovereignty. It is precisely this claim that states make which we are trying to assess.
21 Chris Brown, International Relations Theory ,111.
22 At least, it will have failed to show that we need sovereign states if the international ethical 
order is to be defensible on moral grounds.
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goal."23 I think the reply to Frost's dismissal of utilitarianism is this: Let us accept 
that Frost is correct in claiming that the status quo does not maximize utility. (I 
argued for this conclusion myself in Chapter Three above.) But if one is using 
utilitarianism as a "background theory," why should one not conclude that 
sovereignty cannot be reconciled with one's favoured deep moral view. Frost's 
argument could just as easily lead to the conclusion that state sovereignty norm is 
ethically unjustified. Of course, if we understand "background theory" to mean 
"theory capable of effecting a reconciliation between sovereignty and the claims of 
individuals," then utilitarianism is unacceptable as a background theory. But why 
not reject this understanding of a background theory, on the grounds that it 
legitimates an undue attitude of respect for the settled norm of sovereign statehood? 
If one objects to this question by saying that it exemplifies an overly detached and 
external approach to the normative character of the society of states, that it begins 
with individuals and their interests rather than with the states system itself, the reply 
is that no matter where one begins the process of questioning and assessment, there 
is no good ethical reason to hold the norm of sovereignty in such high regard.24 
This reply immediately suggests that constitutivists owe us an account of why state 
sovereignty is so valuable; accordingly, we now turn to this question.
8.5. The Ethical Relevance of Sovereignty
There seems little doubt that the focus on sovereignty -- the need to block external 
intervention in the internal affairs of the state — can mask oppression caused by 
sovereign states themselves.25 We should add that, if justice requires a concern 
with the plight of individuals, the restriction of emphasis to externally imposed 
mistreatment (i.e., by other states, foreign capital, etc.) is never justified, for it 
would enable domestically manufactured oppression to go uncriticized. (This, by 
the way, is a good reason to resist approaches to international justice which 
concentrate only on inter-country inequalities and neglect the equally serious 
domestic statistics.) Nevertheless, and keeping in mind this caveat, it is open to the 
neo-Hegelian to argue that state sovereignty is a crucial element of an ethically 
defensible international ethical order.
The neo-Hegelian view seems to be that the "modem state" is already — albeit 
only potentially -- capable of ensuring justice and freedom for all, hence there is no 
need to posit a global community whose purpose is to meet the demands of justice. 
Brown emphasizes that this neo-Hegelian position does not amount to "a
23 Chris Brown, International Relations Theory , 119.
24 See Chapter Six — on Nationality — for a discussion of the question of the relevance of where 
one begins one's theorizing.
25 Chris Brown, International Relations Theory , 130-31.
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conservative acceptance of the status quo," since it rather enables us to see the 
extent to which present arrangements fall short of the requirements of a truly ethical 
community.26 But if we accept this claim, as in charity we should, what practical 
implications follow? What do the central constitutivist claims imply about the ethical 
status of sovereignty? Here is a list of alternatives:
1. Sovereigntism
State sovereignty should be protected at least as strongly as is suggested by the 
present norms of international society.
2. Anti-Sovereigntism
The idea of state sovereignty should be given up altogether.
3. Qualified Sovereigntism
The importance of state sovereignty should be maintained, but it should be 
qualified where that seems necessary for the creation of the conditions required to 
provide justice and freedom for everyone in the world.
We now need to consider the merits of each of these views.
What can be said for and against Sovereigntism? As Frost emphasizes, 
sovereignty is one of the central accepted norms of contemporary international 
society, so presumably it has something to be said in its favour. In reply to this 
claim, I think it is plausible to maintain that what sovereignty has going for it is 
precisely that it has allowed states to develop ethically defensible institutions, i.e., 
institutions which ensure that justice is done (at least within the scope of those 
institutions). But then, where this has not been achieved, where a state's 
institutional framework has not shown itself to be capable of providing justice for 
all of its citizens, what is left of the claim that state sovereignty deserves protection?
Against sovereigntism as here conceived, we should note that to protect state 
sovereignty by maintaining that each state is absolutely entitled to be recognized as 
independent, risks the interests, and in some cases the very lives, of the citizens of 
states. The same reason that justifies sovereignty in the first place also generates a 
motivation for restricting that sovereignty when it stands in the way of interest- 
protection.
What can be said for and against Anti-Sovereigntism? It seems clear that, if we 
were to give up our commitment to sovereignty, a major obstacle standing in the 
way of rights-protection would be removed. But such a drastic solution to the 
current problem might be too quick, since (i) states to some degree have made it
26 Chris Brown, 'International Political Theory and the Idea of World Community', in Ken Booth 
and Steve Smith (eds.), International Political Theory Today (Oxford: Polity Press, 1995), 90-109, 
at 104.
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possible to provide for justice in the modem world (at least within their particular 
jurisdictions), and (ii) this recommendation to override sovereignty claims might 
simply be unworkable.
This last point is indeed the main consideration against Anti-Sovereigntism: as a 
practical solution to the violation of human rights, it seems altogether unrealistic, 
"utopian" in the bad sense of the word -- i.e., literally a recommendation that 
neither is nor could be realized in any place in the foreseeable future. It follows 
from its utopian character that the desired end to human rights violations will not be 
achieved, thus adding to the unattractiveness of this solution.
What can be said for and against Qualified Sovereigntism? This compromise 
solution has all the attractions of any such answer: it is potentially acceptable to all 
parties to the dispute, thus promising the possibility of genuine reconciliation and 
progress; it avoids the main weaknesses of the more extreme alternatives (i.e., 
violation of individual interests, utopianism). Moreover, qualified sovereigntism 
ensures that the benefits of sovereignty are protected, but the qualifications are 
added when the same reason for having state institutions — i.e., to bring about and 
maintain justice -- also constitutes a reason for limiting sovereignty whenever those 
institutions are not maintaining justice.
Against Qualified Sovereigntism we might also introduce the utopianism charge, 
but it will be less susceptible to that objection than Anti-Sovereigntism was. 
Furthermore, since restrictions on state sovereignty are already accepted in 
international law and practice, the accusation of utopianism against qualified 
sovereigntism loses much of its force.
I provisionally conclude that Qualified Sovereigntism is the best of the available 
alternatives, and that it supports a recommendation for changes to the current 
emphasis on state sovereignty. Constitutive theory can support Qualified 
Sovereigntism because "the fact that a rational, ethical community is possible yet 
nowhere exists signposts the imperative need for a change in the way we live."27
It should be emphasized that Hegel is himself not entirely antagonistic toward the 
ideals embodied in liberal individualist conceptions of the rights of persons, nor 
does he long for a return to a traditional society in which individual moral reflection 
is absent.28 On this basis, we can rightly object to Hegel's exclusion of women 
from public affairs, giving as our grounds another of Hegel's own positions, 
namely, that each person is to be accorded equal rights as a moral subject.29
27 Chris Brown, 'International Political Theory and the Idea of World Community1, 104.
28 See G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, translated by H.B. Nisbet, edited by 
Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), § 66 , for mention of our 
"inalienable" and "imprescriptible" rights.
29 Allen W. Wood, Hegel's Ethical Thought, 245.
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Likewise, we should reject his view that states should be sovereign in the sense that 
they are "independent units which make mutual stipulations but at the same time 
stand above these stipulations."30 If a state commits itself to violating basic rights, 
that state cannot be legitimate; hence, the independence of states is weakened by 
some requirements that stand above any stipulations they might make. Hegel's 
(quite proper) sympathy with rights therefore has implications for a defensible 
Hegelian view of the ethical importance of state sovereignty.
We must now confront a problem with the Neo-Hegelian resolution of the conflict 
between sovereignty and rights. Neo-Hegelian constitutive theory resolves the 
contradiction between sovereignty and human rights by arguing that individuality 
itself is not possible without the institutions of the modem state and, moreover, that 
such a state can provide the requirements of individuality only if it is recognized as 
sovereign by other states which are, in turn, accorded the same recognition. But 
several questions need to be asked of this account of the importance of sovereignty. 
Why is it that states cannot play their constitutive role in the absence of autonomy 
(or strong autonomy) in their relations with other states? What is so special about 
recognition by other states? Would a federation of states that allowed some 
autonomy, but restricted that autonomy whenever rights violations were at issue, 
result in each state in the federation being incapable of constituting individuality in 
the required sense? And if restrictions to autonomous statehood are resisted while 
each individual sovereign state is required to meet strict standards of rights 
protections — as a precondition of earning the honorific title of 'rational, ethical 
state' or 'state proper' — then would this not be simply another way of saying that 
individual rights will be everywhere protected by a justified system of states? In 
fact, the federation view looks like an improvement upon this latter approach, since 
federations presumably would have some formalized means of ensuring that rights 
protections are guaranteed, while traditional Hegelianism (i.e., Hegel's own 
position) — according to which states (properly so-called) are absolutely sovereign, 
but only states that meet strict criteria will qualify as states proper — need not 
require such formalization. The problem with the latter approach would be that, 
while it suggests similar constraints and positive duties of states, it (unlike the 
former view) provides no reliable means of ensuring that states live up to their 
ethical obligations.
Again, we need to raise the question of why rights can exist only in the context of 
sovereign states which are recognized by other sovereign states.31 Moreover, we
30 G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, § 330A.
31 That this is the constitutivist position is confirmed by a reading of Frost, Towards a 
Normative Theory of International Relations , 177-83.
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have seen that, since not just any society of sovereign states protects rights, we 
need to know what to do when an international society -- for example, the present 
one — fails to protects the rights that states are supposed to be necessary to protect. 
In section 8.8, we will look at an argument for the necessity of a system of 
sovereign states which incorporates the kind of analogy of persons with states that 
seems to be assumed in neo-Hegelian reasoning about sovereignty.
8.6. Sovereignty and Protection-Failure
It seems plausible to assert that "a state's authority over territory is based at least 
in part in its providing protection to all its citizens — and that its retaining that 
authority is conditional on its continuing to do so."32 From this idea, an argument 
can be mounted in support of the claim that what we might call protection-failure (at 
the very least) weakens a state's claim to both internal sovereignty, i.e., final 
authority over all matters within its borders, and external sovereignty, i.e., 
"supremacy with respect to its relations with other political units beyond its 
borders."33 What one means by "protection" here is, of course, crucial to the 
acceptability of any argument for the weakening of the claims of sovereignty. The 
protection I consider here is the protection of the lives and vital interests of citizens - 
- the most important protections in which a state can engage — and, accordingly, 
failure on this score will be the most momentous type of protection-failure, and will 
constitute the strongest reason for limiting sovereignty claims. We should perhaps 
point out that a weakening of the claim to sovereignty need not entail any good 
reason for the introduction of external or transnational jurisdiction over some 
formerly sovereign territory. In an example offered by Allen Buchanan, Jews in 
Second World War Poland would have been justified in seceding from the Polish 
state, and setting up a new state in a part of Poland, because the Polish state was 
not protecting them from Nazi extermination plans.34 Thus a new claim to 
sovereignty is sometimes thought to be necessary in order to protect some group 
whose victimization is not being prevented by the existing state. The decision to 
accept the new state is presumably based in part on its potential for achieving the 
more important aim, namely, the protection of the victims, in this case the Jewish 
people. Note that no claim about the general admissibility (or inadmissibility) of 
external intervention is made here: that, again, depends on the prospects of 
intervention for bringing about the necessary security arrangements. I concur with
32 Allen Buchanan, 'Secession and Nationalism', in Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit (eds.), A 
Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy (London: Blackwell, 1993), 586-96, at 591, 
emphasis in original.
33 Ibid., 586.
34 Ibid., 591.
this judgement, but the point is that the injustice must be overcome, and it is 
advisable to overcome the injustice without secession if this is possible, as it will be 
in many cases by introducing internationally binding duties on states. The main idea 
I note here is that sovereignty should be taken seriously in the majority of cases, 
since denying its legitimacy could lead to international chaos.
The fact of "interconnectedness" of states, i.e., their mutual penetration in the 
lives of citizens and non-citizens alike, represents a serious problem for the 
defender of sovereignty who would emphasize the strictly national scope of political 
decision-making and of principles of political and economic organization. Of the 
many difficulties this interconnectedness introduces, perhaps the most important is 
a questioning of "the relevance of the nation-state, faced with unsettling patterns of 
national and international relations and processes, as the guarantor of the rights and 
duties of subjects."35 The question is whether nation-states are capable of achieving 
independently the rights-protections on which 'sovereigntism' -- the robust defence 
of state sovereignty -- would seem to depend. This point is a particular application 
of the 'ought implies can' principle: it is no good asserting that the development of 
individuality requires the maintenance of a society of sovereign states if it turns out 
that those states are not able to protect the preconditions for that development. And, 
faced with the facts of global interpenetration — where, for instance, 
environmentally momentous policy decisions made in one country directly affect the 
vital interests of individuals in another country who played no part in making those 
decisions -- it seems hard to deny that sovereign authority, traditionally understood, 
is not sufficient to ensure the means to individual security-protection (to say nothing 
about the means to protect broader interests in individual self-development). If the 
defence of sovereignty depends on the state's being sufficient for such protection, 
then that defence is fatally flawed, given contemporary global realities.36 Nominally 
sovereign states cannot guarantee the rights of their citizens independently of the 
actions of other states and of regional and international organizations.37
The links between constitutivism, sovereignty, and environmental degradation 
call for further comment. In addition to the benefits provided by an individual's
35 David Held, 'Democracy, the Nation-State and the Global System', in David Held (ed.), Political 
Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity, 1991), 204.
36 See Ibid.. 202. And see Henry Shue, 'Exporting Hazards' in Peter G. Brown and Henry Shue 
(eds.), Boundaries: National Autonomy and Its Limits (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 
1981), 107-45, and Andrew Hurrell, 'International Political Theory and the Global Environment', 
in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds.), International Political Theory Today (Oxford: Polity Press, 
1995), 129-53. See the reference to Hedley Bull in Held, 205, for the admission that this 
interconnectedness is not new.
37 One might object here that sovereignty is a legal term, and so is not concerned with political 
power. Hence sovereignty is preserved if the bindingness of international agreements derives from 
the will of states. The problem with this argument is that it ignores the facts to which I have 
drawn attention. No state can bind itself to do something which it cannot in fact do.
citizenship in a state, we should assess the damage created by constitutive 
attachments to see if that damage is not worse than that which would be caused by 
giving up those attachments. This will be one aspect of the project of assessing the 
reasons for and against the alternatives. In this context, it is relevant to mention the 
point that continued dependence upon the system of sovereign states will mean that 
serious collective action problems will remain, most importantly the problems 
associated with large-scale environmental degradation. When there are many actors, 
it will be hard to reach an international agreement on such matters. In this sort of 
case, the notion that the state is constitutive of an individual's identity does not look 
like such a strong point in favour of the state, for a person's constitutive 
attachments might end up contributing to a pattern of activity that does more harm 
than good.
On the other hand, the need for environmental cooperation and for sustainable 
development can be seen as deriving from  a concern for the basic human rights to 
subsistence and security. For, if ozone-depletion, rainforest destruction, and 
similarly serious trends are allowed to continue, it will ultimately be individual 
human beings who will suffer their effects. Hence, it follows from the commitment 
to protect rights to security and subsistence that one should be directly concerned 
with large-scale environmental degradation whose likely long-term consequences 
threaten the interests those rights are designed to protect. Again, it seems that a 
commitment to one's state might make it less likely that these large-scale global 
problems will be satisfactorily solved, so the ethical attraction of sovereignty 
appears to be weakened, even for neo-Hegelians who hold citizenship in such high 
regard.38
Let us return now to the relation between constitutive theory and rights protection. 
Mervyn Frost says that "states ought to be recognised and protected because it is 
only within states that individuals come to have the rights of citizens and this set of 
rights is constitutive of free individuality."39 The success of this rationale for the 
recognition of the legitimacy of states clearly depends on the plausibility of the 
claim that states do provide the conditions necessary to protect the rights of citizens. 
But then, if this claim is false in any particular case, the legitimacy of the state in 
question is likewise compromised, and constitutive theory is then unable to provide 
the rationale for attaching primary importance to actual sovereign states.
Frost believes that a
38 On the problems for sovereignty presented by global environmental problems, see Andrew 
Hurrell, 'International Political Theory and the Global Environment', 129-53, especially 147-51.
39 Mervyn Frost, 'Constituting a New World Order', Paradigms 8, No. 1, Summer 1994, 13-22, 
at 17.
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significant strength of constitutive theory is the way in which it links the 
settled norm that accords value to human rights with the norm that accords 
value to sovereign statehood. ... [Constitutive theory] demonstrates that 
sovereignty is not to be conceived of as an absolute value seen in isolation 
from other values. Those states claiming it for themselves are forced by 
constitutive theory to see that their sovereignty claims must be seen as 
bundled together with other norms. Where the states claiming sovereignty 
are not providing the other dimensions needed for freedom within their 
states, their claims are to that extent diminished.40
Hence Frost is explicit about the role of the sovereignty norm in his theory: 
sovereignty is legitimately claimed by states only when those states also meet other 
criteria (the rule of law, constitutional government, etc.), the most important of 
which for our purposes is the criterion that the human rights norm is recognized and 
honoured. According to constitutive theory, "to make a sovereign claim is ... to 
declare yourself open to inspection across a whole range of social values such as 
human rights, democracy, the rule of law, constitutional government, international 
law, and so on through the whole list of settled norms."41 This statement raises the 
following problem: What is to be done when some of the norms are honoured but 
others are not? I suggest that we then must attach priority to some norms as against 
others, and that the human rights norm is a good candidate for the most important 
norm of all. This is true not only for my own cosmopolitan theory but also for neo- 
Hegelian theory, since both approaches withhold approbation of states that do not 
provide the conditions for individual development. Consequently, we should deny 
the claim to sovereignty in cases where basic rights are not being protected. It 
follows that sovereignty cannot provide a free-standing reason for denying cross- 
border ethical concern with human rights because that concern with rights is one o f  
the tools we use to judge the plausibility o f any given claim to sovereignty.
Chris Brown notices a vital inconsistency in Frost's approach which, I think, 
explains the problems we have identified. It is the attempt to combine (i) a starting 
point in contemporary practice, with (ii) the need to distinguish states from one 
another from an ethical standpoint.
Part of the problem with Frost's formulation of these issues is a product of 
his desire to produce normative theory from the starting point of the ways in 
which normative issues are actually framed in the modem system of states. 
The first principle of prescriptive international relations, as promulgated by 
such bodies as the United Nations, is state sovereignty, and this notion is 
coupled with a refusal to distinguish between different kinds of states 42
40 Ibid., 17-18.
41 Ibid., 19.
42 Chris Brown, International Relations Theory , 121.
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Of course, this sort of refusal is entirely un-Hegelian, so if Frost indeed proceeds 
in this way then to an important extent he gives up an essential element of traditional 
constitutive theory, i.e., that only certain kinds of political arrangements count as 
ethically acceptable. But if, on the other hand, Frost wants to provide a theoretical 
framework from which present arrangements can be questioned, then he must deny 
any strong ethical appeal to contemporary practice. This latter approach is 
preferable, but it rules out Frost's central methodological move, i.e., to begin with 
the settled norms of current international political practice, for that would put 
sovereignty and human rights (to take the objects of the two most relevant norms) 
on an equal ethical footing.
Constitutive theory presents a fundamental objection to cosmopolitan political 
ethics. It is that the state is the largest independent ethical institution we have, 
whereas the cosmopolitan belief in the basic importance of 'humanity as a class' 
represents a utopian dream. Against this Hegelian celebration of the state, it should 
be noted that state sovereignty itself appears increasingly utopian in the light of the 
growing power of multinational corporations and other non-state influences (such 
as international religious movements).43
Accordingly, we might view Hegel — in true Hegelian fashion — as a creature of 
his time, in that he thought the sovereign state would (eventually) be able to provide 
for the actualization of human freedom, when in fact we can now see that 
developments since the 1820s have rendered his own view itself merely an instance 
of wishful thinking. Protecting the rights of everyone, and ensuring for them the 
means to self-development, are not purposes that states in the contemporary world 
can achieve. We are therefore led to search for alternative means to actualizing these 
worthy goals, and a continued attachment to sovereignty as a necessary condition of 
justice in the world is, on this account, an obstacle to be overcome rather than a 
desirable feature of current arrangements.
8.7, Poverty. Human Rights, and State Sovereignty
Of direct relevance to the neo-Hegelian project of reconciling the norm of human 
rights with the norm of state sovereignty is the existence of poverty on a large scale. 
Interestingly, Hegel himself addresses this problem, though only in a domestic 
context, realizing that poverty -  the condition of destitution and need which means 
that the poor person cannot properly participate in social life — represents a threat to 
the idea that the modem state is rational and therefore ethical44 At a very basic and 
important level, poverty constitutes a social evil. "The enjoyment of the
43 Allen W. Wood, Hegel's Ethical Thought, 30.
44 G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, §§ 241-45.
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administration of justice is often made very difficult for [the poor]. Their medical 
care is usually very bad. Even if they receive treatment for actual illnesses, they lack 
the means necessary for the preservation and care of their health ..."45
In his discussion of poverty, Hegel notes that private charity is not sufficient to 
deal with this problem: not only is it unreliable and hence ineffective, but it is also 
"unjustly humiliating" for the recipient.46 What is needed is public action to 
eradicate poverty, but for Hegel the two different forms of this solution are both 
unsatisfactory. First, the poor can be helped with the proceeds of taxation of the 
wealthy. But this violates the principle of civil society according to which each 
person must earn his own keep by engaging in productive labour. Alternatively, the 
state might itself employ the poor in large public works projects, thereby honouring 
the aforementioned principle of civil society. The problem with this second 
proposal is that it would result in overproduction, i.e., one of the causes that 
generated a poor underclass in the first place. Hegel can therefore see no way to 
solve the problem of poverty 47
If we take seriously the idea that each person is a rights-bearer who should be 
accorded equal consideration, the existence of a large class of desperately poor 
people is cause for concern. And if there is no way out of this situation, it is unclear 
precisely why Hegel held to his view that the modem state is fundamentally rational 
and ethical. We might propose instead that a state -- or a society of states — lacks 
ethical credentials at a very deep level insofar as it permits or even requires 
widespread poverty.
A modem solution might reject the Hegelian requirement of full employment and 
substitute the notion that individuals should engage in some productive work some 
of the time, thereby averting the difficulties associated with overproduction. 
Weakening one's commitment to the full employment condition in this way might 
still violate Hegel's principle of civil society, but the fact that this violation can also 
be described as a necessary condition o f the eradication o f poverty might be thought 
to add to its plausibility as an instrument of policy. In any case, even if  one acts 
upon Hegel's preferred solution, to leave the poor to beg from the public,48 one is 
still left with the problem of poverty as well as the violation of the principle of civil 
society directing everyone to work for their livelihood (unless one understands 
begging to be a form of productive labour). Moreover, the idea that individuals are
45 From an anonymous transcription of Hegel's 1819-1820 lectures on the Philosophy of Right, 
quoted in Allen W. Wood (ed.), Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 453.
46 G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, § 253R.
47 Cf. Shlomo Avineri, Hegel's Theory of the Modem State (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1972), 154.
48 G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, § 245R.
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constituted by their community — i.e., the fundamental premiss of Hegelian political 
theory -- is surely strengthened by the realization that destitution is avoidable for 
some individuals only when the productive surplus of their community is utilized to 
ensure that each of them is guaranteed a certain social minimum.
The upshot of this short discussion of poverty is that redistributive taxation is an 
ethically acceptable way of dealing with large-scale impoverishment. In addition, if 
each human being has a right to be exempt from the hardships to which poverty 
gives rise, it is unacceptable to contain redistribution within nation-state boundaries, 
for such a limitation threatens to leave many individuals in poverty.
8.8. Rejection of an Argument for the Necessity of a 
Society of States
I promised earlier in this chapter to discuss an argument in support of the claim 
that a society of sovereign states is a requirement of a global institutional 
arrangement that satisfies the demand to develop individuality. I will now consider 
such an argument, first setting it out in outline and then discussing its plausibility.
Premiss 1: The modem state, in its constitutional, ethical form, is a necessary 
condition of the full development of the individuality of citizens.
[Premiss A: (Support for Premiss 2): Individuals are what they are only when 
they are recognized as individuals by other individuals. It is a precondition of the 
development of individuality that there are individuals who recognize each other.]
Premiss 2: Similarly [see Premiss A], states are what they are only when they are 
recognized as states by other states. Sovereign statehood requires states who 
recognize each other. (And there cannot be citizens if there are no states.)
Therefore,
Conclusion: The development of individuality requires a world of independent, 
sovereign states.
Our first task is to determine whether this argument is valid. First, notice that 
premiss A is not part of the main argument: it is rather a defence of premiss 2; thus 
within the main argument we have an argument by analogy with premiss 2 as its 
conclusion. I will return to this internal argument shortly. Secondly, if a certain 
type of state structure is necessary for individuality, and if states cannot exist 
without recognition from other states, then it follows that individuality cannot 
develop in the absence of a plurality of states. The main argument is, therefore, a 
valid argument, since — if its premisses are true -- a single, global state structure 
would not be a state in the proper sense of the word, for it would lack the necessary 
other-recognition.
We should now consider acceptability of the premisses. Is premiss 1 acceptable? 
Let us assume its truth for the sake of argument. I will ultimately reject the
181
argument without rejecting this premiss. I should note, however, that opponents of 
Hegelianism can maintain that individuality can develop in the context of a society 
of states whose sovereignty is strictly limited by overarching principles whose 
application overrides individuality-threatening measures.
Is premiss 2 acceptable? I think it is not. My rejection of the argument hinges on 
my dismissal of this premiss. That is, I think that there could be, in principle, a 
state which was not recognized by any other state. A world-state would be such a 
state. Now the Hegelian denial of this claim works by introducing premiss A, i.e., 
an analogy between states and individuals. So we need to consider whether the 
analogical argument succeeds.
First, it should be pointed out that the reasoning is plausible with respect to the 
claims about human individuality. At any rate, I will grant that an individual needs 
other individuals if his or her own individuality is to be recognized: proper 
recognition of one's individuality can come only from others who stand on a 
roughly equal footing with oneself.49 Hence I will not question premiss A. 
Secondly, the two cases (individual and state) are relevantly dissimilar and, 
consequently, one can accept premiss A and deny premiss 2. The argument is 
formally invalid, and it is also weak when considered as a plausibilistic (non- 
deductive) argument. This is because the reasons that function to support the claim 
that individuality requires otherness do not apply in the case of states. States are not 
individuals in the same sense that human beings are individuals, nor is their 
'individuality' a matter of ethical concern in the same way that human individuality 
is evidently important.
I take the main argument to be weak because its second premiss is implausible 
and unsupported. But let us consider what would be entailed by our acceptance of 
the argument's conclusion, that the development of individuality requires a world of 
independent, sovereign states. If this conclusion is accepted, must we deny that 
internal injustice is to be condemned (except in extreme cases)? I take it that this 
would depend on how we understand "sovereign" in this context, and if 
sovereignty implies absolute and final authority -- and rules out external standard- 
setting or external enforcement — then (for reasons given earlier in this chapter), 
since justice would be an internal matter, we would be committed to an unpalatable 
view about international ethics: internal injustice would be a strictly internal matter. 
Finally, even if we were to accept that sovereign statehood does require recognition 
of one's state by other states, this will not answer the fundamental question at
49 Hegel's own discussion of the need for recognition by equally regarded others takes up a 
significant part of the Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1977), especially the sections on 'Master and Slave', Stoicism and Scepticism, 
and the Unhappy Consciousness.
issue, namely, that sovereignty itself requires some defence against the objection 
that some global legal structure (i.e., a structure that imposes some limits on 
sovereignty) would protect individuality in cases where sovereign states would 
threaten it.
Conclusion
In this conclusion I want to confront some issues that were not directly addressed 
in any of the preceding discussions. I can only gesture at solutions to the problems 
presented, but at the very least the reader should get an idea of some of the 
additional topics I consider relevant to the problem of global justice.
I have focused in this work on the main cosmopolitan theories of justice along 
with the most serious communitarian challenges to the global implications of 
universalist moral theorizing, but I have not been able to address many of the 
problems communitarians claim to detect in the cosmopolitan strategy. There is 
perhaps one fundamental communitarian objection to rights-based approaches to 
justice which has not yet been discussed. It runs as follows: the focus on individual 
rights will lead to social divisions between persons which, in turn, will make it 
impossible to sustain even the type of community favoured by defenders of rights. I 
think this notion, that there can be no such thing as a ’rights-based community', is 
generated by a fundamental misunderstanding of what rights are and what social 
frameworks are necessary if rights are to be protected. No right is properly 
recognized unless the duties to which it gives rise are themselves acknowledged in 
practice; hence a rights-based community fosters social bonds of a very specific 
kind. It should be noticed that this type of community is quite clearly preferable to a 
so-called 'community' in which social ties are founded, not on the recognition of 
the equally legitimate claims of each person as a moral being, but on some 
traditional conception of the proper place of each person in the social hierarchy. If 
communities are to recognize the importance of each and every relevant individual, 
they would do well to take rights seriously by making honest commitment to the 
community conditional upon the background protections rights provide.
This work has defended a moral cosmopolitan approach to international justice.1 
But moral cosmopolitanism does not entail institutional cosmopolitanism, where the 
latter signifies 'world government' or a global political structure in which 
supranational institutions would have significantly more power than they now 
have.2 Nevertheless, I have argued that there are good reasons for moral 
cosmopolitans to take seriously the idea that governmental powers above the level 
of the state might produce greater benefits for the class of persons in whom they 
take an interest (i.e., the class of all persons, regardless of race, class, sex,
1 See Chapter One for a discussion of the distinction between cosmopolitanism and 
communitarianism as alternative moral perspectives.
2 For the distinction between moral cosmopolitanism and institutional cosmopolitanism, see 
Charles Beitz, 'Cosmopolitanism liberalism and the states system', in Chris Brown (ed.), Political 
Restructuring in Europe: Ethical Perspectives (London: Routledge, 1994), 124.
nationality, or citizenship). I do not intend to defend world government in any 
detail; instead I will mention a common complaint against it and attempt to weaken 
the force of that complaint. Institutional cosmopolitanism must face at least one 
major ethical objection. World government, it is argued, would entail an extreme 
concentration of power and consequent danger of tyranny, thereby putting in 
jeopardy the very rights that governments exist to protect.3 The attempt to achieve 
justice through global institutional mechanisms is, according to this criticism, 
almost inevitably self-defeating.
This objection is usually offered by those who seek to defend something close to 
the institutional status quo, and the dangers of concentration of power are difficult 
to deny. Nevertheless, the objection does not show that the status quo is preferable 
to some alternative arrangement. The problem is that there is more than one way to 
avert the dangers of an absolutist global state. One way is to divide the world into 
territorially distinct sovereign states in which the functions of government and the 
rights of persons are confined within specific borders. Another way is to 
distinguish the tasks of government functionally rather than territorially, i.e., to 
ensure that there is a separation of government functions, with appropriate checks 
and balances.4 This functional approach is in fact the way we deal with the potential 
for tyranny at the nation-state level: we do not protect against government tyranny 
by requiring states to split up into smaller units.
If the case against global state structures (at least for some purposes) implicitly 
relies on the claim that the present arrangement successfully counteracts tyranny, 
then it is worth pointing out — as we did in Chapter Eight — that sovereign states are 
themselves often the cause of the rights-violations of their citizens. Accordingly, 
rejecting a world state is no guarantee that tyranny will be overcome. Quite the 
contrary. Refusal to set up and maintain global structures can in some cases 
endanger the very preconditions of a just society (e.g., by failing to ensure that 
environmental standards are maintained both at home and abroad).
I would like to address just one final objection, namely, that the principled 
approach to international justice outlined in these pages is an exercise in utopianism. 
Are the arguments put forward here irrelevant to any ‘real world’ concern with 
improving the global situation? One tempting response is simply to say that, if a 
commitment to defensible ethical principles does in fact commit us to providing the
3 A statement of this objection, from a theorist whose sympathies lie with the moral 
cosmopolitans, can be found in John Rawls, 'The Law of Peoples', in Stephen Shute and Susan 
Hurley (eds.), On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993 (New York: Basic Books, 
1993), 54-55.
4 This suggestion, along with several others, is offered by Onora O'Neill in her illuminating 
essay, 'Justice and boundaries', in Chris Brown (ed.), Political Restructuring in Europe: Ethical 
Perspectives (London: Routledge, 1994), 69-88 , at 71-72.
means to protect all persons in their basic human rights, then no accusations of 
utopianism should deter us from recognizing the obligations to which rights give 
rise. Powerful people, of course, will deny these conclusions, for they find it 
difficult to accept measures that run contrary to what they perceive to be their 
interests. As Thomas Hobbes put it, "Potent men, digest hardly anything that 
setteth up a power to bridle their affections".5 But an argument for a particular 
conclusion about moral obligations is not refuted by pointing out that those who 
refuse to follow the argument will not act in accordance with what it requires of us.
There are enormous difficulties standing in the way of implementing the kind of 
redistribution required by the commitment to basic human rights. However, this 
sort of worry should be distinguished from the moral arguments themselves. No 
doubt, there were massive obstacles standing in the way of the abolition of slavery 
in early-nineteenth century America. An analogous objection to the one we are now 
considering could have been put by someone who objected to morally-based calls 
for abolition. To call for the complete abolition of slavery, it could plausibly have 
been said, is utopian, for too many powerful people have a vested interest in its 
continuation. With this sort of idea in mind, people did, in fact, recommend more 
“realistic” measures, for instance, introducing regulations that would ensure better 
treatment for slaves. I assume that, even if we recognize that such proposals were 
well-meant, we nonetheless must judge that they were seriously inadequate to 
address the root problem. Similarly, present-day attempts to appease powerful 
states and other influential agencies merely provide support for the claim that their 
power entitles them to ignore the full force of ethical arguments suggesting that the 
interests of the weak should be better protected.
My claim is that reasonable persons can be convinced that the requirements 
defended in this work are feasible. I do not say there are any easy solutions, only 
that no fundamental restructuring of human nature is necessary to bring about the 
obligatory changes. If the demands of the theory are not too demanding on persons, 
then we can avoid the objection that our conclusions are “excessively high- 
minded.”6 I have suggested on more than one occasion that the demands of a 
defensible cosmopolitan approach to international distributive justice need not be 
too great for human beings to bear.
5 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan , C.B. Macpherson (ed.), (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), Chapter 
30, 379. (First published in 1651.)
6 Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 21.
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